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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates how the ‘spatialisation’ of green technologies influences opportunities 
to realise green growth from different industrial activities – an aspect of green growth which 
is currently underrepresented in the literature.  The research compiles various datasets 
representing world-wide indicators of innovation and manufacturing, as well as interviews 
with researchers and industrial actors in different economies, to investigate the spatialisation 
of solar photovoltaic (PV) industries. The overarching purpose is to examine whether 
domestic economies need both innovation and manufacturing in order to supply green 
technologies.  
 
The thesis comprises of four standalone chapters (Chapter 2 to 5) that explore this question 
by applying evolutionary economic geography (EEG) theory on the concept of green growth. 
The first chapter (Chapter 2) develops a conceptual framework on how the spatialisation of 
technologies affects the composition of industrial activities in various economies. It argues 
the localisation of green innovation enables economies to be resilient to the loss in 
manufacturing. The second chapter (Chapter 3) demonstrates that both ‘first-mover’ and 
‘late-comer’ economies contribute towards solar PV innovation, despite the majority of 
global manufacturing shifting to China. The third chapter (Chapter 4) finds patterns of 
research collaboration between different countries based on their respective 
innovation/manufacturing intensities. The last chapter (Chapter 5) explores how the 
presence (or absence) of domestic manufacturing influences actors’ commercialisation of 
different solar PV technologies.  
 
The findings seek to advance the competitiveness debate by recognising the tension between 
the internationalisation of green technologies and the realisation of green growth in domestic 
economies.  First, it argues that economies realise long-term green growth by retaining high-
value activities that other economies cannot reproduce. Second, it recognises that an 
economy does not need both innovation and manufacturing to commercialise green 
technologies, but that the propensity to rely on local resources is influenced by the domestic 
industrial composition and the maturity of a technology. These findings emphasise that 
industrial policies should consider spatial characteristics in assessing whether domestic green 
technology supply and/or markets will lead to green growth in the domestic economy.   
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Chapter 1: Thesis introduction 
The internationalisation of green technologies and the implications of 
realising green growth 
 
“Meanwhile, China is not waiting to revamp its economy. Germany is not waiting. India’s not 
waiting. These nations are not standing still. These nations are not playing for second place…They’re 
making serious investments in clean energy because they want those jobs. Well I do not accept second 
place for the United States of America… Because the nation that leads the clean energy economy, is 
the nation that leads the global economy. And America must be that nation.”  
– President Barack Obama, 2010 State of the Union Address 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Domestic support for green technologies undergoes techno-national debates as both 
developed and emerging economies invest in green industries (Barua, Tawney, & Weischer, 
2012; Dutz & Sharma, 2012). The race for green technologies implies that domestic 
economies’ opportunities to realise green growth is threatened by global competition. The 
current literature addresses this issue by undertaking empirical analysis of which countries 
have been successful in green innovation (Fankhauser et al., 2013; Johnstone, Haščič, & 
Popp, 2009).  This literature is certainly relevant to understanding the importance of 
innovation. It is less adept at explaining why manufacturing of green technologies can still 
shift to foreign economies – thereby appearing to invalidate the long-term growth rationale 
for green industrial policy. Another set of literature compares how various countries develop 
national innovation systems for green technologies – including those who entered the 
industry through manufacturing (Bergek et al., 2008; Kamp, Smits, & Andriesse, 2004; Lo, 
Wang, & Huang, 2013). Though this literature does highlight the different approaches 
countries take in establishing green industries, it does not consider how the spatial dynamics 
of technologies can affect the amount of economic growth countries can realise from these 
industries.  Understanding the spatial shifts of industrial activities – and the implications on 
value-added to the economy – are important in addressing when and how various economies 
can realise green growth.  
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Therefore this thesis investigates how the spatialisation of green technologies influences 
opportunities to realise green growth from different industrial activities.  Its first aim is to 
demonstrate how an evolutionary economic geography (EEG) perspective is useful to green 
growth literature. First, EEG recognises how the spatial characteristics of technologies affect 
where industrial activities locate as technologies mature. Second, these spatial characteristics 
have implications about the levels of economic value that economies can achieve from 
innovation and manufacturing activities in the short and long-term.  Third, these spatial 
dynamics can provide a balanced assessment of whether green growth in the domestic 
economy will be realised from domestic supply and/or domestic markets for green 
technologies. 
 
The second aim of the thesis is to examine whether domestic economies need both 
innovation and manufacturing in order to commercialise green technologies. Both EEG and 
systems failure literature argue that both research and industrial actors need to be located 
close to each other in order to enable continuous learning feedback loops (Woolthuis, 
Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005; Ponds, van Oort, & Frenken, 2007).  However this thesis 
considers countries that have high technological capabilities but low industrial capacity. 
Technological capabilities refer to the ability of economies to manage technological change – 
including the ability to commercialise technologies (Bell & Pavitt, 1997; Watson et al., 2014). 
Industrial capacity simply refers to an economy’s ability to manufacture existing technologies 
(Bell & Albu, 1999; Lall, 1994). Does the lack of a domestic industry jeopardise these 
countries ability to commercialise technologies?  
 
This thesis uses the solar photovoltaic (PV) industry as a case study to explore these aims. 
The research compiled various datasets representing global-wide indicators of innovation and 
manufacturing between 1990 and 2012. The data also include interviews with solar PV 
researchers and industrial actors who are based in different economies. In doing so, it can 
compare how countries’ composition of research and manufacturing in solar PV technologies 
changed in two different time periods. The first time period (1990-2004) characterises the 
dominance of ‘first-mover’ countries (such as Japan, USA and Germany) in contributing to 
both global research and manufacturing (Liebreich, 2011). These countries are characterised 
as first-movers because they engaged in the early commercialisation for these technologies. 
The second time period (2005-2012) is an inflection point when China – as a late entrant 
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(a.k.a. late-comer) increased its industrial capacity to surpass the size of first-mover countries 
(Zindler, 2012).  
 
Therefore exploring the research and manufacturing dynamics of the solar PV industry is 
useful to this thesis’s research for two reasons. It can juxtapose countries’ contributions to 
global research and manufacturing in these time periods to see whether shifts in 
manufacturing result in similar spatial shifts in research. The purpose is to ascertain how the 
spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing changes over time at the global 
level. Second it can identify cross-sections of countries that demonstrate various levels of 
technological capabilities and industrial capacity. Therefore through comparing research 
collaborations of these countries, along with the findings from the interviews, the thesis can 
discuss how the presence (or absence) of domestic industry affects these research actors’ 
commercialisations efforts.  
 
Aside from the introduction and conclusion chapters, the thesis is divided into four 
standalone chapters. Chapter 2 develops a conceptual framework on how the spatialisation of 
technologies affects the composition of industrial activities in various economies. It argues 
the ‘localisation’ of green innovation enables economies to be resilient to the loss in 
manufacturing. Chapter 3 demonstrates that both first-mover and ‘late-comer’ economies 
contribute towards solar PV innovation. These developments occur despite the majority of 
global manufacturing for crystalline PV products shifting to China. Chapter 4 finds patterns 
of who foreign countries undertake research collaborations with, based on their own level of 
technological capabilities/industrial capacities. Chapter 5 explores how the presence (or 
absence) of domestic manufacturing influences actors’ commercialisation efforts in different 
solar PV technologies.  
 
The findings seek to advance the competitiveness debate by recognising the tension between 
the spatialisation of technologies and ‘localisation’ of green growth.  First it argues that 
economies realise long-term green growth by retaining high-value activities that other 
economies cannot reproduce – i.e. demonstrating their resilience to global competition. 
Second it recognises that an economy does not necessarily need both innovation and 
manufacturing to commercialise green technologies. However the propensity to rely on local 
resources is influenced by the domestic industrial composition and the maturity of a 
technology – a nuance that is currently not explicitly found in the EEG literature. These 
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findings emphasise that industrial policies targeted towards specific green technologies 
should pay attention to their spatial characteristics. Broader green growth literature can also 
use this spatial framework to consider how countries competitiveness in green technologies is 
based on this concept of resilience.  
 
This rest of this introductory chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 covers the key 
literature associated with each aim of this thesis, highlighting the gaps in the literature that 
this thesis seeks to address. This section ends by writing key conceptual questions that can 
help in addressing these gaps. Section 3 describes the data that were gathered on the solar PV 
industry to explore these questions. Section 4 then provides an introduction to each chapter, 
focusing on how its findings can address the gaps in the literature. Section 5 ends with 
concluding remarks.   
 
1.2 The need to re-examine the claims of green growth 
 
1.2.1 Key premises of green growth 
 
Most academic discourse on green growth is largely discussed within the environmental 
policy literature. The concept of green growth has arisen after the start of the global 
economic recession in 2008 (Barbier, 2010; Bowen et al., 2009). Facing the global crises of 
economic recessions and climate change, international organizations and national 
governments are structuring policies to encourage investments in industrial activities that 
reduce adverse impacts to the environment (Ekins, 2014; Robins, Clover, & Singh, 2009).  
Such economic activities include research, development and deployment (RD&D) of green 
technologies – that is, those technologies that reduce the environmental impacts of the 
economy. Establishing these industries can provide economic growth through the creation of 
new industries, markets, and associated jobs (Hepburn & Bowen, 2012). 
 
The concept of green growth stems from a rich background literature in environmental 
policy. The attraction of the term is that it is able to reconcile the priorities of sustaining 
natural capital whilst simultaneously creating endogenous economic growth opportunities 
(UNEP, 2011). This concept is perhaps best encapsulated in the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (OECD 2011, p.8) definition of green growth, which states: 
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“Green growth means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that natural assets 
continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies. To do this 
it must catalyse investment and innovation which will underpin sustained growth and give rise to new 
economic opportunities.”  
 
Thus the three key aspects of green growth are (Hallegatte et al., 2011; Jacobs, 2012): 
1. The need to sustainably preserve natural capital in the process of economic 
development. 
2. That innovation (both technological and organizational) can be used to significantly 
decrease the impact on the environment. 
3. Such innovation can provide long-run economic growth opportunities through 
improving production efficiencies, whilst creating new industries and markets in 
domestic economies. 
Nevertheless even within environmental policy circles, green growth faces critiques. The first 
critique focuses on whether green technological innovation is a viable and sufficient solution 
in ensuring the sustainable management of environmental resources (Neumayer, 2003). 
These critiques stem from ‘limits to growth’ and ‘strong sustainability’ theories (Fitzpatrick, 
2011). Their main underlying idea is that the global economy has exceeded the earth’s 
ecological thresholds (Huesemann, 2003). Environmental policies are necessary to limit 
resource consumption and pollution – even if it imposes severe costs on economic growth 
(Meadows, Meadows, & Randers, 2004).   
 
Though not necessarily a critique, literature on green growth focuses on the challenges on 
developing and deploying green technologies in the economy. These include the need to 
overcome market failures that do not account for the costs of pollution (particularly 
greenhouse gases); underinvestment in RD&D in green innovation; techno-institutional lock-
ins in fossil fuel-dependent economies; and various government failures that inhibit the 
organizational changes needed to invest and deploy green technologies (Barbier, 2010; 
Hallegatte et al., 2011; Stern & Rydge, 2013). These market and government failures indicate 
the obstacles within the domestic economy that prevent the realisation of green growth.  
This thesis is interested in critically examining the third premise of green growth that focuses 
on endogenous economic growth. The justification of policy investments in developing green 
industries is that it can realise economic growth by selling technologies to domestic and 
foreign markets (Barua, Tawney, & Weischer, 2012). These include economies that 
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indigenously innovate technologies, as well as those who enter the industry through 
manufacturing them. Consequently more economies are participating in the supply of green 
technologies (Zindler, 2012). Thus it becomes more challenging for individual economies to 
realise green growth from selling green technologies. It should be noted that this global 
competition occurs when there are low trade barriers that enable a plurality of firms to access 
domestic and foreign markets (Karp & Stevenson, 2012).  
 
This first aim of the thesis is to integrate a more spatial perspective of technologies to 
understand which economies can benefit from green growth. This perspective is relevant as 
more countries compete in supplying these technologies to domestic and global markets. 
This perspective is also conceptually unique to other literature on green growth because it 
focuses on how spatial characteristics of technologies affects where industrial activities locate 
over time – and its implications on levels of green growth in different countries. Therefore it 
can address both short term and long-term green growth opportunities for different 
economies – not just from supply-side activities, but also from markets.  
 
Whilst other studies have used specific measures of innovation and trade data to undertake 
this comparison, this thesis will use datasets of both innovation and manufacturing of solar 
PV data to undertake empirical comparisons. The purpose is to understand how the 
industrial composition of innovation and manufacturing within an economy changes over 
time – and how this compares to other countries. By being able to undertake this analysis, 
this thesis questions how the presence (or absence) of domestic industries affects research 
actors propensity to leverage domestic or international partners. This question underlies the 
second aim of the thesis. It therefore contributes to the literature in EEG by discussing how 
the size of domestic industries can influence patterns in international research collaborations. 
The following sub-sections will review the current literature that addresses these aims, and its 
limitations in explaining relevant spatial dynamics.  
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1.2.2 First aim: Integrate insight from EEG to understand which economies 
can realise green growth 
 
The international configuration of manufacturing of several green industries has changed in 
the span of a few years. An increasing amount of green technology manufacturing has shifted 
to East Asian economies, particularly in the solar and wind industries. By 2010, Chinese 
producers accounted for over 50% of the global supply for solar PV and wind technologies 
(Liebreich, 2011). This radical increase in manufacturing supply has led to the plummet of 
global technological prices, thus making it increasingly difficult for firms located in states 
with higher production costs to compete. Between 2008 and 2012, prices for solar PV 
modules decreased by 80% whilst onshore wind turbines decreased by 29% (Liebreich, 
2013). For green growth policy-makers, the challenge is to consider how to make domestic 
green industries resilient to global competition. 
 
One potential solution for policy-makers is to institute policies that favour the domestic 
industrial base. These policies can include increasing import barriers, or imposing local 
content rules for technologies. In the case of the solar PV industry, manufacturing coalitions 
in the United States and EU have lodged anti-competitive cases against Chinese solar PV 
manufacturers (Zindler, 2012).  The combination of low global prices and tariffs against their 
modules has led to increased distress amongst Chinese solar PV companies (Chase, 2013).  It 
is acknowledged that like solar PV companies in the West, there will be major consolidations 
happening in the Chinese solar industry (Chase, 2013). These dynamics raise key political 
economy issues of the salience in investing in green industrial policy if it does not actually 
lead to green growth for the domestic economy.  
 
Current environmental policy literature addresses this political economy issue by using 
different measures of innovation – particularly patents– to identify which countries can 
innovate green technologies (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2014; Johnstone et al., 2009). 
Environmental policy literature also evaluates the success of environmental policy 
instruments in stimulating green innovation (Ambec et al., 2013; Lanoie et al., 2011).  These 
literatures are useful in terms of making comparisons between countries, especially with 
regards to the levels of technological capabilities. However this literature is less adept at 
addressing the political economy concern of whether having high technological capabilities is 
sufficient in appropriating the economic benefits of innovating technologies in the long-run.  
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This question arises as countries with lower technological capabilities transfer these 
technologies to build their own industrial capacity (Fu & Zhang, 2011; Lewis & Wiser, 2007; 
Wu & Mathews, 2012; Zhou et al., 2012).  The resulting increase in industrial capacity in 
these late-comer countries – particularly China – undermines the industrial capacity of 
countries that first commercialised these technologies (Barua et al., 2012; Dutz & Sharma, 
2012). First-mover economies’ industrial capacity becomes threatened by the increase in 
production volume of green technologies either directly (through imports of cheaper 
technologies) or indirectly (by depressing global market prices for these technologies) 
(BNEF, 2014). Certain sets of academic literature suggest that latecomers’ appropriation of 
global markets demonstrates the relevance of latecomer advantage over first-mover 
advantage (Mathews, 2013; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2013; Wu & Mathews, 2012). However this 
literature also ignores how the margins of economic value from manufacturing these 
technologies also decrease with the increase in global volumes – thereby limiting long-term 
growth opportunities. Therefore though latecomer advantage does enable these countries to 
enter these industries to realise green growth through manufacturing these technologies – it 
does not make these economies immune to global supply and demand dynamics.  
 
Another set of literature thus becomes useful in taking an in-depth look at how various 
countries develop national innovation systems (NIS) to commercialise the next generation of 
technologies, or engage with innovations that reduce production costs (Buen, 2006; Foxon et 
al., 2005; Lo et al., 2013; Tang & Hussler, 2011). Both of these innovative activities can 
improve the competitive positioning growth opportunities of these economies (Maskell & 
Malmberg, 1999). Nevertheless the in-depth focus on individual countries – or a set of 
countries within the same category– does not enable direct comparisons between first-mover 
and late-comer countries. In surveying the empirical literature on both first-mover and late-
comer countries’ innovation systems for green technologies, a striking difference appears on 
the emphasis on having access to domestic markets versus access to domestic manufacturing. 
NIS of first-movers stresses the importance of demand policies and strategic niche markets 
(SNM) to enable the commercialisation of technologies (Foxon & Pearson, 2008; Schot & 
Geels, 2008; Verbong, Geels, & Raven, 2008). SNM were especially important in creating 
user-producer feedbacks to improve technology design and integration into broader market 
infrastructures (Geels & Raven, 2006; Kamp et al., 2004). The importance of user-producer 
linkages to enable increased technological capabilities is already quite well-developed within 
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NIS and international development literature (D’Costa, 2012; Henderson et al., 2002; Lewis 
& Wiser, 2007).  
 
However the literature on late-comers emphasise the importance of having access to 
manufacturing facilities to enable technological learning (Atkinson et al., 2009; Mathews & 
Cho, 2000; Nahm & Steinfeld, 2013). Domestic firms increase RD&D efforts, whilst also 
partnering with both domestic and foreign research actors to undertake innovation (Fan & 
Hu, 2007; Lazonick, 2004; Tang & Hussler, 2011). If having access to domestic industry is 
important to enable technological learning, how does the shift – or at least, diminished size –
of domestic manufacturing affect first-movers’ opportunities to engage in similar kinds of 
technological learning?  
 
This thesis thus seeks to address certain conceptual gaps in the current literature on green 
growth. First, it explicitly recognises that green industrial policy is subject to domestic 
political economy expectations. More specifically, states are interested in ensuring that public 
investments from green technologies are maximised within the local economy to realise green 
growth. However the ability for late-comers to appropriate market shares in green 
technologies appears to undermine the importance of innovation – an outcome that studies 
on green innovation do not fully address. This thesis argues that late-comers appropriation of 
global market shares does not necessarily signal long-run economic growth if the margins of 
technologies decrease with increased production volumes. In fact, it also leaves these 
economies to be vulnerable to global oversupply. Therefore it recognises that value-added 
from manufacturing changes over time as global production increases – another aspect that is 
under-appreciated in the current literature. Therefore the main conceptual gap is to 
understand why industrial activities shift across national borders at different stages of a 
technologies maturity – and the implications on green growth opportunities for different 
economies.  
 
These conceptual gaps and questions are best addressed through using literature from EEG. 
EEG is a useful literature as it considers how the spatial relationship between innovation, 
manufacturing and markets changes over the course of a technology’s development 
(Boschma & Frenken, 2006). Through analysing the spatial product life cycle (PLC), it 
demonstrates how these industrial activities locate in economies where comparative 
advantage exists (Vernon, 1966). These spatial dynamics ffect how different economies can 
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realise economic growth, and highlights how much value-added these economies can receive 
based on understanding which economies compete in the different industrial activities (Amin 
& Thrift, 1992; Hassink, 2010; Pike, Dawley, & Tomaney, 2010).Therefore EEG is especially 
useful in redressing first-mover versus latecomer advantage through using the concept of 
resilience (Christopherson, Michie, & Tyler, 2010). This concept recognises how the spatial 
characteristics of technologies and industrial activities affect economies’ exposure to 
competition in innovation and manufacturing. Through this framework, EEG emphasises 
why it is important for both academic literature and policy-makers to understand the spatial 
and temporal dynamics of different green technologies. These spatial dynamics have 
implication on both short and long-term opportunities for green growth in different 
economies. 
 
1.2.3 Second aim: Do domestic economies need domestic manufacturing to 
sustain domestic innovation efforts?  
 
Whilst EEG generally argues that both innovation and manufacturing activities can be 
spatially distant after commercialisation of technologies, this literature does argue that the 
relationships between these two activities are much more spatially proximate prior to 
commercialisation (Asheim, Coenen, & Vang, 2007; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Storper, 
1997). This literature argues that the spatial proximity between these activities is needed to 
enable continuous interactive learning in testing new technologies; and to establish trust 
amongst partner actors in order to restrict knowledge spillovers with external actors (Storper 
& Venables, 2004).  
 
The need for spatial proximity is also supported in the systems failure approach to 
innovation systems (Woolthuis et al., 2005). Innovation systems refer to how actors work 
within networks and institutional settings to engage with the process of innovation (Lundvall 
et al., 2002). These actors do not just include scientists and industrial firms, but entrepreneurs 
as well (Woolthuis et al., 2005). The systems failure approach argues that the failure of 
creating internal networks between innovative actors such as scientists, industrial actors and 
entrepreneurs leads to difficulties in “crossing the valley of death” (Markham et al., 2010). 
This analogy refers to when product innovations fail to achieve market commercialisation – 
thereby leaving these innovations on the shelf.  
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EEG recognises how certain innovation clusters – particularly neo-Marshallian districts – 
create specialised industrial districts that provides innovative actors access to domestic 
industry in order to engage in commercialisation activities (Amin & Thrift, 1992; Etzkowitz 
& Leydesdorff, 2000).  In fact, industries tend to locate in these innovation clusters to also 
benefit from knowledge spillovers from University RD&D (Lee & Win, 2004; Østergaard, 
2009). In fact, literature on the development of national systems of learning for late-comers 
economies emphasise the importance of having access to manufacturing facilities to enable 
technological learning (Fan, 2006; Lei et al., 2011; Mathews & Cho, 2000). Domestic firms 
increase RD&D efforts, whilst also partnering with both domestic and foreign research 
actors to undertake innovation.  
 
What both of these literatures emphasise is the importance of spatial proximity in engaging in 
early stage commercialisation of technologies. Furthermore both of these literatures assume 
that innovative clusters have these industries within their own economy. Therefore if having 
access to domestic industry is important to enable technological learning, how does the shift 
– or at least, diminished size –of domestic manufacturing affect first-movers opportunities to 
engage in similar kinds of technological learning?  The second aim thus considers whether 
economies engaged in the innovation of technologies do need access to domestic industry in 
order to engage in commercialisation activities. 
 
 
1.3 Datasets used for the empirical research 
 
The research will be undertaken through writing four different chapters, which are briefly 
outlined in the next section. This thesis uses the international solar PV industry as a case 
study to examine the spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing over time.  
The three empirical chapters focus on applying the conceptual framework developed in 
Chapter 2 to examine the spatial dynamics of the global solar PV technologies. The 
conceptual framework argues that economies are resilient to global competition in supplying 
technologies when the industrial activities that it undertakes are less spatially mobile due to: 
(1) high transport and trade costs (thereby requiring innovation, manufacturing and markets 
to co-locate); and/or (2) the technologies that it produces are not replicable (i.e. no other 
economy has yet to learn how to manufacture these same technologies, enabling the firms in 
the first-mover economies to extract high economic rents).  
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The different technologies involved with solar PV technologies fall within a range of these 
spatial characteristics. The dominant technology (crystalline PV technologies) is spatially 
mobile and highly replicable as different actors can buy production equipment to undertake 
manufacturing (Bazilian et al., 2012). Nevertheless this production equipment still requires 
high-level process innovations involved with improving the efficiencies of the entire 
manufacturing process, and improving the quality of technologies produced (Pew, 2013). 
These kinds of process innovations can provide high value-added to economies, as these 
technologies are less replicable and requires access to specialised knowledge in sciences and 
engineering. However there are alternative PV technologies to the dominant design that are 
less replicable, and can provide higher margins of economic value to economies that manage 
to successfully commercialise these technologies (Goodrich, James, & Woodhouse, 2011). 
These technologies thus demonstrate how various economies have different levels of 
resilience to globally competitive dynamics, depending on which industrial activities they 
specialise in.  
 
Two of these chapters directly base their empirical analysis on international datasets 
representing both research (as a proxy for innovation levels, or level of technological 
capabilities) and manufacturing activities. The fifth chapter uses 15 qualitative interviews with 
actors associated with research institutes, universities and firms located in various countries. 
Whilst the next section will focus on how the different chapters will use the data for its 
analysis, this section will describe the data, including providing notes on its usefulness and 
limitations. 
 
1.3.1 Datasets representing “innovation” 
 
The novelty of this research is that it uses different types of innovation ‘output’ datasets in 
order to have a standardised way of comparing countries’ innovation efforts. These datasets 
include peer-reviewed scientific publications, patents and best-in class data of the solar PV 
industry. The scientific publications were downloaded from two of the largest academic 
databases: the Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) databases. Identification of the relevant 
articles was based on searching for articles that included “solar photovoltaic”, and only 
downloading articles from scientific and industrial journals. Using solar photovoltaic as a 
search term is effective because researchers that would like to publish scientific and industrial 
results on solar PV advances will first use this term to highlight its relevance to this 
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technological community. Through using the bibliometrics data from the academic databases, 
the research could identify country affiliations either through individual author’s address (in 
the case of Scopus), or institutional addresses (in the case of WoS). However as the 
bibliometrics information in both databases did not directly separate the country information 
from the addresses, the author spent several months cleaning the data to obtain the relevant 
country addresses for either the authors or institutions. Undertaking this endeavour was 
worthwhile, as it provides more robust analysis for Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 (Carvalho & 
Perkins, 2015; Carvalho, 2015a). It is especially important for Chapter 4, which undertakes 
global innovation network analysis that is based on the co-author country affiliations.   
 
The patent data that were collected came from the European Worldwide Office of Patent 
Statistics database (PATSTAT). By using inventor and firms’1 country addresses for patents, 
the author could then obtain comparative evidence of where more applied industrial research 
was occurring. The patent dataset only include granted patents, thereby enabling a level of 
quality insurance of the data. The patent datasets are useful in recognising innovation that is 
closer to commercial applications than scientific publications. This dataset does have 
reporting limitations because not only technologies will be patented.  
 
The best-in class data refer to publications that identify the best performing solar PV 
technologies at the time of publication.  The two publications that provide this data are from 
the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), based in Colorado, USA. The second 
one comes from the Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications journal, which posts bi-
annual publication of “Solar Efficiency Cell Tables”. These sets of data are widely recognised 
within the global solar PV community as recording the highest confirmed efficiencies of solar 
PV cells and modules for the different generations of solar PV technologies for any given 
time period. However there are important biases for these data. First, they do not capture all 
product innovations, but only new solar PV technologies which displace previous highest 
confirmed efficiencies, together with details of the inventor/fabricator. Furthermore, they 
only record product innovations which are sent to leading laboratories (in the US, Germany, 
Australia, Switzerland and Japan) for testing on a standardised basis, and therefore inevitably 
under-report innovation of the actual level of product innovations (e.g. innovations which 
                                                 
1The PATSTAT databases provided the Bureau Van Dijk Identification (BVD ID) numbers that could then be 
used to cross-reference with the Orbis database – which then provides the addresses of corporate headquarters 
of companies. The corporate headquarters were used as firm’s addresses.  
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improve the durability of modules). Therefore, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of 
systematic bias across countries, although the prestige of being a recognised front-runner 
means that leading research institutes have motives to disclose results in order to attract – or 
even sustain – research funding.  We also reduce the risk of country bias by using two 
datasets assembled and published in two different countries. It should be noted that best-in 
class data are only used for Chapter 3’s analysis.  
 
As each dataset has some limitations, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 consider all the datasets as a 
way of triangulating the results in terms of comparative significance of countries’ 
contribution to global innovation efforts. Furthermore each type of research dataset 
(scientific publications, patents and best-in class) has at least two different ‘sources’ that also 
try to confirm the different proportions of countries. Therefore though the thesis research 
does treat the findings from this analysis as preliminary, it has taken every effort to use the 
multiple data sources to cross-reference the interpretation of the results. 
 
1.3.2 Datasets representing manufacturing and industrial capacity 
 
The manufacturing dataset is derived from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) data 
that have confirmed manufacturing capacity of countries in different parts of the crystalline 
PV supply chain. While capacity and output production will not be perfectly correlated, 
capacity data nevertheless provide us with a comparative measure of the importance of 
different countries as producers of solar PV. Unfortunately this dataset does not have 
manufacturing capacity for alternatives PV technologies that can compete with crystalline PV 
technologies. Nevertheless it is confirmed that these alternative technologies account for less 
than 5% of global solar PV manufacturing capacity (Chase, 2013).  Therefore in calculating 
different countries’ proportion of global manufacturing capacity, the exclusion of this 
capacity is negligible. Furthermore through industrial reports, the research can confirm that 
countries that successfully manufacture and sell these technologies have manufacturing plants 
located in USA, Japan and to a much smaller extent, China (Chase, 2013; Goodrich et al., 
2011; Pew, 2013).  
 
Another limitation of the current manufacturing dataset is that it does not provide data on 
manufacturing capacity of production equipment for solar PV technologies. This production 
equipment refers to the technologies that are installed in solar PV factories to manufacture 
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the actual solar PV technologies (de la Tour, Glachant, & Ménière, 2011). Having this dataset 
would provide a better understanding of the entire value chain within the solar PV industry. 
Instead the research relies on other third-party verification from BNEF reports to identify 
which economies manufacture these technologies (primarily, the USA, Germany, 
Switzerland, and more recently, China) (Chase, 2013). However consideration of both 
alternative and production equipment is considered in the analysis of Chapter 4 and 5. 
Nevertheless the manufacturing capacity in the solar PV value chain is still useful in showing 
key spatial dynamics for Chapter 3, which is the only chapter in which manufacturing 
capacity is directly used for comparative analysis amongst countries. 
 
1.3.3 Qualitative interviews 
 
The datasets outlined above are useful in providing analysis at the international level. 
However the thesis research was also interested in getting more micro-analysis on the spatial 
relationship between innovation and manufacturing.  This kind of analysis is especially 
important for understanding the nature of collaborations between researchers and industrial 
firms. Whilst research publications and patents are useful in terms of showing ‘codified’ 
output results of spatial patterns of collaborations, EEG recognises that significant part of 
knowledge spillovers occurs through tacit exchanges amongst different actors.  
 
Whilst it is impossible to interview all the actors within solar PV research networks, the 
research focused on identifying the main research institutes involved with solar PV research. 
This information was identified through the best-in class datasets. Therefore the researcher 
contacted the head researcher of institutes, or Presidents/Vice Presidents of firms, to 
participate in interviews. Furthermore the researcher attended solar PV industrial 
conferences in China and the United Kingdom (UK) to speak to potential participants. The 
researcher ended up with 15 in-depth interviews with participants that were associated with 
institutional affiliations in Australia, China, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and the 
United States of America (USA).  These interviews were either taken in-person (in the UK 
and China), or over Skype and emailed answers. It would especially be beneficial to extend 
the analysis by interviewing more participants – especially from Japan, Singapore, Canada and 
the USA. Nevertheless these interviews were especially useful in identify how countries with 
small domestic solar PV industries – such as Australia, Netherlands, and the UK – still play 
an important role in the research for solar PV technologies. The insights from these 
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countries present novel findings on the kinds of collaborative strategies these countries take 
with foreign industrial partners. 
 
Table 1. Information on data measures and sources  
Industrial activity  Data Source Time 
period 
Additional notes 
Manufacturing: 
Manufacturing capacity of 
PV modules 
(Megawatt [MW] capacity) 
Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 
(BNEF) 
2005-
06.2012 
1. Annual data on 
manufacturing 
capacity for selected 
countries. Capacity is 
used as an indicator 
of the relative size of 
manufacturing 
output. 
2. BNEF also provides 
capacities for tier 1 
and 2 silicon and 
solar PV cells. 
Research innovation: 
Scientific publications 
Scopus (Elseiver) Restricted to 
1990-2012 
1. Relevant 
publications 
identified using 
search term, “solar 
PV”. 
Research innovation: 
Scientific publications 
Web-of-Science 
(Thomson Reuters) 
Restricted to 
1990-2012 
1. Relevant 
publications 
identified using 
search term, “solar 
PV”. 
Innovation:  
Patent filings (absolute 
numbers) 
European Worldwide 
Office of Patent 
Statistics 
Restricted to 
1990 -2012 
1. Countries identified 
using reported 
addresses of 
inventors and firm 
(Bureau van Dijk 
Identification) 
BVDID addresses. 
2. Solar PV patents 
identified using 
patent classification 
code, “Y02E10”.  
3. Only patents granted 
included in the 
dataset, yielding 
51,293 patents.  
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Industrial activity  Data Source Time 
period 
Additional notes 
Product innovation:  
PV cell data (absolute 
numbers) 
National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory 
(NREL) 
1976-
09.2013 
1. Total of 205 data 
points for different 
PV cells. 
2. NREL categorises 
them within 24 types 
of PV cells, which 
are classified in 5 
broad family classes. 
3. The locations where 
PV cells were 
developed verified 
by additional 
research.  
Product innovation:  
PV cell data (absolute 
numbers) 
Solar cell efficiency 
tables from Journal of 
Progress in Photovoltaics 
1997-2012 1. Total of 208 data 
points for both PV 
cell and modules. 
2. Similar type/family 
classification to 
NREL. 
3. Location where PV 
cells were developed 
verified by additional 
research.  
4. Due to limited data 
availability, the first 
time period is 
between 1997 and 
2004, and second 
2005-2012. 
Research and 
manufacturing: interviews 
with participants affiliated 
with research institutes 
and technological firms 
(both production 
equipment and final 
product firms) 
15 interviews with 
actors directly 
affiliated with 
institutions in 
Australia, China, 
Germany, 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland, UK, and 
the USA 
Interviews 
conducted 
between 
2013-2014. 
1. Both institutional 
and country 
affiliations are not 
attributed to any 
quotes, unless 
permission has 
already been granted. 
2. Importance of 
anonymity is because 
participants would 
be easily identifiable, 
even with the 
country affiliations.   
Source: Author’s compilation 
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1.4 Research chapters  
 
1.4.1 Chapter 2. Reconsidering green industrial policy: Does techno-
nationalism maximise green growth in the domestic economy? 
 
This chapter recognises how techno-national debates on green industrial policy are 
connected to domestic political economy expectations of green growth (Barua et al., 2012; 
Karp & Stevenson, 2012). Techno-nationalist policies are aimed at ensuring that the returns 
from green industrial policy are appropriated within the national economy. The domestic 
political economy debate focuses on whether it is worth supporting green innovation and 
markets if other economies learn to manufacture and export these technologies (Bell & 
Pavitt, 1997). The literature on green growth recognises that global competition results in 
innovation and manufacturing shifting to countries where comparative advantage exists 
(Hallegatte et al., 2011; OECD, 2011), but these spatial dynamics contradict the political 
economy expectations of economic spillovers between domestic innovation, manufacturing 
and markets.  
 
This chapter focuses on how this techno-nationalist perspective is problematic. In doing so, 
it develops a conceptual framework based on the spatial characteristics of industrial activities 
and technologies. This spatial perspective is derived from key theories from EEG literature – 
particularly the spatial PLC and economic resilience. Through this spatial framework, it 
demonstrates how different economies are exposed to global competition and examines how 
innovation enables economies to become resilient to global competition in manufacturing. 
Lastly it illustrates how supply-side protectionism can inhibit domestic market expansion 
along with associated economic value and employment opportunities. Consequently, the 
chapter seeks to provide a balanced assessment of how domestic economies can achieve 
green growth from innovation, manufacturing and markets.  
 
As such, this chapter seeks to fulfil the first aim of this thesis by demonstrating how a spatial 
perspective on technologies is helpful in explaining internationally competitive dynamics and 
the implications on domestic green growth opportunities. This framework is also useful in 
differentiating green technologies according to their characteristics of: (1) spatial mobility 
(based on transport and trade costs); and (2) production replicability – that is, ability for 
other economies to also manufacture these technologies. These spatial dynamics thereby 
influence the relative spatial distances between research, manufacturing, and markets. 
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Furthermore these spatial dynamics can help explain the resilience of domestic economies to 
global competition in supplying these technologies. 
 
1.4.2 Chapter 3. First-mover advantage and the spatial evolution of innovation 
and manufacturing in the solar PV industry 
 
Within the context of debates about the resilience of first-mover advantage (FMA) in ‘clean 
tech’, this chapter explores the changing spatial distribution of economic activity in the global 
solar PV industry. Conceptually, we situate our analysis in the spatial PLC model, which gives 
rise to two hypotheses (Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Vernon, 1966). The spatial decoupling 
hypothesis posits that there will be a spatial separation between innovation and 
manufacturing over time, with first-movers retaining competitive advantages in innovation 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996); while the spatial recoupling hypothesis suggests that 
innovation will eventually follow manufacturing as it migrates to late-comers (Mathews & 
Cho, 2000).  
 
This research takes a macro-level perspective in seeing how different first-mover and late-
comer countries account for different levels of innovation and manufacturing activities 
during two different time periods. The results show that whilst there has been a major shift 
of manufacturing capacity to late-comers (notably China), the research finds only partial 
evidence of recoupling, at least when measuring innovation by patents or countries’ 
production of best-in-class solar cells. Using scientific research publications provides a 
slightly different picture, suggesting that late-comers are increasingly catching up with first-
movers. The chapter concludes by discussing the relevance of the findings for debates about 
the importance of proximity for innovation and policy-inducted FMA.  
 
The results from Chapter 3 highlight can address both the research aims of this thesis. First it 
demonstrates how EEG concept of spatial PLCs is useful in assessing the competitiveness 
debate between first-mover and latecomer countries. Second it provides a discussion of 
whether increases in industrial capacity also are relevant for inducing – or sustaining – 
innovation. 
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1.4.3 Chapter 4. Accessing knowledge spillovers through international 
research collaborations: Analysis of solar PV innovation networks 
 
The structure of global innovation networks (GINS) and international research 
collaborations can highlight the level and quality of knowledge spillovers different countries 
have – based on their position within these networks and the countries they actually 
collaborate with.  EEG and international development literature implicitly recognises that a 
hierarchy exists amongst countries with different levels of technological capabilities. 
Countries with high technological capabilities are those that can engage with innovation at 
the technological frontier – and can thus restrict international research collaborations 
between these select groups of countries. International development literature recognises that 
countries with lower technological capabilities undertake research collaborations with 
countries with high technological capabilities in order to benefit from experiential and 
knowledge spillovers. However both of these literatures acknowledge that the ‘catch up’ 
nature of these collaborations does not necessarily guarantee that countries will benefit from 
knowledge spillovers at the technological frontier.   
 
This chapter explores these interactions by studying the evolution of different countries 
positions within different solar PV innovation networks over two time periods. It also 
focuses on the research collaboration profiles of Germany, Japan and USA (as first-mover 
countries) and China (as a late-comer). The preliminary results have some surprising findings 
on how countries with high technological capabilities but low industrial capacity play a more 
prominent role in research collaborations for each of these countries with large industrial 
capacity. The chapter considers whether competitive dynamics of domestic industries 
influences the patterns of international research collaborations.    As such, it considers how 
the size of the domestic industry can potentially affect patterns of international research 
collaboration due to techno-national considerations. However it highlights a potentially 
important role that countries with low industrial capacity but high technology capabilities 
play for countries with large industrial capacities.   
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1.4.4 Chapter 5. How does the presence – or absence – of domestic industries 
affect the commercialisation of technologies? 
 
Literature in EEG highlights the importance of the spatial proximity between research 
institutes and industrial firms in facilitating learning feedback between these different types of 
actors when engaging in commercialisation for early stage technology. This literature assumes 
the existence of domestic industries to enable these commercialisation efforts. This chapter 
considers the importance of domestic industry in enabling innovation efforts for different 
solar PV technologies. It does so by comparing the responses of interviewees who are 
involved in different types of solar PV technologies, and are based in economies that have 
different sizes of solar PV industrial capacity. These economies include Australia, China, 
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the USA.  
 
The research highlights how the professionalisation of solar PV sciences and the spread of 
solar PV social networks have enabled innovators and industrial actors to ‘search for the 
right partners’ in early-stage research for alternative PV technologies. While there is no 
guarantee, the presence of domestic industries with diverse skill sets can increase the 
probability of finding a partner with the right knowledge complementarities. These 
preliminary findings also illustrate how strong linkages between research institutes and 
domestic industries can intentionally limit international knowledge spillovers that can help 
foreign industrial partners to compete with domestic industries. In contrast, the absence of 
domestic industrial linkages incentivises research institutes to seek foreign industrial partners 
for commercial collaborations. 
 
Therefore the research findings identify key nuances in the spatial relationship between 
innovation and manufacturing, thereby addressing both aims of the thesis. First, it 
demonstrates that countries with high technological capabilities do not necessarily need 
access to domestic industries to engage with commercialisation efforts. Instead these 
economies can undertake linkages with foreign partners that have high industrial capacities. 
This conclusion provides evidence that the spatial relationship between innovation and 
manufacturing can be spatially distant in the next cycle of technologies. Second, it highlights 
how techno-national factors can affect the propensity for international research 
collaborations to occur between countries with different industrial capacities – a factor not 
discussed in the current EEG literature.  
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1.5 Conclusion 
 
This thesis thus seeks to understand how the spatial relationship between innovation and 
manufacturing changes over time, and how it affects the level of economic value-added to 
different economies participating in these industries. This spatial perspective will be useful to 
green growth literature that is considering how to assess the competitiveness of economies in 
supplying green technologies. The motivation for using this perspective arises as it appears 
that the opportunities to realise green growth in the domestic economy are threatened as 
more economies compete to supply green technologies. Current green growth literature 
primarily focuses on innovation activities to determine which economies will innovate new 
green technologies. However success in innovation does not necessarily guarantee that 
manufacturing for these technologies will remain in the same economy.   
 
Therefore this thesis examines the spatial dynamics between innovation and manufacturing 
as the primary unit of analysis. The research seeks to understand why these industrial 
activities locate in various types of economies as technologies mature – and its implication on 
level of green growth for these economies. In studying this relationship, it considers whether 
economies do need access to domestic industries in order to up-scale new product 
innovations or engage with high level process innovations. Rather than study this spatial 
relationship within individual economies, this research compares economies that first 
undertook indigenous innovation with those that industrialized via technological catch up. 
These spatial dynamics can provide a balanced assessment of whether green growth in the 
domestic economy will be realised from domestic supply and/or domestic markets for green 
technologies. 
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Chapter 2: Reconsidering green industrial 
policy: Does techno-nationalism 
maximise green growth in the domestic 
economy? 
Addressing political economy concerns of investing in green industrial 
policy by applying insights from evolutionary economic geography  
2 Make invisible 
 
Abstract. This chapter recognises how techno-national debates on green industrial 
policy are connected to domestic political economy expectations of green growth. 
Techno-nationalist policies are aimed at ensuring that the returns from green 
industrial policy are appropriated within the national economy. The domestic political 
economy debate focuses on whether it is worth supporting green innovation and 
markets if other economies learn to manufacture and export these technologies. The 
literature on green growth recognises that global competition results in innovation 
and manufacturing shifting to countries where comparative advantage exists, but 
these spatial dynamics contradict the political economy expectations of economic 
spillovers between domestic innovation, manufacturing and markets. This chapter 
focuses on how this techno-nationalist perspective is problematic. In doing so, it 
develops a conceptual framework based on the spatial characteristics of industrial 
activities and technologies. Through this spatial framework, it demonstrates how 
different economies are exposed to global competition and examines how innovation 
enables economies to become resilient to global competition in manufacturing. Lastly 
it illustrates how supply-side protectionism can inhibit domestic market expansion 
along with associated economic value and employment opportunities. Consequently, 
the chapter seeks to provide a balanced assessment of how domestic economies can 
achieve green growth from innovation, manufacturing and markets. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Beyond the environmental imperative, the political justification for green industrial policy 
includes economic and social benefits that can be realised within the national economy 
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(Hallegatte et al., 2011). These co-benefits consist of improving domestic companies’ 
profitability and building domestic green industries to increase net employment (Jacobs, 
2012). Therefore policy support and fiscal investments into green industrial policy can yield 
green growth in the national economy (Bowen et al., 2009). This economic rationale was 
used by national governments to support green stimulus packages after the start of 2008/09 
economic crisis (Barbier, 2010). Out of a total of USD 2.8 trillion in stimulus packages 
globally, 16% was dedicated specifically to green sectors (Robins, Clover & Singh, 2009, p. 2). 
Nevertheless the opportunity to realise green growth in each national economy appears to be 
threatened as more economies compete to supply green technologies (Barua, Tawney & 
Weischer, 2012).  
 
The current literature on these competitive dynamics analyse the merits of first-mover versus 
late-comer advantage. The early literature demonstrates how certain developed economies 
were successful in developing green technologies through policies establishing national 
innovation systems (Bergek et al., 2008). The Porter hypothesis confirmed that early success 
in the commercialisation of green technologies enabled economies to achieve first-mover 
advantage in global markets (Porter & van Der Linde, 1995). However, the rise of Chinese, 
Taiwanese and Indian solar photovoltaic (PV) firms and wind technology companies 
challenges the merits of first-mover advantage (Lewis & Wiser, 2007; Liebreich, 2011). These 
firms’ success in manufacturing resulted from technology transfer and capitalising on their 
comparative advantage in low-cost production (Lewis & Wiser, 2007; Wu & Mathews, 2012). 
 
These international dynamics have stimulated techno-national debates similar to those that 
occurred with other technologies such as internet and communication technologies (ICT), 
and electronics. Archibugi & Michie (1997, p. 17) highlight how techno-nationalist 
perspectives can affect public attitudes towards industrial policy: “What is the point of 
government policies to promote innovation in industry if the benefits can be transferred to 
other countries? Is there any guarantee that firms will use these benefits to the advantage of 
the nation which provides support?” This chapter argues that these political economy 
concerns centre on whether the domestic economy can appropriate the returns from public 
investments into green industries.  
 
These debates on green growth can benefit from evolutionary economic geography (EEG) 
theory, which addresses how global dynamics of technological competition affects local 
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economic development (Potter & Watts, 2010). More recent literature on green growth 
recognises that innovation and manufacturing of green technologies shift to countries where 
comparative advantage exists (Dutz & Sharma, 2012). For example, international 
organisations such as the recently established Global Green Growth Institute identify how 
various economies can realise green growth (Barua et al., 2012; OECD, 2011b). However this 
literature does not recognise how globally competitive dynamics affect long-run economic 
returns from industrial activities. Therefore EEG demonstrates how the concept of 
‘resilience’ identifies key opportunities and challenges facing economies in realising green 
growth in the long-run. The second gap in the literature on green technologies is that it does 
not differentiate technologies according to their spatial characteristics. However these 
characteristics influence the balance of economic value from technology supply and market 
creation. This chapter argues that protectionist policies towards supply-side firms can incur 
opportunity costs from not realising green growth or providing domestic employment 
through market expansion.  
 
This chapter’s objective is to address techno-national concerns regarding investment in green 
industrial policy. To this end, the second section of the chapter demonstrates how the lack of 
a spatial perspective on technologies in the current literature creates dilemmas in the political 
economy. The third section draws on EEG’s concept of resilience to demonstrate long-term 
green growth opportunities for different economies. The fourth section considers how 
spatial characteristics of technologies affect the balance of growth from supply and demand 
for green technologies in the domestic economy. The last section reviews how this spatial 
perspective is useful for the literature on green growth, and considers questions for future 
research. 
 
2.1.1 Realising green growth through green industrial policy 
2.1.2 Key premises of green growth  
 
Green growth stems from a combination of sustainable development, ecological 
modernisation, and endogenous economic growth imperatives (Hepburn & Bowen, 2012). 
The analysis of green growth is largely circumscribed by environmental economics and policy 
fields – and now increasingly, the industrial policy sphere (Rodrik, 2013). The rationale for 
green growth is described in the literature according to three underlying premises (Hallegatte 
et al., 2011; Jacobs, 2012):  
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1. There is a need to sustainably preserve natural capital in the process of economic 
development. 
2. Innovation (both technological and organisational) can be used to significantly 
decrease the impact on the environment. 
3. Such innovation can provide long-run economic growth opportunities through 
improving production efficiencies, whilst creating new industries and markets.  
 
The first two premises have strong ideological underpinnings in sustainable development and 
ecological modernisation. Their combined argument is that economic growth can be 
decoupled from long-term environmental impacts through developing green technologies 
(Coenen & Díaz López, 2010). Bailey & Wilson (2009) recognise how these premises of 
green growth are in line with the hegemonic discourse of neoliberal techno-centric solutions 
to environmental problems. They are techno-centric by focusing on technological innovation 
as a solution to environmental problems, and neoliberal because of the emphasis on, 
“economic growth as the normal condition of a healthy society” (Dryzek, 1997, p. 46). 
Premises of green growth are in direct contrast to green radicalism, which places a greater 
inherent value on the environment over the imperative of economic growth. Its main critique 
is that the pursuit of economic growth is misaligned with the goal of maximising the welfare 
of both society and the environment (Meadows, Meadows & Randers, 2004). Instead, 
environmental policy should focus on the importance of social and economic values to create 
behavioural changes that preserve the ecological rather than the capitalist system (Fitzpatrick, 
2011). These critiques are especially important in terms of questioning the viability of 
substituting natural capital with green technological capital (Neumayer, 2003).  
 
The green radical perspective is useful in questioning whether technological solutions will be 
deployed in time to avoid irreversible climate change. Solar PV and wind technologies 
demonstrate how clean energy technologies can make significant technological advances over 
a short period of time and become cost-competitive with incumbent technologies (see Figure 
10). However, other low-carbon technologies still need to move along the learning curve to 
provide more low-carbon energy alternatives. The IEA estimates that energy and process-
related emissions have to reduce to half the 2011 level by 2050 in order to avoid a 2 degree 
Celsius increase in global average temperatures (IEA, 2014).    
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2.1.3 Techno-national debates and green industrial policy 
 
Nevertheless this chapter’s critique of the current literature on green growth focuses on the 
lack of spatial analysis underlying the third premise of endogenous economic growth brought 
about by green innovation. The dual challenges of the economic recession in 2008/2009 and 
the on-going international negotiations on resolving climate change created ‘windows of 
opportunity’ for directing fiscal stimulus investment into green industries (Barbier, 2010; 
Bowen et al., 2009). It is believed that targeted public investments, supported by green 
industrial policies, will help economies achieve a green industrial revolution and ‘long-waves 
of economic growth’ (Stern & Rydge, 2013). The economic rationale of this third premise 
provides a strategic and analytical case for politically justifying green industrial policy beyond 
a concern for the environment (Bowen & Fankhauser, 2011).  
 
This chapter argues that the early literature underappreciates the spatial implications of green 
growth – thereby creating controversies over green industrial policies in the domestic 
political economy. The third premise of green growth does not consider whether public 
investments in domestic green industries will yield economic spillovers to the local economy. 
This lack of spatial analysis creates an inherent domestic political economy expectation that 
public investments into Research and Development (R&D), industry and markets will benefit 
domestic actors. However the ascendency of Chinese solar PV firms encroaching on 
American and European market shares highlights key domestic political economy problems 
in not addressing these spatial expectations. For example, public investments that support 
domestic markets are not necessarily met by technologies manufactured within the local 
economy. When there are low trade barriers, market demand can be met by low-cost 
technologies manufactured in foreign economies. Between 1999 and 2011, China increased 
its share of global production of solar PV technologies from 1% to over 60% (UNEP & 
BNEF, 2010; Wang, 2013). These low-cost imports make it more difficult for manufacturing 
plants in economies with high production costs to compete (Chase, 2013; Zindler, 2012). 
  
Intensified global competition in the supply of technologies has resulted in international 
trade disputes. In the case of solar and wind, global price reductions created economic 
distress for American and European solar PV firms (see Figure 3 and 4 in Section 3). 
American solar- and wind manufacturing coalitions successfully lobbied the US government 
to impose tariffs against imports of Chinese technologies and Vietnamese (wind) 
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technologies in 2012 (Zindler, 2012), and in 2013 the EU imposed import tariffs on Chinese 
solar technologies (EU Commission, 2013). It should be noted that the justification for tariffs 
was unfair competition due to generous subsidies in the form of low-interest loans Chinese 
firms. China reacted by imposing anti-dumping tariffs in 2013 against US and South Korean 
polysilicon imports (Hook, 2013). Another ‘green’ trade dispute over Brazilian ethanol 
exports to American markets ended in 2011 (Winter, 2012).  
 
These developments demonstrate that domestic policy-makers do react to global competitive 
dynamics – especially when it threatens domestic industry. In the case of trade disputes, these 
political economy frictions occur as domestic public investments go towards market-based 
subsidies for green technologies. The policy rationale for these market subsidies is to help 
green technologies overcome cost-differentiation with low-cost incumbent technologies 
(Hallegatte et al., 2011). However an inherent political economy perception is that domestic 
supply-side actors should benefit from this subsidy – not just in terms of engendering 
learning economies but in appropriating market share. As Karp & Stevenson (2012, p. 5) 
explain with regard to the American political economy stance on Brazilian ethanol: “To 
prevent Brazilian exporters from undercutting US producers, and sending US tax dollars to 
Brazil, the US imposed a near-prohibitive tariff on ethanol imports until the end of 2011, 
when the subsidy lapsed.” 
  
Now that governments in both developed and emerging economies are investing in green 
industrial policies for both the supply and demand of different green technologies (see Figure 
1 below), there is global competition for supplying green technologies to multiple markets. 
Other countries’ success in innovation and manufacturing can potentially limit future 
avenues for green growth within the local economy (Archibugi & Michie, 1997). Techno-
national debates occur when it appears that domestic investments to support the 
development of green technologies will not benefit the domestic economy in the long term 
(Karp & Stevenson, 2012; Lewis, 2012). These outcomes go against the domestic political 
economy expectation of appropriating returns from public investments in the national 
economy (Archibugi & Michie, 1997). 
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Figure 1. Dedicated funds to green sectors from national Economic Stimulus 
Packages 2008/2009 (Total Estimated Investment in Green Sectors = USD 435.9 
billion) 
  
Source: Data derived from (Robins et al., 2009, p. 2) 
* Note: x-axis is on a base 10 logarithmic scale  
*Note: R.O.W: refers to the “rest of the world”.  
 
Green technologies are one of the latest industries to undergo techno-national debates. 
Other industries include space, automobiles, and currently, internet and communication 
technologies (ICT) (Dicken, 2011). For ICT technologies, the main debates centre on 
developing international standards for intellectual property rights (IPR) to enable technology 
transfer, and national security concerns over providing foreign firms access to domestic 
markets (Ernst, 2009). Techno-national debates of green technologies have a similar concern 
over protection of IPR to protect domestic investments in R&D, and providing domestic 
market access to foreign firms (Karp & Stevenson, 2012; Lewis, 2012; Ockwell et al., 2010). 
However these techno-national debates are compounded by political economy controversies 
related to environmental policies. These include continued scepticism regarding the climate 
change phenomenon and the imposition of stringent environmental policies (Fitzpatrick, 
2011). The latter becomes particularly salient if the political economy perceives the costs of 
environmental compliance as a threat to the competitiveness of industries exposed to foreign 
competition (Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2014).  
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Further political economy inertia in diffusing green technologies involves techno-institutional 
‘lock-in’ effects of incumbent, ‘brown’ technologies (Foxon & Pearson, 2008). These effects 
refer to complimentary network infrastructures and institutional support (including organised 
political lobbying) of incumbent technologies. Verbong & Geels (2007) demonstrate how the 
ease of integration of biomass into fossil-fuel power plants in the Netherlands enabled 
biomass energy to have greater diffusion than solar PV and wind technologies. Moreover, 
lock-in to the supply or dependence on fossil fuels can reinforce resistance to green 
technologies (and incur even higher switching costs) (Unruh, 2002). These lock-in effects 
demonstrate the additional costs of modifying physical and policy infrastructures, the 
inflexibility of user behaviours and the power of industrial lobbying (Barbier, 2010; Hallegatte 
et al., 2011; Stern & Rydge, 2013). These controversies can compound techno-national 
debates on the perceived costs of transitioning to a green economy.  
 
However, the Porter hypothesis demonstrates that green technologies offer ‘win-win’ 
economic growth opportunities that could counteract their political resistance. The Porter 
hypothesis argues that the early imposition of stringent environmental legislation would 
create incentives for polluting firms to innovate green technologies (Porter & van Der Linde, 
1995). Green innovations would improve the competitiveness of domestic firms through 
productivity improvements that also reduce environmental compliance costs. Their success 
in the early commercialisation of green technologies would create first-mover advantages 
when selling these technologies to foreign markets. Empirical studies by Johnstone et al. 
(2009, 2010), Lanoie et al. (2011), and Newell, Jaffe & Stavins (1999) do show increases in 
R&D expenditures and/or patenting in less environmentally-intensive technologies after the 
imposition of environmental policies. Nevertheless, there are mixed results on whether these 
innovation efforts improved production efficiencies and economic competitiveness (see 
overview by Ambec et al., 2013). 
  
Noailly & Shestalova (2013) and Fankhauser et al. (2013) demonstrate the importance of 
knowledge complementarities in enabling countries’ to develop different green technologies. 
For example, improved scrubber systems can be used to reduce particulates from fossil-fuel 
electricity generation plants. However a fossil-fuel plant will not innovate a renewable 
technology as it does not have the necessary knowledge base. Furthermore Aghion et al. 
(2012) demonstrates how countries with previous experience in green innovation are more 
likely to be successful in subsequent innovation than countries who lack this experience, 
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despite both countries facing similar punitive policies on pollution. Consequently, these 
studies show how both stringent environmental regulation and broader industrial policies are 
needed to enable the development of technologies (Foxon et al., 2005b; Goodward et al., 
2011) 
 
2.1.4 The internationalisation of green technologies: entering industries 
through indigenous innovation or manufacturing 
 
Creating comprehensive green industrial policies are important in countries’ pursuit of green 
growth (Rodrik, 2013; Schwarzer, 2013). Industrial policies involve a combination of 
technology-push policies – encouraging development and early commercialisation of new 
technologies – and demand-pull policies – creating a market demand to enable large-scale 
diffusion (Hallegatte et al., 2011; OECD, 2011b).  The particular policy mix will be 
determined by various factors. The first factor is the technology’s stage of development 
(Foxon et al., 2005a; Watson et al., 2014). Emerging green technologies such as wave- and 
tidal technologies, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and integrated combined cycle 
combustion, being at the R&D and demonstration project stage, are better supported by 
supply-side policies in the form of technological grants and R&D tax breaks to innovating 
firms. On the other hand, on-shore wind and crystalline solar PV technologies, which are 
already in production, means industrial policy focuses on overcoming barriers in integrating 
these technologies into existing power infrastructures (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen & Gilsing, 
2005).  
 
Another factor influencing policy instrument choice is the institutional preference of 
domestic economies. Foxon et al. (2005) shows that the UK’s preference for market-based 
instruments led the initial use of renewable obligations to create demand for wind 
technologies. In contrast, Denmark and Germany successfully used feed-in tariffs for the 
early commercialisation of small-size wind turbines (Klaassen et al., 2005). Both of these 
studies, along with Woodman & Mitchell (2011), argue that the early success of wind turbine 
development in Germany and Denmark over the UK2 was because their choice of 
                                                 
2The UK has reformed its demand-side approach to renewable technologies by replacing 
renewable obligation certificates with a contract-for-differences approach (a modified form 
of feed-in tariff) for utility-scale electricity generation (Woodman & Mitchell, 2011).  
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instrument provided a stable demand signal for domestic firms to invest in the production of 
these technologies. Another example is Brazil’s biofuel blend mandates which encourage 
domestic ethanol production (Goldemberg et al., 2004). In the USA, the preference was for 
production and investment tax credits for wind technologies, but uncertainties over the 
renewal of tax credits after their expiry created major fluctuations in asset financing of 
projects (UNEP & BNEF, 2010, 2013).  
 
These early demand-side signals were met by domestic supply due to the paucity of market-
ready technologies. Most studies on technology-push policies of green technologies highlight 
the importance ‘crossing the valley of death’ in bringing potential innovations into early 
commercialisation (Canton, 2005). Goodward et al. (2011) demonstrate how public and 
private R&D for technologies, including direct funding or tax breaks to private firms, is 
essential for experimentation with different technological designs. Innovation studies also 
highlight the importance of creating learning feedback loops between producers of 
technologies and ‘lead’ users of technologies (Nill & Kemp, 2009). Raven & Geels' (2010) 
comparison of the Danish and Dutch biogas industries shows the importance of applied 
learning between research institutes, industries and users. These interactions in Denmark led 
to the success of biogas technology development, while insulated scientific learning in the 
Netherlands meant the Dutch industry’s success was more limited. These same comparative 
findings between Denmark and the Netherlands are presented by Kamp, Smits & Andriesse 
(2004) for the wind industry. Musiolik & Markard (2011) demonstrate how government 
policies were used to create formal innovation networks between researchers and industry in 
Germany, enabling the successful development of fuel cell technologies. Watanabe et al. 
(2000) argue that the dynamism in Japan’s solar PV industry was partly attributable to broad-
based government policies, but more so to knowledge spillovers between industrial players. 
 
Ultimately these studies demonstrate that the economies that were successful in diffusing 
green technologies were those that established strong national innovation systems (NIS) – a 
conceptual construct for analysing the development and diffusion of new technologies within 
a specific country by examining the interaction amongst actors, networks and institutions 
(Lundvall et al., 2002). However, these studies did not engage with how the development of 
the domestic industry was affected by global competition dynamics. At the time of early 
commercialisation, the lack of foreign suppliers of technologies meant global competition for 
domestic markets was limited.  
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Table 1. Top 10 global wind manufacturers in 2005 & 2010 (by production capacity) 
2005 2010 
Company Country Production 
(GW) 
Company Country Production 
(GW) 
1. Vestas Denmark 3.2 1. Vestas Denmark 6.3 
2. Enercon  Germany 2.7 2. GE Wind USA 6.0 
3. Gamesa Spain 1.9 3. Sinovel  China 5.3 
4. GE Wind  USA 1.3 4. Gamesa  Spain 4.4 
5. Siemens Germany 1.1 5. Goldwind   China 3.6 
6. Suzlon India 0.9 6. Suzlon   India 3.5 
7. Repower Germany 0.9 7. Enercon   Germany 3.4 
8. Goldwind  China 0.7 8. Dongfang   China 3.0 
9. Nordex Germany 0.5 9. Repower  Germany 2.9 
10. Ecotecnica Spain 0.3 10. Siemens Germany 2.9 
Source: Liebreich (2011, p. 31) 
 
Table 2. Top 10 global solar PV manufacturers in 2005 & 2010  
(by production capacity) 
2005 2010 
Company Country Production 
(GW)* 
Company Country Production 
(GW)* 
1. Sharp Japan 500 1.  JA Solar China 1,900 
2. Q-Cells  Germany 420 2.  Suntech China 1,620  
3. Suntech China 270 3.  First Solar**  USA 1,502  
4. Motech Taiwan 240 4.  Yingli China 1,100  
5. Solarworld  Germany 200 5.  Trina Solar   China 1,000  
6. China Sunergy  China 180 6.  Q-Cells Germany 1,000  
7. Kyocera Japan 180 7.  Canadian Solar  China 800  
8. Isofoton  Spain 130 8.  Motech Taiwan 600  
9. Schott Germany 121 9.  Gintech Taiwan 600 
10. Sanyo Electric Japan 115 10. JinkoSolar China 600 
Source: Liebreich (2011, p. 33) 
*Production capacity is from BNEF research and is based on company announcements.   
**First Solar produces thin-film solar PV technologies, whereas the other companies listed produce crystalline 
PV technologies.  
 
China’s proportion of global manufacturing of solar PV and wind technologies has led to an 
increased focus on how it was able to up-scale production capacity for these technologies so 
quickly. The empirical literature acknowledges that China’s entry into solar PV and wind 
technologies occurred when it was possible to transfer technologies. Wu & Mathews (2012) 
and de la Tour, Glachant & Ménière (2011) describe how both Taiwanese and Chinese firms 
bought the most advanced production equipment from suppliers in the USA and Germany. 
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This equipment allowed Chinese firms to quickly upscale production across the solar PV 
value chain. In contrast, China’s entry into wind manufacturing relied more on a combination 
of indigenous innovation and technology transfer (Gosens & Lu, 2013; Lewis & Wiser, 
2007). It was not possible to buy production equipment for wind technologies as the 
producers of the production equipment also competed in the manufacture of the final 
product (Pew, 2013).  
 
These industries also benefitted from significant government support. De la Tour, Glachant 
& Ménière (2011), D’Costa (2012), Saxenian (2002), and Khanna (2008) describe how China 
and Taiwan instituted policies to draw their diaspora back home, bringing their expertise to 
develop domestic firms. These governments also subsidised loans for manufacturing facilities 
through state and national developmental banks (Goodrich, James & Woodhouse, 2011). 
Furthermore, they built infrastructure to support industrial districts for these technologies. 
However, these studies also note that this support was given at different levels of 
government in China due to differences in policy agendas (Bedin et al., 2013; Liu & 
Goldstein, 2013). Wind technologies had a combination of federal and provincial support 
that was aimed at meeting ambitious domestic market targets; the federal government 
recognised the large-scale potential of wind power to meet China’s growing energy demand. 
In contrast, provincial governments in China pursued the development of solar PV industry 
as an export-oriented growth strategy (Zhang et al., 2013). Prior to the imposition of tariffs 
against Chinese solar PV products, about 95% of Chinese solar PV technologies were 
exported to foreign markets (UNEP & BNEF, 2011). 
 
2.1.5 Re-examining techno-national debates on competitiveness and green 
growth 
 
These international dynamics raise techno-national questions on green industrial policy. 
Should governments invest in the early commercialisation of green technologies if foreign 
economies can acquire these technologies to produce them at lower cost? Furthermore, 
should countries that engaged with early R&D ensure that technologies are not transferred to 
foreign economies? Lastly should foreign firms be able to sell to domestic green markets if it 
undermines the competitiveness of domestic firms? How policy-makers perceive 
opportunities and challenges for competitiveness can influence how they structure industrial 
policies – including trade protectionism.  
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It is important to recognise that green industrial policy is not formulated within a purely 
technocratic process. The use of public investment and policy to support green technologies 
means that it is subject to domestic political and social contestation. It also recognises that 
the nature and level of contestation varies in different economies, depending on domestic 
political economy dynamics. For example, in 2009 the US Senate failed to pass the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act that would have created comprehensive industrial policies for 
addressing climate change and renewables. This was because of political economy 
contestation of climate change legislation included in the bill (Hoffman, 2011). In contrast, 
China’s expansion of the 12th five-year plan to include both innovation and demand policies 
for low-carbon technologies was a result of finding new industrial growth opportunities, a 
need for diverse sources of energy demand, and lowering environmental pollution (Hong et 
al., 2013; Thomson, 2014).  
  
Techno-national debates centre on the loss of competitiveness in green technologies and 
global competitive dynamics preventing the domestic economy from realising green growth, 
despite investing in green industrial policy. However this chapter argues that the current 
literature assessing competitiveness tends to use the wrong indicators. First, these indicators 
are not reflective of the value added to the national economy. Indicators that use firm’s 
market share as an indicator of competitiveness assume that all of the firm’s activities occur 
within the domestic economy, whereas firms are a key enabler of global production networks 
by outsourcing or offshoring manufacturing activities (Henderson et al., 2002).  
 
Additionally, the economies’ share of either innovation or production capacity is only 
reflective of one kind of industrial activity that can provide value-added to the economy. Nor 
does the existing literature consider how the levels of value-added from these industrial 
activities can change with increasing global competition. The problem with current research 
on innovation is that it uses R&D expenditures or patents to measure innovation. These 
indicators are useful for learning who is dedicating efforts in which sectors and how 
successful they are in early-stage innovation. However innovation is not a guarantee of 
achieving commercialisation – especially given the difficulties in ‘crossing the valley of death’. 
And comparing countries’ manufacturing capacities provides no indication of their ability to 
compete to develop the next generation of technologies. 
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This last point is raised in the literature on emerging economies, such as China’s shift away 
from technology transfer processes towards indigenous innovation in solar PV and wind 
technologies (Wang, Qin and Lewis, 2012; Ru et al., 2012; Fu & Zhang, 2011; Liu et al., 
2011). These studies demonstrate that indigenous innovation has led to China’s increased 
technological capabilities in developing more sophisticated renewable energy technologies. 
Nevertheless, these studies also acknowledge that Chinese actors have yet to reach a point 
where they  compete with ‘early’ economies in advancing the technological frontier (Gosens 
& Lu, 2013; Qiu, Ortolano & Wang, 2013; Wang, 2013; Wang, Qin & Lewis, 2012; Zhang, 
Andrews-Speed & Zhao, 2013; Zhao et al., 2012). Fankhauser et al. (2012) also demonstrate 
that China has relatively low rates of green innovation in comparison with other OECD 
countries.  Watson et al. (2014) highlight that despite targeted R&D and market-incentive 
programs for hybrid electric vehicles and electric vehicles, these policies have yet to 
demonstrate an improvement in Chinese technological capabilities to commercialise these 
technologies. 
   
Collectively, this literature acknowledges that industrial activities locate in economies where 
comparative advantage in innovation and manufacturing exists (Altenburg, 2008; Dutz & 
Sharma, 2012). The green growth literature by the OECD and the Green Growth 
Knowledge Platform (GGKP) tries to assuage techno-national concerns by showing how 
different economies can realise green growth based on their comparative advantage (OECD, 
2011a; Schmalensee, 2012). This chapter advances this assertion, by demonstrating how the 
level of value-added differs across industrial activities and changes over time. In appreciating 
these variations and their implications for green growth, this chapter argues for the concept 
of resilience as a key consideration of green industrial policy. 
 
2.2 Resilience: providing long-term green growth  
 
Evolutionary economic geography (EEG) provides a useful framework for studying the 
spatialisation of industries and its implications for local economic development through 
spatial product life cycles (PLCs) (Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Potter & Watts, 2010). In the 
first stage of the PLC, few economies have the innovation capabilities to compete with each 
other in developing viable product innovations (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999). Once a certain 
product innovation achieves a ‘dominant design’ (i.e. the greatest market acceptability), the 
basis for competition shifts to low-cost production (Vernon, 1966). In order to increase the 
54 
 
scale and efficiencies of production, knowledge underlying these processes is codified into 
written manuals, routines or even production technologies. This codification also enables 
firms to transfer manufacturing to low-cost economies. Alternatively, low-cost economies 
can acquire these codified forms of knowledge (e.g. technological licenses, patents, 
production equipment) to enter these industries through manufacturing. The spatial PLC 
demonstrates how industrial dynamics connect economies with different comparative 
advantage in innovation and manufacturing (Pietrobelli & Rabellotti, 2011). 
 
The spatial ‘decoupling’ of industrial activities does not conform to domestic political 
economy expectations of local economic spillovers between innovation and manufacturing. 
The political justification for investing in domestic innovation is that it will provide new 
technologies to expand the scope of the domestic industrial base, or that it will increase the 
productivity – and hence global competitiveness – of the domestic industrial base. Therefore 
the spatial shift of manufacturing to low-cost economies appears to undermine the 
expectation that innovation will provide new technological opportunities for domestic 
industry. Instead, it appears to suggest that in the long run, economic spillovers from 
domestic R&D will ultimately benefit technological opportunities for foreign economies. 
  
This chapter argues against this inference by focusing on how the levels of value-added to 
economies differ according to the stage of a technology’s development. While the shift of 
manufacturing to low-cost economies does demonstrate a shift in absolute economic value 
from manufacturing, the margins of economic value derived from selling these technologies 
are much lower due to the expansion of global supply at this stage of industry development. 
Chase (2013) and Zhang et al. (2013) demonstrate that China’s increase in production of 
solar PV has led to lower profits margins, even for Chinese producers. A number of green 
technologies have demonstrated these dramatic reductions in global prices over a short 
period of time (see Figures 2, 3, and 4 below). The most dramatic were global solar PV 
prices, which reduced by 80% between 2008 and 2012 due to the expansion of supply from 
China (Liebreich, 2013, p. 37). It should be noted that for each diagram, the light blue line 
indicates the experience curve for each technology, demonstrating how much costs per watt 
(or in the case of wind, watt hour) reduced with the doubling of manufacturing capacity – 
demonstrating cost reductions from improvements in efficiency and increased supply.  
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Figure 2. Solar PV module price reductions, 1976-2012 (USD/Watt) 
 
Source: Chase, 2014 
Figure 3. Average levelised cost of onshore wind, 1984-2012 (Euro/Megawatt Hour) 
 
Source: Liebreich (2013, p. 38) 
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Figure 4. Lithium-ion battery experience curve 
 
Source: Liebreich (2013, p. 39) 
 
 
The diminished margins from manufacturing demonstrate how these economies are exposed 
to global competition. This exposure occurs as codification enables knowledge transfer 
processes that permit other economies to replicate these technologies. EEG explains that this 
kind of manufacturing becomes less ‘territorialised’ or ‘localised’ as it does not depend on the 
assets within the economy (Malmberg & Maskell, 2002; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Storper, 
1997). However, global competition for these technologies increases as more economies gain 
access to codified production technologies (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). If global markets 
are unable to absorb this supply, the result is a decrease in global prices and distressed 
margins within the producer economies. A good example of this cycle is the shutdown of 
crystalline PV plants that occurred first in the USA and Europe, and then even in China (see 
Figure 5 below). So even manufacturing-dependent emerging economies are exposed to 
fluctuations in global supply and demand (see Figure 6 and 7 below). 
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Figure 5. Decommissioned PV cell manufacturing capacity by country and rest of the 
world (R.O.W.), % 
 
Source: Calculated from BNEF database 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Global supply and demand of equipment (GW), 2006-2015 
 
Source: Liebreich (2013, p. 6) 
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Figure 7. Global supply and demand for lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles 
 
Source: BNEF (2013, p. 13) 
 
In demonstrating the diminishing returns to economic value from manufacturing, this 
chapter reasserts the importance of innovation in making economies resilient to global 
competition. An economy’s resilience is determined by its ability to either: 1) retain these 
activities within the local economy, even as other regions compete to participate in these 
same industrial activities; or (2) adapt to the shift of an industrial activity by creating new 
activities that yield economic value (Hassink, 2010; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Storper, 
1997).  The spatial nature of innovation enables economies that are successful in innovation 
to achieve both scenarios.  
 
Unlike manufacturing, innovation tends to be more spatially embedded (or ‘territorialised’) in 
local economies (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Storper, 1997). EEG demonstrates that 
innovation activities are actually clustered at the local level because they rely largely on tacit 
exchanges of knowledge amongst actors, best facilitated through face-to-face interactions 
(Storper & Venables, 2004). Furthermore, cultural institutions – such as language and 
customs – shape the nature of these interactions and the development of their networks 
(Boschma, 2005). Therefore the development of national innovation systems makes them 
unique to the local economy. Saxenian's (1996) comparison of Boston with Silicon Valley 
examines how innovative clusters within the same country have developed very different 
innovation systems. The primary factors are due to the types of actors (and their networks) 
and the path-dependency of innovation experience, which has resulted in very different 
cultural approaches to risk. The territorialisation of innovation demonstrates how countries 
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that have developed strong national systems of innovation can retain innovation, despite 
losing manufacturing (Boschma & Kloosterman, 2005; Gertler & Levitte, 2005).  
 
The territorialisation of innovation also means that an innovation system cannot be 
replicated by a foreign economy (Storper, 1997). The implication is that countries that 
undertook catch-up strategies through manufacturing still need to develop their national 
innovation system. As Section 2 demonstrates, though emerging economies have reduced 
their reliance on foreign economies for technology, they still invest in these economies to 
access knowledge spillovers (Ernst, 2009). For example, Lewis & Wiser (2007) demonstrate 
that India’s Suzlon opened their international headquarters in Aarhus, Denmark to benefit 
from leading innovation research there. This example indicates how the territorialisation of 
innovation attracts investment from foreign economies, rather than losing out to them. 
  
The importance of retaining innovation is that it enables economies to manufacture 
technologies that have high value. Manufacturing for these technologies takes place in leading 
innovation hubs due to the need for highly-skilled workers who gain their expertise from 
these very same hubs (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Moretti, 2012). These technologies have 
high value because other economies cannot reproduce them. A Pew (2013) study shows that 
bilateral trade flows between the US and China in solar PV, wind and energy smart 
technologies had the net export value of USD 1.6 billion for the USA in 2011. The study 
demonstrates that the comparatively low value of Chinese exports to the USA was due to the 
global supply glut and consequently low market prices of final products. In comparison, the 
USA exported production equipment, highly specialised materials and sub-components that 
help Chinese manufacturers increase their production capacity, which Chinese firms have not 
yet learned to develop.  
 
In cases where other economies learn to produce these technologies, early-innovators can 
adapt by developing more sophisticated designs or next generation technologies. By 
developing and retaining strong innovation systems, these economies can capitalise on their 
knowledge to optimally advance the frontier (see Figure 8 as an example for wind 
technologies). For example, the next generation of solar technologies includes thin-film 
technologies. The only firm that has successfully commercialised this is the American 
company First Solar. As shown in Figure 2, it can produce thin-film technologies at a lower 
cost than the dominant crystalline PV technologies. Innovation studies of green technologies 
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demonstrate there is considerable scope for growth through innovation by means of 
knowledge complementarities. Noailly & Shestalova's (2013) comparison of inter-
technological spillovers suggests that solar PV and energy storage technology can have 
applications outside their own fields. Therefore innovation increases the adaptability – and 
hence resilience – of economies as manufacturing shifts. 
  
Therefore this chapter argues that economies that have successfully innovated green 
technologies continue to have opportunities to realise green growth. However these 
economies need to continue to invest in R&D in order to capitalise on their accumulation of 
knowledge capital. Fankhauser et al. (2013)demonstrate that countries like Japan and 
Germany have a high potential to convert their innovative capacities to producing green 
technologies in the automobile, materials and specialised production equipment. However 
countries such as the UK, which has comparative advantage in chemicals, pulp and paper, 
batteries, and cement industries, have low green innovation levels for green technologies. By 
not capitalising on their comparative advantage to undertake green innovation in these 
sectors, the UK can miss out on opportunities to realise green growth in the long run.   
 
Figure 8. Top ten countries in developing wind turbines according to maximum 
power and blade size 
 
Source: Derived from BNEF database 
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2.3 Spatial characteristics of industrial activities and 
implications on value-added to the local economy 
 
This section expands on EEG’s study by focusing on the spatial characteristics of different 
technologies affects the spatialisation of industrial activities. These differences in 
technologies’ characteristics can affect where innovation, manufacturing and markets locate 
in relation to each other. The spatial distance between these activities can thus determine the 
ability for economies to realise economic-value within the geographical confines of the 
economy. Appreciating these differences in spatial characteristics can provide a more 
nuanced approach to structuring industrial policy for various technologies that maximises 
‘green growth’ to the domestic economy. 
  
2.3.1 Industrial activities that have low spatial mobility will require 
manufacturing to be spatially proximate to markets 
 
The level of spatial mobility of technologies affects the distance between industrial activities. 
High spatial mobility means that technologies (and their sub-components) have low trade 
costs, so can be produced in disparate places and delivered to final markets. However, 
industrial activities that have low spatial mobility need to be spatially concentrated as the high 
costs of trade undermine any advantage there may otherwise be to obtaining technologies 
from lower cost economies. Therefore industrial activities with low spatial mobility can 
monopolise the entire industrial complex within the domestic economy, producing economic 
spillovers throughout the industrial cluster.  
 
The difference in these spatial characteristics can help explain why certain technologies are 
more spatially dispersed than others. Wind technologies (and their sub-components) are 
physically large, thereby having high shipping costs (Pew, 2013). Shipping also increases the 
risk of damage to components, potentially leading to malfunctions. In response to these 
conditions, manufacturing plants for wind components tend to be close to markets (Gosens 
& Lu, 2013; Lewis & Wiser, 2007). Biomass electricity generation is another example of a 
green industry that has high transport and logistics costs, with the sourcing biomass products 
accounting for a significant proportion of these overall costs (WEC & BNEF, 2013). These 
studies show that large-scale markets for wind and biomass technologies tend to source 
technologies from local manufacturing plants. In contrast, solar PV technologies have low 
transport and logistics costs. The modularisation of solar PV enables its sub-components to 
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be produced and assembled in discrete economies and exported to final markets. Therefore 
solar PV production networks are integrated globally (Wang, 2013) and vulnerable to  trade 
tariffs (Zindler, 2012).   
 
Institutional factors can also increase the cost of trade and affect the spatial mobility of 
technologies. For example, an obvious ‘hard’ institution is a trade regime that favours locally-
produced technologies over those produced outside the country. This can be achieved 
through the obvious route of import tariffs, but another means is through local content rules. 
The latter requires that imported technologies are produced using a defined level of inputs 
sourced in the target economy. Industrial policies for Brazilian and Chinese3 wind markets, as 
well as Chinese and Japanese solar PV markets, all have local content rule restrictions (Lewis 
& Wiser, 2007; Schwarzer, 2013; UNEP, 2013). Therefore techno-nationalist industrial 
policies can structure domestic market mechanisms to retain manufacturing within the 
domestic economy despite global competition.  
  
Another institutional variation that increases the cost of trade is differences in intellectual 
property rights (IPR) regimes. Firms are able to sell patents and technological licenses to 
foreign economies, or undertake research partnerships with foreign technologies. However  
Dechezleprêtre et al. (2011) demonstrate how the weak enforceability of IPR regimes reduces 
the propensity for technology transfer. Ernst (2011) proposes international standardisation of 
patent laws to overcome these institutional differences. Lewis (2014) highlights the important 
of joint research collaborations to engender trust. All in all, institutional factors can limit the 
spatial mobility of otherwise highly mobile and codified forms of innovation.  
 
2.3.2 Green industrial policy: realising green growth through supply and 
demand of technologies 
 
So far this chapter has largely focused on how green industrial policy can engender green 
growth through the production of green technologies. It argues that techno-national debates 
that focus on protecting domestic producers of technologies can harm the potential 
economic value-added realised through market expansion.  Expansion of green markets is an 
important premise of green growth. The transition to a low-carbon trajectory occurs through 
                                                 
3 In the case of Chinese wind markets, foreign firms are required to also take joint-ventures with a domestic firm in order to 
sell to local markets.  
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the supply and diffusion of green technologies. A joint study by WEC and BNEF (2013) 
demonstrates how price reductions in solar and wind technologies have brought the levelised 
costs of electricity into the same range4 as fossil-fuel generation (see Figure 9 below). 
Furthermore, industrial policies that support green markets can also attract both domestic 
and foreign investments to expand these markets. BNEF estimates that global asset financing 
for newly installed renewable energy capacity, and deploying energy smart technologies, was 
USD 207 billion in 2013 (Mills, 2014, p. 3). In comparison, global investments into the 
supply side of technologies were only USD 45 billion (Mills, 2014, p. 3). 
 
Lastly, the build-out of green markets creates employment opportunities in various sectors 
(Dicken, 2011; Muro, Rothwell, & Saha, 2011). These include marketing, finance and 
insurance, as well as labour related to installing, operating and maintaining technologies. A 
joint study by Swiss Re and BNEF calculate that insurance for renewable energy can grow to 
USD 1.5 – 2.8 billion based on the construction, operation and market-related risks related to 
the build-out of solar PV and wind markets (Turner et al., 2013). Another potential benefit is 
the dependence of markets on domestic labour, which means that these jobs are less exposed to 
international competition.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
4The ranges are dependent on electricity markets and financing structures of different economies. 
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Figure 9. Levelised costs of electricity for different technologies 
 
Source: WEC & BNEF (2013, p. 10) 
 
Therefore economic value can be derived from levels of global supply and domestic demand 
of technologies. The spatial characteristics of technologies then have implications for the 
level of value-added to the local economy. The economic geography and business 
management literature recognise that manufacturing has the lowest value-added to the 
economy (Dicken, 2011; Porter, 2011). In comparison, innovation provides the highest value 
due to the lack of replicability of technologies.  Market activities’ dependence on domestic 
labour also increased value-added to the domestic economy (see Figure 10 below).  
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Figure 10. Value-added from different industrial activities  
 
Developed from: Masahiko & Haruhiko (2002) 
 
The spatialisation of certain technologies demonstrates that domestic markets are not 
restricted to domestic supply. Instead the source and level of technology supply is influenced 
by: (1) replicability of technologies (based on how many economies can make these 
technologies, and hence affect global supply); and (2) spatial mobility of technologies 
(determining whether costs of trade will increase or decrease access to foreign supply of 
technologies). Technologies with high spatial mobility indicate that both domestic and 
foreign firms have access to domestic markets. However the intensity of competition for 
these markets is dependent on the level of replicability. If only a few firms can produce these 
technologies, sellers can charge high prices to sell to domestic buyers. However if many firms 
can reproduce these technologies, it becomes a buyer’s market. Though supply-side firms in 
the domestic economy will face low profit margins, the economic value to the local economy 
can be counteracted by market expansion from cheap technologies. 
  
Table 3 below summarises the conceptual framework of how replicability and mobility of 
technologies can affect the balance of economic value to the local economy. It looks at the 
trade-offs in value between buyer’s and seller’s markets based on supply of technologies.  
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However,  market demand needs to be high enough to absorb this supply and the 
importance of diffusing green technologies to achieve a low-carbon trajectory – along with 
green growth from market expansion – provides justification for demand-side policies. 
Though the prices of green technologies can decrease due to increases in global supply, it 
does not guarantee that green technologies will be cost-competitive to their brown 
incumbents. These dynamics illustrate the importance of economies’ instituting demand for 
green technologies – regardless of whether it provides economic spillovers to domestic 
manufacturing. Ironically, this techno-national focus on achieving economic growth from 
green industrial policy can subsume the priority of becoming “green the economy” through 
technological diffusion. The table below demonstrates that policy-makers should balance 
priorities in supporting both the supply of and demand for technologies.  
Table 3. Determining level of competition in domestic markets based on spatial characteristics of technologies 
 
Spatial mobility of technologies 
Replicability of technologies 
Low High 
Low Seller’s market: Low competition in domestic 
markets creates high value for domestic 
producers.  
Supply-side actors can command high technology 
prices because other firms cannot produce these 
technologies. Domestic economies can potentially 
still benefit from having local manufacturing plants, 
even if the firms are headquartered abroad. The high 
costs of transport favours manufacturing to be 
located near the market [e.g. large offshore wind 
turbines]. 
Both buyer’s and seller’s market: High 
competition in domestic markets.  High costs of 
trade means manufacturing will need to be close to 
markets. However the replicability of these 
technologies could mean that multiple firms compete 
to supply technologies to domestic markets. A more 
competitive domestic market can still benefit market 
actors [e.g. biomass markets that have multiple 
companies competing for domestic market share].  
High Seller’s market: Low competition for domestic 
and foreign markets creates high value for 
domestic producers.  Few supply-side actors can 
produce these technologies. Furthermore these 
technologies have high spatial mobility that allows 
them to be sold in multiple countries. Therefore 
supply-side actors can reap high levels of value in 
both domestic and foreign markets [e.g. First Solar’s 
thin-film technologies]. 
Buyer’s market: Intense competition for domestic 
and foreign markets.  High technological replicability 
means that multiple actors from different economies 
can produce these technologies. The low costs of 
transport indicates that demand can be met by global 
supply. This leads to low profit margins for supply-side 
firms, to the benefit of markets [e.g. crystalline PV 
technologies]. 
Source: Author schema based on Boschma (2014); Dicken (2011); Storper (1997)
2.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to reveal how the spatial dynamics of technologies and industrial 
activities affect domestic green growth opportunities. It recognises that the political economy 
goal of green industrial policy is to maximise economic returns to the local economy. 
However it argues that techno-nationalist perspectives can misconstrue where green growth 
opportunities actually exist. Maximising economic value within the economy does not always 
occur through spillovers between domestic innovation and manufacturing – especially as 
these technologies become subject to cost competition globally. 
  
EEG uses the concept of resilience to investigate whether the local economy can withstand 
global competition. It argues that the ability of domestic industry to appropriate returns is 
not through highly replicable manufacturing technologies, which only expose them to global 
competition and commodity price fluctuations. Instead, the concept of resilience shows how 
success in innovation enables these economies to concentrate on manufacturing high-value 
technologies those other economies cannot reproduce. Furthermore, economies can 
capitalise on their knowledge accumulated through innovation to develop the next generation 
of technologies.  
  
This chapter also considers how the spatial characteristics of technologies can affect whether 
green growth opportunities are realised through the supply or demand of local economies 
and argues that green industrial policy should consider how the spatial characteristics of 
technologies affect supply and demand dynamics. These dynamics can affect how much 
economic value can be added either through domestic supply and the build-out of markets. 
Policy-makers should also reconsider whether trade policies that protect domestic markets 
from foreign competition can have larger opportunity costs for green growth through market 
expansion, particularly in cases where technologies are highly replicable and have high spatial 
mobility.  
 
Having said this, techno-national policies to protect domestic industry can be justified under 
two circumstances. The first is ensuring that the IPR of domestic innovative actors is 
protected so as to reward (and encourage) investments in innovation. Auerswald (2012) and 
Harvey (2008) studies demonstrate that weak IPR regimes that do not protect against 
knowledge spillovers dampen the willingness of innovative actors to invest in risky 
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innovation. Therefore the development and enforcement of international standards for IPR are 
incredibly important. The second case is when developing countries use localisation policies 
to help the fledgling domestic industry develop technological capabilities (Lewis & Wiser, 
2007).  
 
Both circumstances have their own controversies. Protection of IPR can hamper the 
diffusion of green technologies that are essential for developing countries’ mitigation and 
adaptation efforts (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011; Lewis, 2014). Ockwell et al. (2010) argues that 
developed country concerns for green IPR protection can be overstated as developing 
countries are not necessarily ‘supply competitors’; although firms in developing countries can 
get access to technologies to build their technological capacity, they have not been able to 
access cutting edge IPR. However, green IPR diffusion is needed to help developing 
countries build their capacity to engage with low-carbon development. In terms of fledgling 
industry protection, D’Costa (2012) highlights how persistent market protection for the 
Indian industry created a monopoly situation prior to trade liberalisation in the 1990s, with 
disincentives for domestic firms to increase their technological capabilities to become 
globally competitive. In this case, protection of domestic markets for the domestic industry 
creates high costs for both domestic development (in terms of improving technological 
capabilities) and domestic consumers (in terms of accessing high quality foreign goods).  
  
Further research questions can be developed using EEG’s study of the spatialisation of 
technologies and its implications on local economic development. The spatial production life 
cycle shows that in the first cycle, there is spatial decoupling between innovation and 
manufacturing activities. Questions still remain, however. Does this spatial distance between 
innovation and manufacturing persist over different successive cycles of technologies? Or do 
emerging economies capitalise on the close spatial relationship between indigenous 
innovation and manufacturing to develop alternative technologies? Even if innovation and 
manufacturing occurs in countries where comparative advantage exists, does it mean an 
increase in research collaborations between these countries? The motivation would be to 
enable learning geared towards process innovations or the commercialisation of early 
prototypes. Or do countries collaborate with others that have similar technological 
capabilities? Lastly, do domestic political economy developments in green technologies affect 
how research institutes interact with counterparts in competitor countries? These questions 
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have the potential to shed light on the resilience of economies pursuing green growth from 
supply-side activities.  
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Chapter 3: First-mover advantage and the 
spatial evolution of  innovation and 
manufacturing in the solar PV industry 
Considering the spatial relationship of innovation and manufacturing over 
time 
3 Make invisible 
 
ABSTRACT. Within the context of debates about the resilience of “first-mover 
advantage” (FMA) in clean tech, this chapter explores the changing spatial distribution 
of economic activity in the global solar photovoltaic (PV) industry. Conceptually, we 
situate our analysis in the product life-cycle model, which gives rise to two hypotheses. 
The spatial decoupling hypothesis posits that there will be a spatial separation between 
innovation and manufacturing over time, with first-movers retaining competitive 
advantages in innovation; while the spatial recoupling hypothesis suggests that 
innovation will eventually follow manufacturing as it migrates to late-comers. While 
there has been a major shift of manufacturing capacity to late-comers (notably China), 
we find only partial evidence of recoupling, at least when we measure innovation by 
patents or countries’ production of best-in-class solar cells. Using scientific research 
publications provides a slightly different picture, suggesting that late-comers are 
increasingly catching up with first-movers. We conclude by discussing the relevance of 
our findings for debates about the importance of proximity for innovation and policy-
inducted FMA.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
According to theories of first-mover advantage (FMA), firms which gain an early lead in a 
particular industry may go on to enjoy long-term competitive advantages (Kerin et al., 1992). 
Within the context of the so-called “clean tech” industry (Caprotti, 2011; Cooke, 2008), ideas 
of FMA have been drawn upon to argue for an important role for early state intervention to 
support the development of “green” national champions. One influential variant of this 
thesis, famously espoused by Porter (Porter, 1991; Porter & van der Linde, 1995) places 
strong emphasis on properly designed public environmental regulation to stimulate the early 
innovation of environmentally sound technologies. Others have highlighted the importance 
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of deploying a wider set of industrial policies (Wallace, 1996). Either way, the underlying 
assumption is that the early adoption of state-based demand- and supply-side measures may 
be instrumental in generating first-mover advantage in this emerging field of technology. 
Moreover, by implication, those countries “late to the game” in the development of clean 
tech might subsequently struggle to “catch-up”. 
 
Couched in the policy-oriented discourse of ecological modernisation and, latterly, green 
growth, such ideas have proved influential. Indeed, historical experience has lent weight to 
the predictions of policy-induced FMA, with early state interventions in countries such as 
Germany, Denmark and the US apparently supporting the development of domestic 
environmental technology industries from the 1960s onwards (Beise & Rennings, 2005; 
Huber, 2008; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Popp, 2006). However, the past decade has 
witnessed the dramatic growth of a clean tech industry in a number of emerging economies, 
despite being comparative late-comers (de la Tour et al., 2011; Lema & Lema, 2012; Liu & 
Goldstein, 2013). For policy-makers, such trends have fuelled fears of a wholesale shift of the 
emerging clean tech industry from West to East, and called into question the public support 
provided to the domestic clean tech industry in developed economies (Pegels & Lütkenhorst, 
2014). Moreover, of direct concern in the present chapter, the recent growth of the clean 
tech industry in emerging economies would appear to challenge the idea that countries can 
retain their FMA in emerging sectors. 
 
For economic geographers, the geographic spread of the clean tech industry is unlikely to 
come as a surprise. Industrial and product life-cycle theories have long posited a spatial shift 
of manufacturing activity from “core” (i.e. developed, first-movers) to “peripheral” (i.e. 
developing, late-comer) countries as industries mature (Vernon, 1966). More recently, 
research into production networks and chains has drawn attention to how a growing number 
of industries are increasingly organised on a transnational basis, with different functions and 
operations involved in the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services 
located in different countries/regions (Coe et al., 2004; Dicken, 2010). An important insight 
from this literature is that, from the perspective of regional and/or national economic 
prosperity, what matters is the control of high-value added activities. This, in turn, points to 
the importance of retaining competitive advantages in innovation.  Innovative capabilities 
and outputs can be interpreted as intangible assets (Mudambi, 2008). Such assets are more 
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difficult to replicate, rendering them the source of value-added and prosperity for longer 
periods of time (Poletti et al., 2011). 
This chapter intervenes in these debates by exploring spatial shifts in the innovation and 
manufacture of solar photovoltaic (PV) technology over time.  A central aim is to examine 
whether countries which first became dominant in innovation and manufacturing retain their 
innovative advantages as manufacturing shifts to emerging economies. Put differently, does 
innovative activity follow dominance in manufacturing over time, or does it remain with first-
movers? To answer these questions, we map the evolving geography of the solar PV 
industry, charting the spatial distribution of (a) manufacturing and (b) innovation over the 
period 1976-2012.   
 
Our research makes two important contributions. First, we contribute to debates in 
economic geography about the dynamic spatial relationship between innovation and 
manufacturing over time (Boschma, 2005; Morgan, 2004). These debates centre on whether 
learning from spatially proximate manufacturing activities is necessary for enhancing the 
capability of innovating actors to improve the technological performance of successive 
products and advanced manufacturing technologies (Aoyama et al., 2011; Mudambi, 2008). 
They also centre on the “resilience” of economies (Hassink, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006) 
and the degree to which accumulated, territorially-embedded innovation capabilities enable 
first-movers to adapt to new competitive realities. On the one hand, it could be that 
innovation and manufacturing spatially separate as the industry matures, with the factors 
which provide competitive advantage in manufacturing in late-comers failing to translate into 
innovative capabilities. Alternatively, whilst spatial decoupling may take place in the short-
term, it could be that innovative activity eventually follows manufacturing. In particular, 
technological learning gained through manufacturing and the absorption of foreign 
technology may give rise to indigenous innovation capabilities required to successfully 
participate in the next round of innovation (Ru et al., 2012; Yeung, 2007). We refer to this 
dynamic as spatial recoupling. 
 
Second, by investigating the reality of spatial decoupling and recoupling in the context of 
solar PV, we seek to address an important gap in current understanding regarding the 
economic sustainability of FMA. The growth of clean tech in several emerging economies 
raises questions about the advantages of being a first-mover; the degree to which late-comers 
(or “followers”) can free-ride off first-mover technological investments (Lieberman & 
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Montgomery, 1988; Pegels & Lütkenhorst, 2014); and whether first-movers become “locked-
into” technological trajectories which make it difficult for them to adjust to external shocks 
from new sources of competition (Martin & Sunley, 2006). A number of chapters offer 
empirical support for the idea that a combination of demand- and supply-side factors was 
instrumental in the early dominance of a handful of developed countries in the clean tech 
sector (Brandt & Svendsen, 2006; Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006). More recently, several case-
studies have documented the rise of the clean tech sector in emerging economies (de la Tour 
et al., 2011; Dutz & Sharma, 2012; Hansen & Ockwell, 2014; Lewis, 2007; MacLaughlin & 
Scott, 2010; Mathews et al., 2011; Pueyo et al., 2011). However, missing from the literature 
have been more systematic, comparative analyses which have sought to go beyond the 
analysis of either first-movers or late-comers to examine the changing distribution of 
economic activity in clean tech across countries from both of these categories.  
 
A particular novelty of our study is that it uses multiple measures of innovative activity. 
Previous larger N, comparative research which has examined innovative capabilities and 
outputs in clean tech has tended to rely exclusively on patent counts. For sure, these counts 
are not without their merits. Yet they can also be misleading. Most importantly, patents 
counts alone say nothing about the “quality” of innovations, and the identity of countries at 
the frontier of inventive activity (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011). Precisely for this reason, as well 
as academic research publications, we use a novel measure of “best-in-class” product 
innovations.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the product life-cycle (PLC) 
model and elaborates on two competing hypotheses (spatial decoupling and recoupling) 
regarding the dynamic relationship between manufacturing and innovation. The research 
design is presented in Section 4, followed by results in Section 5. In brief, while there has 
been a major shift of manufacturing capacity to late-comers (notably China), we find only 
partial evidence of recoupling, at least when we measure innovation by patents or countries’ 
production of best-in-class solar cells. Section 6 provides discussion and conclusions.  
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3.1.1 Spatial decoupling and recoupling  
 
3.1.2 The product life cycle 
 
Our conceptual starting point in the present chapter is the product life-cycle (PLC) model 
which provides a framework for beginning to understand the spatial relationship between 
innovation and manufacturing in solar PV. The PLC posits that technologies go through 
essentially two main stages (Klepper, 1996). In the initial growth stage, innovative efforts lead 
to the development of new technologies. The basis of competition between innovators and 
entrepreneurs is product innovation. These actors seek to make their experimental designs 
technologically and commercially attractive by “learning-by-searching” which, to a greater or 
lesser extent, involves trial-and-error (Callander, 2011). At this stage, access to strategic niche 
markets (SNM) often assumes an important role, in that they provide an environment in 
which to incubate new technologies and create learning feedback loops for the product’s 
further development and performance improvements of associated process technologies 
(Kemp et al., 1998).  
 
Yet once a technology achieves a “dominant design” – where a certain technological design 
gains the greatest market acceptability – the technology matures. At this stage, the basis of 
competition shifts from product innovation towards reducing production costs, and 
expanding market share though process innovations (Abernathy & Townsend, 1975). The 
knowledge that underpins production of technologies becomes codified into hardware 
technologies, production routines and written manuals (Tidd & Bessant, 2009).  Codification 
of production technologies enables knowledge underpinning production to be transferred 
across geographic space from first-mover economies, where technology was originally 
developed, to economies that have the comparative advantage in high-volume manufacturing 
(Mudambi, 2008; Potter & Watts, 2010). Technologies may be transferred through foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as multinationals invest in production facilities in late-comer 
economies with lower manufacturing costs (Dunning & Lundan, 2008).  Alternatively, 
domestic firms in economies can acquire this codified knowledge to manufacture 
technologies in the local economy, including through imports of embodied technology, 
licencing and original equipment manufacture (OEM) (Hobday, 1995). In either case, later-
comer economies are assumed to be able to capitalize on their comparative advantage in 
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manufacturing to enter these new technological industries, sometimes as part of outsourcing 
strategies by firms in first-movers (Xiaobo et al., 2010; Yeung, 2007).  
 
The growth and maturity stage constitutes one cycle of the PLC. The next iteration of the 
PLC begins with certain declines at the maturity stage (Klepper & Simons, 2005). The main 
risk at the maturity stage is of technological obsolescence, where the global markets are 
saturated with the current dominant design, or existing technologies are no longer cost or 
performance competitive. Thus a new cycle of competition occurs – with the potential of at 
least two different technological trajectories. In one instance, existing users upgrade to newer 
versions of the dominant design (e.g. upgrading from an iPhone 5 to an iPhone 5C). An 
important part of the innovation that goes into improving the existing dominant design is the 
upgrading of production equipment used in factories to manufacture products. These kinds 
of process innovations are considered to be of a high-level because they require advanced 
engineering in production equipment design and, increasingly, automation (Hansen & 
Ockwell, 2014). Therefore, at this stage, innovation may be focused around high-level 
process innovation as well as product innovation.  The second potential scenario is when a 
completely new kind of product acts as a complete substitute for the dominant design (e.g. 
technological substitution occurs from the telegraph, to the telephone handset, to the mobile 
phone) (Winter, 1984). Again, this is likely to require significant process innovation, and the 
production of a new generation of manufacturing technologies.   
 
A central focus in the present research is on the second and third stage of the PLC. For 
many categories of clean tech, the initial growth phase took place in developed economies, 
often supported by domestic governments (Brandt & Svendsen, 2006; Huber, 2008). Yet less 
well understood is the degree to which the shift of manufacturing to late-comers is 
accompanied by a shift in the locus of innovative activity to these economies. We explore 
this question, examining two competing hypotheses outlined below, the spatial decoupling 
and the spatial recoupling hypotheses (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. The conceptual relationship between manufacturing and innovation 
 
Source: Author’s schema based on Nelson & Winter (1982) 
  
88 
 
Table 1. Hypotheses based on the conceptual relationship between manufacturing 
and innovation 
Stage 1: Growth Stage of new 
technology 
Stage 2: Maturity Stage Stage 3: Next iteration of PLC 
Competitive basis: Product 
innovation 
Competitive basis: 
Process innovation 
Competitive basis: New 
product innovation to avoid 
technological obsolescence; also 
high-level process innovation  
Spatial relationship between 
innovation & manufacturing:  
Spatial coupling:  close spatial 
proximity between designing 
and producing experimental 
designs.  Potential 
manufacturers are (or working 
closely with) the experimental 
designers.  
 
Spatial relationship 
between innovation & 
manufacturing:  
Spatial de-coupling: in 
open, global markets 
where production 
technology can be 
transferred, economies 
specialize in 
comparative advantage. 
Focus of the industry is 
on reducing costs, so 
manufacturing shifts to 
developing economies. 
Product innovation is 
embedded in first-
mover economies.  
Spatial relationship between 
innovation & manufacturing? 
The conceptual debate: 
• H1: Spatial de-coupling: 
continued specialization of 
activities reinforces 
comparative advantage of 
economies to spatially 
separate innovation and 
manufacturing. 
• H2: Spatial re-coupling: 
industrialized economies 
leverage both indigenous 
and external innovation 
efforts to increase product 
innovation where 
manufacturing occurs. 
Source: Authors, based on insights from Mathews & Cho (2007), Nelson & Winter (1982), and Porter 
(1990) 
 
3.1.3 The spatial decoupling hypothesis 
 
The spatial decoupling hypothesis posits that there will be a spatial separation between 
manufacturing and innovation over time. In particular, manufacturing will shift to late-comer 
(i.e. developing) economies, owing to the lower costs of production in these locations. 
However, during the next wave of the PLC, innovation will predominantly remain rooted in 
first-mover economies.  
 
Theoretical support for the spatial decoupling hypothesis can be found in work in 
evolutionary economic geography (EEG) which suggests that the social, institutional and 
organizational assets required for innovation at the technological frontier are territorially 
“embedded” in advanced economies (Morgan, 2004; Mudambi, 2008; Storper, 1997). These 
economies benefit from knowledge, skills and expertise embodied in domestic actors 
(ranging from scientists, through to venture capitalists through to lawyers), accumulated 
through previous experience of innovation and manufacturing (Amin & Thrift, 1992; 
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Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Furthermore, they benefit from agglomeration effects, including 
synergies and positive spillovers between firms, universities and a range of institutions which 
are spatially proximate (Coe et al., 2004). Together, this spatial clustering of knowledge-based 
assets allows first-mover economies to act as important innovation hubs, productively 
exploiting newly-discovered knowledge through access to skilled labour, supplier linkages and 
specialised market knowledge (Potter & Watts, 2010). This spatial clustering of knowledge-
based assets is especially pertinent in the case of high-level process innovations which require 
access to advanced research, design and engineering capabilities. 
 
Another key claim of economic geographers, which is especially apposite in the present 
context, is that it is more difficult for external actors to easily access knowledge that is 
generated in these innovation hubs (Lagendijk & Oinas, 2005; Morgan, 2004). A large share 
of this technological knowledge is tacit in nature, underlining the importance of spatial 
proximity for knowledge exchange and spillovers (Pinch et al., 2003). The lack of codified 
knowledge makes it difficult for actors to transfer outside the hub, unless they manage to 
recruit knowledgeable actors from these innovation hubs. It is not impossible for late-comer 
economies to develop their own innovation systems necessary to undertake processes of 
learning-by-searching (Fu et al., 2011). However, if first-mover economies continuously 
undertake learning-by-searching efforts to accumulate more knowledge, there is a higher 
probability that these economies will “outpace” late-comer economies through continuously 
building on their knowledge capital (Mudambi, 2008; Porter, 1990; Storper, 1997). 
 
Thus work in EEG provides a conceptual basis to support to the hypothesis that there will 
be a spatial decoupling of industrial activities in successive cycles. This spatial decoupling 
occurs because the specific assets that underpin innovation are difficult to imitate and 
spatially embedded in first-mover economies that first invested and continued to invest in 
being innovative. The result is that these premier innovation hubs continue to produce 
product innovations and high-level process innovations and, as a result, are able to capture 
and retain significant value which arises from the control and ownership of inimitable and 
rare knowledge-based assets (Mudambi, 2008). Conversely, codified knowledge of 
production technologies enables the spatial transfer of manufacturing to late-comer 
economies, namely those with a comparative advantage in production. Innovative activity 
will take place in these countries, although predominantly aimed at incrementally improving 
process efficiency, and lowering the costs of production.  
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3.1.4 The spatial recoupling hypothesis 
 
A second (competing) hypothesis explored in the present chapter is that it may be possible 
for manufacturing and innovation to become recoupled during the next cycle of product and 
process innovations. Inspiration for this thesis comes from work, particularly by 
development scholars, on East Asian economies that achieved high-technology 
industrialization (Fu et al., 2011; Gereffi & Wyman, 2014). A key insight from this literature 
is that manufacturing helped leading firms in countries such as South Korea and Taiwan to 
enter new industries and develop technological capabilities through learning-by-doing. 
Moreover, spatial proximity to manufacturing facilities provided an opportunity for firms to 
apply new experimental designs and develop the next set of product innovations (Yeung, 
2007).  
 
Countries which pursued a strategy of industrialization via technological “catch-up” 
(Mathews & Cho, 2007) did not begin by undertaking indigenous innovation to 
independently learn to produce new technologies. Instead, particular emphasis was placed on 
technology transfer, often supported by activist state policies. Domestic firms were 
encouraged to enter industries with high export growth opportunities, particularly at a point 
of technological maturity when the latest production technologies or dominant designs of 
technologies could readily be transferred (Mathews et al., 2011). Moreover, taking advantage 
of their late-comer status, these firms sought to acquire foreign technological knowledge in 
order to close the technological gap with leading economies. A common starting point for 
these transfers was licencing, joint production ventures, linkages with purchasers of goods in 
advanced economies and FDI (Hobday, 1995; Hsu et al., 2007). However, as domestic 
technological capabilities were deepened through experience of imitating, absorbing and 
producing foreign technology, late-comers increasingly sought to develop their own 
innovation capabilities. Hence domestic firms combined experiential learning in 
manufacturing with knowledge gained through internal R&D and leveraged from multiple 
global innovation hubs (Fu et al., 2011). Amongst others, this has involved serving as 
suppliers to leading global firms, participating in co-operative R&D ventures with foreign 
partners, hiring engineers trained in foreign firms and universities, and acquiring foreign 
innovation-intensive firms (Yeung, 2007).  
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A longer-term goal of governments has been to facilitate a transition from industrial catch-up 
to becoming innovative “fast-followers” (Mathews, 2002), with the capability to develop the 
next set of product and process innovations. This requires the creation of “national system of 
economic learning” (Mathews & Cho, 2007) through which local manufacturing firms, 
research institutions, and even domestic markets move along the learning curve and 
transition from imitation to innovation. An important part of learning involved in enhancing 
indigenous innovation capabilities is achieved through experimentation, and the trial-and-
error testing of multiple sets of product designs. This, in turn, is facilitated by spatial 
proximity to manufacturing facilities to apply and test new prototypes (Mathews et al., 2011). 
An important corollary of these complementarities is that indigenous R&D efforts may well 
lead to increased innovation in economies that specialize in manufacturing, potentially 
challenging the dominance of first-mover economies. Indeed, without a significant local 
manufacturing base to gain valuable feedback, learning and optimise design, first-movers may 
lose their competitive advantages in innovation over time. The result is that there will be a 
spatial recoupling of manufacturing and innovation in the next cycle of product innovations.    
 
3.1.5 Previous evidence  
 
The literature therefore provides two competing hypotheses about the relationship between 
manufacturing and innovation over time – each leading to different conclusions for ongoing 
debates about FMA in clean tech. The first hypothesis suggests that FMA may endure, at 
least in terms of innovation, owing to the accumulation of territorially-embedded networks 
of complementary technological capabilities, actors and institutions. Conversely, the second 
hypothesis suggests that FMA is only temporary, owing to the ability of certain late-comer 
economies to progressively develop the innovative capabilities required for the next 
generation of product and process innovations.  
 
Two streams of previous work shed light into this debate about spatial decoupling and 
recoupling in clean tech. One stream has examined efforts by various late-comer countries to 
develop a domestic environmental technology industry, with a particular focus on strategies 
of technology acquisition and innovation. This case-study literature has documents how, in a 
relatively short space of time, several late-comers such as China, India and Taiwan have 
developed the capacity to manufacture renewable energy technologies. Furthermore, whilst 
recognising that experiences have varied across countries, technologies and firms (e.g. see 
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Furtado et al., 2011; Wu and Mathews, 2012), the literature also documents how technology 
transfer has invariably played a pivotal role in these processes (Hansen & Ockwell, 2014; 
Lema & Lema, 2012; Mathews et al., 2011; Ockwell et al., 2008; Pueyo et al., 2011; Qiu et al., 
2013; Ru et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2012). To the extent that the source of many transferred 
technologies has predominantly been first-mover developed economies, and that transfers 
have often (but not exclusively) been through market channels, this work provides support 
for the idea of enduring FMA. However, rather than simply being passive recipients of 
foreign technologies, studies have also pointed to the growing innovative activity on the part 
of late-comers. A common theme has been how domestic firms in later-comers have made 
investments to improve the technological sophistication of their processes and products, 
move into more valuable parts of the value chain and reduce dependence on foreign 
technology (Lema & Lema, 2012; Ru et al., 2012). What evidence exists suggests that these 
efforts have had two important consequences. One is that in certain sectors (e.g. wind), the 
technological “gap” between the products manufactured in late-comers and first-comers is 
narrowing, although it remains (Liu & Goldstein, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). Another is that a 
greater share of products is the result of indigenous innovation. As an example, Wang et al. 
(2012) reports that the number of wind turbines available in the domestic market which were 
developed by Chinese firms grew from 25 in 2008 to 51 the following year, out of a total of 
120 types. 
 
A second stream of the existing literature which sheds light on our research question relies 
on patent statistics to capture the major inventors of clean technology. An advantage of this 
approach is that it allows comparisons between countries. Most of these studies suggest that 
the bulk of innovation for clean tech continues to take place in developed economies. In 
terms of absolute filings, Bierenbaum et al. (2012) show that a handful of economies such as 
Japan, Germany and the US – which were early-movers in terms of green technologies – 
have dominated the patenting of green technologies over recent decades. Measured by 
patent-intensity (i.e. patent filings per capita), the authors find that Germany and Japan 
emerge as front-runners, with a number of smaller European countries which were again 
early-movers also emerging as significant inventors of clean tech. Conversely, developing 
countries have lagged significantly in terms of the filing of patents for green technology, 
consistent with the spatial decoupling thesis. Similar findings emerge in other studies 
(Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011; Fankhauser et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2009). This said, there is a 
trend of rising patenting in countries outside the traditional core of Europe, Japan and the 
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US. Taiwan and South Korea, two countries which can be categorised as late-comers, are 
amongst the leading economies in terms of patent-intensity (Bierenbaum et al., 2012). 
Moreover, China, in particular, is emerging as an increasingly important source of green 
patents (Bettencourt  et al., 2013; Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011).  
 
3.2 Research design 
 
3.2.1 Empirical focus 
 
In order to examine the existence of spatial decoupling and recoupling in clean tech, we use 
the case of solar PV. The solar PV industry has a number of distinctive characteristics which 
make it a particularly interesting and relevant case in the present context. One is that it is 
characterised by relatively fast-paced technological change in which innovation continues to 
be important (Kirkegaard et al., 2010; The Economist, 2013). On the product side, much of 
this innovation is aimed at improving conversion efficiency of solar cells, although this has 
gone hand-in-hand with efforts to move towards technologies with lower manufacturing 
costs. Currently, the dominant (“design”) technology in solar PV is crystalline silicon, which 
is often referred to as a first-generation technology. Crystalline PV technologies account for 
more than 90% of the global market for solar PV. Many firms that manufacture crystalline 
PV technologies have suffered negative earnings. This stems from their involvement in parts 
of the value chain (mostly ingots and wafers, cells, and modules, as seen in Figure 2) which 
have experienced low and falling market prices as a result of production capacity outpacing 
market growth. As show in Figure 2, however, firms such as Wacker Chemie and MEMC 
have achieved positive earnings. The sophistication of their production equipment has meant 
that these firms can produce silicon and ingot and wafer technologies below the global 
market price. Hence a major focus of innovation continues to be high-level process 
innovations which allow manufacturers to improve the efficiency of capital equipment 
involved in the production of crystalline PV. Many of these innovations have been developed 
by firms in first-mover economies such as Japan, the US and Germany (Wu & Mathews, 
2012). 
 
Another innovation focus is in developing the “next generation” of solar PV technologies 
that are based on alternative semi-conductive materials (Lee et al., 2009). Prior to the increase 
in global supply of crystalline PV technologies that occurred after 2007, significant venture 
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capital and private equity (VC/PE) funding was being invested in commercialising these 
alternative PV technologies. These alternative technologies were attractive because they rely 
less on silicon material, and have a more integrated production equipment system, potentially 
allowing production at (per unit) prices that are lower than crystalline PV technologies. As 
solar PV technologies can be produced from a variety of semi-conductive materials, the 
possibilities for alternative technologies such as thin-film or organic solar PV technologies 
are large enough to produce several different types of product innovation within solar PV 
technologies. As the lack of silicon supply had caused crystalline PV technology prices to 
increase in the early 2000s, VC/PE investors – particularly in the US – were interested in 
commercialising these alternative technologies. However “the window of opportunity” for 
alternative PV technologies appeared to close after 2008, when crystalline prices reduced by 
80% between 2008 and 2012 due to the increased global supply. The USA’s First Solar 
(represented as FSLR in the Figure 2) is one of the most profitable solar PV firms because it 
successfully commercialised and manufactures cadmium telluride technologies below the 
global price for crystalline PV. Though the level of VC/PE investments into alternative PV 
technologies has decreased, different countries continue to pursue innovation of these 
alternative technologies. 
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Figure 2. Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) margins of quoted manufacturers 
by approximate value chain position, Q3 2012 
 
Source: Chase (2013) 
 
Another important feature of solar PV is that manufacturing is, to a greater or lesser extent, 
spatially mobile. The product (i.e. solar PV cells and modules) can be readily transported at a 
relatively low cost, reducing the importance of physical proximity to markets. Furthermore, 
the capabilities required to manufacture cells and modules of first-generation, crystalline 
silicon technologies are not especially high, with off-the-shelf (“turnkey”) production 
technologies available to purchase from international suppliers (Liu & Goldstein, 2013; 
Mathews et al., 2011). As such, it is a sector which fits with the characterisation of maturity in 
the PLC, with standardised production technologies making it possible for production to 
shift to late-comer economies.  
 
3.2.2 Variables and data  
 
Table 1 provides details of our main variables and data sources which fall into two categories: 
manufacturing and innovation. In order to measure the former, we use data on annual 
manufacturing capacity of solar PV modules, sourced from Bloomberg New Energy Finance 
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(BNEF). While capacity and production will not be perfectly correlated, capacity data 
nevertheless provides us with a comparative measure of the importance of different countries 
as producers of solar PV. 
 
Three sets of variables are used in order to capture innovative activity, outputs and capacity 
at the country level. The first variable seeks to measure countries’ research output for solar 
PV. We use the number of publications in scientific journals as our measure of research 
output, calculated using article counts from bibliometric information downloaded from two 
of the largest global academic databases: Scopus and Web of Science (WoS). An article was 
included in the count if it contains the search term “solar photovoltaic”. All relevant 
publications are highly likely to use this “meta-word” to identify their contribution in 
advancing scientific contributions even within the different technological niches of solar PV. 
By filtering for publications only from scientific journals, the datasets include research 
published both by scientific research institutes and firms (who also publish relevant research 
results to the scientific community).  While the use of scientific publications to measure 
scientific output is well-established in the literature (e.g. see Wagner & Wong, 2012), we do 
acknowledge that there could be a bias towards journals and articles published in English. As 
shown later on, however, it is notable that outputs from countries such as Japan, China, 
South Korea and Taiwan all feature significantly within both Scopus and WoS datasets. 
 
A more serious potential shortcoming of scientific publications is that there is no guarantee 
that academic research will result in commercially-viable innovations which provide 
appropriable value-added to economies. Our second variable partially (but not completely) 
overcomes this problem by using counts of patents that were filed by domestic inventors, 
and moreover granted. As explained above, the use of patents is common-place in the 
literature on eco-innovation, not least because they capture the outputs of innovative efforts. 
Our third set of innovation variables exclusively focus on product innovations. More 
specifically, they capture countries’ contributions to improvements in solar cell efficiency at 
the technological frontier, otherwise known as “best-in-class.” We use two best-in-class 
measures. The first one is derived from the US Department of Energy’s National Renewable 
Energy Laboratory (NREL), which has compiled data on solar cell efficiencies since 1976. 
The second one comes from a bi-annual publication of “Solar Efficiency Cell Tables” that 
are published in the journal, Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications. Both sets of data 
are widely recognised within the global solar PV community as recording the highest 
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confirmed efficiencies of solar PV cells and modules for the different generations of solar PV 
technologies for any given time period. There are important biases for these data. They do 
not capture all product innovations, but only new solar PV technologies which displace 
previous highest confirmed efficiencies, together with details of the inventor/fabricator. 
Furthermore, they only record product innovations which are sent to leading laboratories (in 
the US, Germany, Australia, Switzerland and Japan) for testing on a standardised basis, and 
therefore inevitably under-report innovation the actual level of product innovation (e.g. 
innovations which improve the durability of modules). In fact, we cannot entirely rule out the 
possibility of systematic bias across countries, although the “prestige” of being a front-runner 
means that leading research institutes have motives to disclose results in order to attract – or 
even sustain – research funding.  We also reduce the risk of country bias by using two 
datasets assembled and published in two different countries.  
 
In the present context, the best-in-class data serve two useful purposes. First, they pinpoint 
the identity of countries at the forefront of technological advances in conversation efficiency, 
which is instructive for understanding the distribution of advanced technological capabilities 
in innovation. Second, because the best-in-class data disaggregate maximum confirmed 
efficiencies according to different “families” of solar PV, they provide insights into which 
countries are making investments in “older” and “newer” generations of technology and the 
“diversity” of their investments. Diversity matters in the present context because it indicates 
the potential to commercialise alternative technologies – although this typically takes a long 
time. Furthermore, diversity reduces the risk of becoming locked-into a single technology 
which may later become obsolete (Martin & Sunley, 2006).  
 
The time spans of the respective datasets differ according to data availability. The datasets 
that denote research and manufacturing are divided into two different time periods. For 
scientific research publications and patents, respectively, the first time period is between 1990 
and 2004, and the second time period is between 2005 and 2012. The datasets provide a 
cumulative count of all research articles/patents within the respective time period. The first 
period covers a time when both first-mover and late-comer economies begin to invest 
significantly in research/innovation. The second one covers a period when there is a 
significant shift in manufacturing towards emerging economies.  
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The BNEF data for manufacturing capacity run between 2005 and 2012 and we take the first 
and last year for our comparative analysis. Note, 2005 is just one year after the first time 
period for the innovation datasets, though this can be justified on the grounds that 
innovation and research often precede manufacturing. BNEF do not have data for all 
countries.  Although Taiwan is a prominent solar PV manufacturer, its data are included as 
part of the manufacturing capacity of China. We use confirmed operational capacity data for 
four leading countries in the solar PV industry: China, Japan, the US and Germany. We also 
use data on India which is selected as an example of another major emerging economy which 
has entered the clean tech industry (Lema & Lema, 2012).  
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Table 2. Information on data measures and sources  
Industrial activity Data Source Time 
period 
Additional notes 
Manufacturing: 
Manufacturing 
capacity of PV 
modules 
(MW capacity) 
Bloomberg New 
Energy Finance 
(BNEF) 
2005-
06.2012 
1. Annual data on manufacturing 
capacity for selected countries. 
Capacity is used as an indicator of 
the relative size of manufacturing 
output. 
2. BNEF also provides capacities 
for tier 1 and 2 silicon and solar 
PV cells. 
Research 
innovation: 
Scientific 
publications 
Scopus (Elseiver) Restricted 
to 1990-
2012 
1.  Relevant publications 
identified using search term, 
“solar PV”. 
Research 
innovation: 
Scientific 
publications 
Web-of-Science 
(Thomson 
Reuters) 
Restricted 
to 1990-
2012 
1. Relevant publications identified 
using search term, “solar PV”. 
Innovation:  
Patent filings 
(absolute numbers) 
European 
Worldwide Office 
of Patent Statistics 
Restricted 
to 1990 -
2012 
1. Countries identified using 
reported addresses of inventors 
and firm BVDID addresses. 
2. Solar PV patents identified 
using patent classification code, 
“Y02E10”.  
3. Only patents granted included 
in the dataset, yielding 51,293 
patents.  
Product 
innovation:  
PV cell data 
(absolute numbers) 
National 
Renewable Energy 
Laboratory 
(NREL) 
1976-
09.2013 
1. Total of 205 data points for 
different PV cells. 
2. NREL categorises them within 
24 types of PV cells, which are 
classified in 5 broad family classes. 
3. The locations where PV cells 
were developed verified by 
additional research.  
Product 
innovation:  
PV cell data 
(absolute numbers) 
Solar cell 
efficiency tables 
from Journal of 
Progress in 
Photovoltaics 
1997-2012 1. Total of 208 data points for 
both PV cell and modules. 
2. Similar type/family 
classification to NREL. 
3. Location where PV cells were 
developed verified by additional 
research.  
4. Due to limited data availability, 
the first time period is between 
1997 and 2004, and second 2005-
2012. 
Source: Authors’ compilation 
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3.3 Results: the spatial evolution of solar PV 
 
3.3.1 A brief history  
 
The origins of today’s solar PV industry can be traced to the 1950s with the breakthrough 
development of crystalline silicon PV cells in the US. Early developments owed a great deal 
to advances in related industries such as semi-conductors and micro-electronics which 
provided important technological capabilities which could be applied in the emerging solar 
PV industry (Green, 1990). However, the high costs of solar PV cells meant that market 
demand remained limited, with their use largely restricted to selected niches such as satellites.  
Interest in the further development of solar PV technology received a significant boost with 
the oil crisis in 1973.  In order to create alternatives to oil sources, governments in Japan, the 
US and several European countries significantly increased public funds for R&D into solar 
PV technology. An important consequence of these investments was increased 
experimentation, learning and the accumulation of local technological capabilities specific to 
solar PV. The 1970s also saw Australia emerge as a significant actor in solar PV, with the 
University of New South Wales assuming a pivotal role as a hubs of research expertise 
(Effendi & Courvisanos, 2012). 
 
The rise of climate change as a public policy concern in the 1980s and 1990s further 
accelerated public support for solar PV in various developed economies (Kirkegaard et al., 
2010). On the supply-side, governments expanded funding for research, development and 
demonstration projects which helped to reduce the costs and improve the performance of 
solar PV. However, of considerable importance was the growth of demand-side initiatives, 
which significantly expanded the market for solar PV in particular countries (Norberg-Bohm, 
2000). Germany emerged as a leader in this respect, through a combination of capital grants 
for domestic solar installations and feed-in-tariffs (FITs), encouraging  new firms to enter 
solar PV in research and manufacturing and for existing ones to expand their operations in 
the country (Dunford et al., 2013; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006). Japan is another country 
which led in providing generous demand-side incentives for solar PV, including a subsidy 
scheme for residential solar installations and a quota scheme.  
 
A combination of demand- and supply-side supports therefore played an important role in 
the development of manufacturing and innovation capabilities in the majority of countries 
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which went onto become significant players in solar PV during the 1990s and 2000s. Yet 
government policies are not the only reason. First-movers such as Germany, Japan and the 
US have all been technological leaders in several other high-technology fields, with 
manufacturing and innovative capabilities in solar PV developing in a context of well-
functioning national systems of innovation, together with spillovers from other high-
technology sectors (Cooke, 2008).  The question addressed in the present research is whether 
these countries’ locally-accumulated capabilities in solar PV have made their dominance in 
innovation resilient to growing competition from late-comers.  
  
It ought to be noted that several of these apparent “late-comers” have, in fact, had a longer-
standing involvement in solar PV. For example, China and India engaged in indigenous R&D 
during the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequently went onto manufacture solar cells locally. 
However, domestic technological and innovation capabilities significantly lagged their 
counterparts in leading developed economies, with manufacturing capacities remaining 
comparatively small (Dunford et al., 2013; Liu and Goldstein, 2013). Indeed, it was not until 
the 2000s that late-comers started to become significant players in the solar PV industry, led 
in particular by South Korea, Taiwan and China (Mathews et al., 2011). In the rest of this 
section, we trace these dynamics, beginning with manufacturing capacity. 
 
3.3.2 Manufacturing in solar PV 
 
Tables 3-5 show manufacturing capacity in 2005 and 2012 for polysilicon, crystalline silicon 
PV cells and crystalline silicon PV modules, respectively. We focus on a small number of 
leading first-mover and late-comer countries in solar manufacturing, as well as India, which is 
used for illustrative purposes (see below). A number of insights can be drawn from these 
production data. The first is that the period since the mid-2000s has presided over a dramatic 
expansion of manufacturing capacity in solar PV. Between 2005 and 2012, global capacity 
increased by 4,923% and 3,609% for crystalline silicon cells and modules, respectively.  
A second observation is that there have been significant changes in the relative share of 
global capacity contributed by leading countries involved in manufacturing. Most striking is 
the growth of China. From around one quarter of global capacity of solar cells and modules 
in 2005, its share had risen to over two-thirds by 2012, making it by far-and-away the 
dominant producer. The country’s dominance in the upstream part of the value chain is less 
pronounced, accounting for approximately 31% of global capacity in polysilicon production 
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at the end of our time period, a pattern which Liu and Goldstein (2013) attribute to the 
higher technological capabilities required to achieve cost-competitiveness in silicon 
processing. 
  
Another striking shift is the relative decline of Japan which has gone from accounting for just 
over half of global manufacturing capacity in the mid-stream segment of the value chain in 
2005 to 3-4% in 2012. The trends for Germany and the US are somewhat different. 
Germany’s share of global manufacturing capacity was not substantially different at the start 
of the data period as at the end – with the country actually increasing its relative contribution 
in cells and modules. The US witnessed a significant decline in its share of polysilicon 
production, moving from a position of dominance with over half of global capacity in 2005 
to accounting for less than one-quarter in 2012. The USA’s share increased and declined, 
albeit not markedly in the case of solar cells and modules, respectively.  
 
A third observation is that the oft-discussed demise of first-mover, developed countries in 
manufacturing is more relative than absolute. In fact, absolute manufacturing capacity for 
solar PV in Germany, Japan and the US was actually significantly higher in 2012 than 2005.  
For example, while Japan’s share of solar PV cell capacity plummeted from 53% to 4%, its 
absolute capacity grew from 551 MW to 2248 MW over our seven year time period. In fact, 
the declining relative share of leading first-mover, developed economies can largely be 
explained by the dramatic increase in capacity of China. South Korea has also emerged as a 
globally significant player – albeit only in polysilicon. The contribution of other late-comer 
economies has been relatively small, as vividly illustrated by India whose share of global solar 
PV cell and module production has actually declined.  
 
Hence there has been a significant shift in the locus of manufacturing in the solar PV 
industry towards China.  We proceed in the next sub-sections to examine recent shifts in 
innovative efforts in solar PV across both first-movers and late-comer economies. 
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Table 3.  Tier 1 and 2 silicon capacity total - tonnes/year     
Country 2005 (% of global) 2012 (% of global)* 
China 0 (0) 90300 (31) 
India 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Japan 7500 (25) 21900 (8) 
United States 16600 (56) 63500 (22) 
Germany 5500 (19) 49800 (17) 
Other (mostly South Korea) 0 (0) 62000 (22) 
Total 29600  287500 
Source: *Based on BNEF Q2.2012 Report: figures up to June 2012  
 
Table 4.  Crystalline silicon PV cell manufacturing capacity total, MW/year 
Country 2005 (% of global) 2012 (% of global)* 
China 253 (24) 34436 (66) 
India 20.5 (2) 748.5 (1) 
Japan 551 (53) 2248 (4) 
United States 0 (0) 1025 (2) 
Germany 6 (1) 2462 (5) 
Other 211 (20) 11403.5 (22) 
Total 1041.5 52323 
Source: *Based on BNEF Q2.2012 Report: figures up to June 2012  
 
Table 5.  Crystalline silicon PV module manufacturing capacity total, MW/year 
Country 2005 (% of global) 2012 (% of global)* 
China 373 (28) 33960 (68) 
India 66.5 (5) 1588.5 (3) 
Japan 688 (51) 1513.5 (3) 
United States 90 (7) 1467 (3) 
Germany 21 (2) 2882 (6) 
Other 103 (8) 8346 (17) 
Total 1341.5 49757 
Source: *Based on BNEF Q2.2012 Report: figures up to June 2012  
 
3.3.3 Research/innovation in solar PV: Scientific publications 
 
Tables 6 and 7 show results from our analysis of scientific publication counts, respectively 
derived from two leading search engines, Scopus and Web-of-Science (WoS). Note, our time-
frame is longer than for manufacturing capacity, the latter being restricted by the availability 
of data. We also focus on a larger set of countries, chosen because they account for over 70% 
of contributions towards solar PV research in both time periods. The publication counts are 
fairly similar using Scopus and WoS – particularly when it comes to relative shares of the 
global total. 
 
104 
 
Several themes emerge from the data. First, the distribution of scientific research outputs are 
less concentrated than manufacturing capacity, with only a handful of countries accounting 
for more than 5% of publications in any of the time periods. One plausible explanation is 
that, compared to manufacturing, the barriers to entry in scientific research are lower 
allowing a broader range of countries to participate.  Manufacturing in polysilicon solar PV is 
scale-intensive (Dunford et al., 2013), leading to a concentration of manufacturing in 
particular countries with the capabilities to realise significant production volumes. 
 
Reflecting its long history of research into solar PV, together with underlying scientific 
strengths, the US appears as the country with the highest number of scientific publications. 
However, its share of the global total falls between 1990-2004 and 2005-2012, though the 
absolute number of publications rises. Amongst other developed economies, Japan and 
Germany are also significant hubs of scientific research outputs, with the UK and France also 
contributing disproportionately to publications into solar PV technology. Again, their share 
of the global total generally falls over time, with the relative decline greater in Japan. 
 
Turning to late-comers, China is by far-and-away the major source country of scientific 
research, followed by South Korea and Taiwan. All three countries markedly increase their 
share of global publications between the two time periods. In fact, with the partial exception 
of the US, China eclipses other developed economies in 2005-2012. To take one example: 
whilst Japan (11%) accounted for a larger share of global publications than China (7%) in the 
first time period , it was over-taken by China during the second period (7% versus 15%). 
South Korea and Taiwan similarly catch-up, and sometimes outpace, leading developed 
economies (Japan, Germany, etc.) other than the US in terms of scientific publications.  
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Table 6. Scientific publication counts in solar PV research (Scopus)*  
 
 
 
Country 
TP: 1990-2004 TP: 2005-2012 
Country 
Publications 
% of global 
publications in 
time period 
Country 
Publications 
% of global 
publications in 
time period 
China 739 7% 4823 15% 
USA 2095 21% 4525 14% 
Japan 1138 11% 2324 7% 
South Korea 143 1% 1942 6% 
Germany 723 7% 1928 6% 
Taiwan 99 1% 1482 5% 
UK 504 5% 1306 4% 
France 342 3% 1202 4% 
Spain 263 3% 1070 3% 
Italy 291 3% 1006 3% 
Canada 112 1% 600 2% 
Australia 259 3% 594 2% 
Netherlands 201 2% 469 1% 
Switzerland 138 1% 409 1% 
Sweden 120 1% 316 1% 
Russia 285 3% 258 1% 
Total 7452 75% 24254 75% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Scopus database 
Notes: *Percentages are of the global total in the respective time period. 
 
Table 7. Scientific publication counts in solar PV research (WoS)*  
 
 
 
Country 
TP: 1990-2004 TP: 2005-2012 
Country 
Publications 
% of global 
publications in 
time period 
Country 
Publications 
% of global 
publications in 
time period 
USA 1509 21% 6429 18% 
China 504 7% 5242 15% 
South Korea 124 2% 2892 8% 
Japan 788 11% 2425 7% 
Taiwan 83 1% 2065 6% 
Germany 501 7% 1933 5% 
UK 376 5% 1332 4% 
France 311 4% 1251 4% 
Italy 270 4% 1119 3% 
Spain 211 3% 1090 3% 
Canada 74 1% 640 2% 
Australia 159 2% 547 2% 
Netherlands 232 3% 530 1% 
Switzerland 112 2% 421 1% 
Sweden 102 1% 364 1% 
Russia 155 2% 261 1% 
Total 5511 78% 28541 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from Web of Science database 
Notes: *Percentages are of the global total in the respective time period. 
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3.3.4 Innovation in solar PV: Patents 
 
The evidence from scientific publications points to a geographic diversification of major 
research hubs with China, South Korea and Taiwan all emerging as increasingly important 
actors engaged in research into solar PV. The picture for patents is slightly different, though 
similar underlying trends are apparent. Table 8 and 9 respectively show data on counts of 
patents associated with inventors and firms. We use the same time periods and country 
selection as was the case for research publications. 
 
A significant increase of inventive activity takes place across the vast majority countries 
between the two time periods. In terms of developed economies, a large share of patenting is 
concentrated in just three countries, the US, Japan and Germany. Together, they account for 
54% and 76% of patents generated by investors and firms over the first period, 1990-2004.  
The contribution of other individual developed economies to the global stock of patents is 
relatively small, typically 2% or less. Moving to the second period, the share of US, Japan and 
Germany declines to 48% and 62%, as measured by inventor and firm patent counts. 
However, a closer reading of the data reveals a set of mixed trajectories, with the US 
increasing its share, Germany broadly maintaining its share, and Japan experiencing a marked 
decline.  
 
Amongst the late-comers, the most notable trend has been the rise of South Korea as an 
innovative actor, with the country drawing on its earlier experience in the semiconductors 
and flat panel displays to enter the solar PV sector (Wu & Mathews, 2012). Accounting for 
3% and 1% of inventor and firm patents in the first period, its share significantly expands to 
reach 15% and 10% over the second. Taiwan’s innovative output also increases, reaching 5% 
and 3%. The dominance of China in scientific research publications is less evident in terms 
of patenting. Its global share during the second period is 8% and 7% for inventor and firm 
patents. The former is actually a lower share than for the earlier period, though this decline is 
relative, with the actual number of patents much higher.  
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Table 8.  Patent counts associated with inventors  
 
 
 
Country 
TP: 1990-2004 TP: 2005-2012 
Country 
patents 
% of global 
patents in 
time period 
Country 
patents 
% of global 
patents in time 
period 
USA 13296 16% 57672 21% 
South Korea 2318 3% 42501 15% 
Germany 14844 18% 38320 14% 
Japan 16351 20% 37185 13% 
China 9030 11% 21369 8% 
Taiwan 715 1% 13224 5% 
France 1679 2% 7911 3% 
Spain 1041 1% 6707 2% 
Canada 1112 1% 3447 1% 
Italy 615 1% 3370 1% 
Netherlands 1494 2% 3198 1% 
Switzerland 1403 2% 2862 1% 
Russia 3142 4% 2703 1% 
Australia 1068 1% 1957 1% 
Sweden 990 1% 1310 0% 
Total 69098 85% 243736 88% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from PATSTAT database 
Table 9.  Patent counts associated with firms  
 
 
 
Country 
TP: 1990-2004 TP: 2005-2012 
Country 
patents 
% of global 
patents in 
time period 
Country 
patents 
% of global 
patents in time 
period 
Japan 17275 47% 25707 24% 
USA 6270 17% 22074 21% 
Germany 4542 12% 16737 16% 
South Korea 520 1% 10326 10% 
China 274 1% 7415 7% 
France 809 2% 2982 3% 
Taiwan 119 0% 2767 3% 
UK 1035 3% 2439 2% 
Spain 262 1% 2413 2% 
Netherlands 808 2% 1426 1% 
Switzerland 698 2% 1417 1% 
Italy 197 1% 1313 1% 
Canada 333 1% 878 1% 
Sweden 477 1% 793 1% 
Australia 472 1% 759 1% 
Russia 56 0% 26 0% 
Total 34147 92% 99472 92% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from PATSTAT database 
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3.3.5 Innovation in solar PV: Best-in-class products 
 
Patents provide a useful measure of innovative output across both process and product 
technologies, although aggregate counts provide only a partial indicator of countries who are 
contributing most to high value-added technological progress. We therefore turn to data on 
best-in-class solar PV efficiency-enhancing product innovations to gain a more refined 
understanding of countries at the technological frontier (Tables 10 and 11). The time periods 
for these data do not map perfectly onto those used for scientific publications and patents, 
but they provide a good approximation of activity before and after 2005.  
 
Although there are major differences in shares between the two data sources, they both 
indicate that a small number of first-mover developed economies have been responsible for 
the vast majority of class-leading product innovations in both time periods. The US in 
particular emerges as the single dominant source of efficiency-enhancing product innovations 
in solar PV. Its striking pre-eminence is especially apparent using the NREL data. Australia, 
Germany and Japan are the two other developed economies which have registered a large 
share of global product innovations at the efficiency frontier. Note, the former’s considerable 
success in developing single and multi-crystalline silicon PV cells in the 1980s and 1990s was 
not replicated after 2005. Trends in market share for each of these countries (except 
Australia) varies across the two sources of best-in-class data. However, taking the US, 
Germany and Japan, it is notable that the proportion of global product innovation made by 
this trio increases between the two time periods: from 80% to 85% in the case of Progress in 
Photovoltaics and 77% to 85% for NREL.  
 
Conversely, late-comers are conspicuous by their absence, or at least their comparatively 
small contribution to advanced product innovations. South Korea, identified earlier as a 
major source of patents, barely registers any leading-edge product developments.  China’s 
contribution is greater over the period 2005-2013, accounting for 4% and 2% of best-in-class 
innovations depending on the data source. India is similarly the source of a number of class-
leading product developments after 2005. Whilst suggestive of an upwards trend in advanced 
product innovation capabilities, these data nevertheless suggest that late-comers continue to 
markedly lag behind several first-mover developed economies. 
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Table 10.  Progress in Photovoltaics: countries recording best-in-class product 
innovations 
 
 
 
Country 
TP1: 1996-2004 TP2: 2005-2013 
Best-in class 
product 
innovations 
% of global 
product 
innovations in 
time period 
Best-in-class 
product 
innovations 
% of global 
product 
innovations in 
time period 
USA 34 37% 64 44% 
Japan 13 14% 39 27% 
Germany 26 29% 20 14% 
China — 0% 6 4% 
Netherlands 1 1% 5 3% 
Switzerland 2 2% 5 3% 
India — 0% 3 2% 
South Korea — 0% 2 1% 
Spain — 0% 1 1% 
Australia 11 12% — 0% 
France 2 2% — 0% 
Sweden 2 2% — 0% 
Taiwan — 0% — 0% 
Global Total 91 100% 145 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from “Solar Cell Efficiency Tables” versions in Progress in Photovoltaics 
journal.  
 
Table 11.  NREL: countries recording best-in-class product innovations 
 
 
 
Country 
TP1: 1976-2004 TP2: 2005-2013 
Best-in class 
product 
innovations 
% of global 
product 
innovations in 
time period 
Best-in-class 
product 
innovations 
% of global 
product 
innovations in 
time period 
USA 89 69% 48 51% 
Germany 7 5% 16 17% 
Japan 4 3% 16 17% 
Netherlands 1 1% 3 3% 
Canada — 0% 2 2% 
China — 0% 2 2% 
India — 0% 2 2% 
Austria 2 2% 1 1% 
France  2 2% 1 1% 
South Korea — 0% 1 1% 
Spain — 0% 1 1% 
Switzerland 5 4% 1 1% 
Australia 16 12% — 0% 
Sweden 2 2% — 0% 
Global Total 128 100% 94 100% 
Source: Authors’ calculations from NREL’s “Best-in Class Solar Cell Efficiency” chart. 
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Additional valuable insight into evolving innovation capabilities and trajectories amongst 
first-movers and late-comers can be gleaned from their technological diversity in product 
innovation. Based on NREL best-in-class data, Table 12 shows the best-in-class product 
innovations for different types (“generations”) of solar technologies. Notable is the 
observation that Germany, Japan and the US exhibit considerable diversity in the range of 
solar technologies where domestic actors have made significant efficiency-enhancing 
breakthroughs. Diversity indicates broad-based leading-edge innovation expertise across a 
range of competing designs in these first-movers. This is important because, from an 
economy-wide perspective, it guards against lock-into to a single product technology which 
may become obsolete over the longer-term (Bergek & Jacobsson 2003). Moreover, it suggests 
countries are “competing for the future”, developing the next set of product innovations 
which provide lasting competitive advantages for the local economy (Rasmusen & Yoon, 
2012). The diversity of product innovations is much smaller in late-comers. This does not 
mean that such countries are not engaged in innovative efforts focused on a wider range of 
technology, but simply that later-comers have only made leading-edge contributions in a 
narrow set of technologies. What is interesting to note, however, is that China, South Korea 
and India have all made class-leading product innovations in “second generation” thin-film 
cells. This may partly reflect the fact that the scope for further efficiency enhancements in 
“first generation” crystalline cells is comparatively limited. Yet it is suggests a purposeful 
effort to engage in innovation for a family of solar PV technologies which are only beginning 
to be commercialised on a significant scale. 
Table 12.  Diversity in best-in-class product innovations for different types of technologies 
  
Crystalline 
Silicon Cells Emerging PV 
Multi-junction Cells 
(2 terminal, 
monolithic) 
Single Junction 
GaAs 
Thin Film 
Technologies Grand Total 
USA 2,729 1,479 5,245 1,643 2,160 13,256 
Germany 875 465 581 493 293 2,707 
Japan 1,163 529 587 
 
121 2,400 
Australia 1,942 
    
1,942 
Netherlands 
 
81 
 
496 
 
577 
Switzerland 
 
372 
  
49 421 
France  
  
204 
 
63 267 
Austria 
 
242 
   
242 
Canada 
 
211 
   
211 
Spain 
  
201 
  
201 
China 
    
135 135 
India 
    
135 135 
Sweden 
    
63 63 
South Korea 
    
17 17 
Grand Total 6,709 3,379 6,818 2,632 3,036 22,574 
Source: Derived from NREL data points 
 
3.3.6 Spatial relationships between innovation and manufacturing  
 
The analysis so far has focused on discrete indicators of either manufacturing or innovation. 
Yet of particular concern in the present chapter is the dynamic relationship between these 
two forms of economic activity. In order to better understand this relationship, we use 
bubble plots to graphically depict several countries’ global share of manufacturing and 
innovation over two respective time periods, shown here by TP1 (2005) and TP2 (2012). As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the percentage of global innovation is shown on the y axis and 
manufacturing on the x axis, with the absolute size of PV manufacturing capacity (in MW) 
indicated by the size of the bubble. We focus on five countries (China, Germany, India, 
Japan and US) chosen to represent a mix of first- and second-movers in solar PV for which 
we have confirmed comparative data. 
 
It should be noted that the positions of the countries within the graph provide a relative 
comparison of countries to each other in terms of their share of the global total for 
innovation and manufacturing in that time period. It should also be noted that beyond a 
critical mass of manufacturing capacity, further manufacturing does not matter any longer – 
especially as it exceeds global demand (see the solar PV chart in Figure 6 in Chapter 2). 
Nevertheless showing the size of the manufacturing capacity illustrates how much 
manufacturing capacity has grown for each country – not just for second-movers, but first-
movers as well. Presenting the size of manufacturing capacities further demonstrates the 
importance of innovation over manufacturing – i.e. ensuring economic resilience. Though 
the industrial capacity of all the countries increases over time as manufacturing technologies 
become more readily available, it further exposes each country to global supply and demand 
for what become increasingly globally traded commodities.  Therefore success in innovation 
is needed in order to create more high-value technologies that no other country has produced 
yet. 
 
In testing our hypotheses, spatial decoupling would be revealed if two conditions held: (a) 
first-movers retained their dominant position in innovation between TP1 and TP2 whilst 
losing their large share of manufacturing; and (b) late-comers increased their manufacturing 
dominance between TP1 and TP2, whilst not experiencing an equivalent (or at least 
significant) increase in their global share of innovation. Conversely, evidence of re-coupling 
could be seen if: (c) first-movers lost both their dominance in manufacturing and innovation 
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between TP1 and TP2; while (d) second-movers experienced a significant increase in both 
their manufacturing and innovation share between the two time periods.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Legend: Interpretation of comparative graphs as % of global total for 
manufacturing (x axis) and innovation/research (y axis) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own schema 
 
Following a similar order as to above, we begin by plotting the share of manufacturing 
capacity against share of scientific publications, using both Scopus (Figure 4) and WoS 
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(Figure 5). The first-movers mostly experience a decline in their relative manufacturing 
between TP1 and TP2, whilst experiencing a decline in their share of global scientific 
publications, although the respective losses are greater for some countries than others. As a 
late-comer, China significantly increases both its share of manufacturing output, as well as its 
share of scientific publications. Taken together, these trends are indicative of a recoupling of 
manufacturing and research, though an important caveat is in order. The other late-comer, 
India, shows no trend towards spatial recoupling. Its share of both manufacturing capacity 
and research remains low in both time periods.  
 
 
Figure 4.  The relationship between manufacturing and research publication 
(Scopus) 
 
Source: BNEF Q2.2012 Report (figures up to June 2012) and authors’ calculations from Scopus database.  
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Figure 5.  The relationship between manufacturing and research publication (WoS) 
 
Source: BNEF Q2.2012 Report (figures up to June 2012) and authors’ calculations from Web of Science 
database.  
 
 
Turning to patents, the evidence for recoupling is weaker, whether measured by inventors 
(Figure 6) or firms (Figure 7). China’s rapid transformation into the preeminent centre of 
solar PV manufacturing is not matched by equivalent growth in patenting over time. As with 
research publications, India makes little or no progress in terms of expanding either 
manufacturing or innovation between TP1 and TP2, such that it remains lodged in the 
bottom left hand-side quadrant (i.e. low manufacturing, low innovation). Whilst Japan 
experiences a significant loss of both global manufacturing and patenting share over time, 
such a trend is far less apparent in the case of Germany or the US, with the latter actually 
increasing its share of global patenting. One potential shortcoming of focusing exclusively on 
solar modules is that we do not have data on South Korea which has negligible production in 
this middle part of the value chain. Yet it is worth noting that, when measured by polysilicon 
manufacture, it is apparent that the country has both significantly increased its share of 
manufacturing and patenting in a short period of time consistent with progressive recoupling 
(not shown graphically).  
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Figure 6.  The relationship between manufacturing and patents (associated with 
inventors)* 
 
Source: BNEF Q2.2012 Report (figures up to June 2012) and authors’ calculations from PATSTAT 
database.  
Notes: *India TP1 is obscured in the graph, with the country occupying a roughly similar position as in TP2 
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Figure 7.  The relationship between manufacturing and patents (associated with 
firms) 
 
Source: BNEF Q2.2012 Report (figures up to June 2012) and authors’ calculations from PATSTAT 
database.  
 
 
We turn finally to best-in-class data (Figures 8 and 9). There is very little compelling evidence 
of recoupling. India and China exhibit similar trends as those observed for patenting. 
Amongst the first-movers, there are some differences, but the overall pattern is one of 
continued dominance in innovation whilst mostly experiencing a fall in their contribution to 
manufacturing.  
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Figure 8.  The relationship between manufacturing and best-in class data  
 
Source: BNEF Q2.2012 Report (figures up to June 2012) and authors’ calculations from PV Progress in 
Photovoltaics journal article series. 
 
Figure 9.  The relationship between manufacturing and best-in class data 
 
Source: BNEF Q2.2012 Report (figures up to June 2012) and authors’ calculations from NREL’s “Solar 
Cell Efficiency” chart.  
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3.4 Discussion and conclusions 
 
This chapter maps the changing spatial distribution of manufacturing and innovation in the 
clean tech industry using the example of solar PV. Conceptually, our analysis is rooted in the 
product life-cycle model, which gives rise to two competing hypotheses (spatial decoupling 
and recoupling) regarding the dynamic relationship between manufacturing and innovation 
over time. We provide evidence of a dramatic global shift in the locus of manufacturing 
activity in solar PV away from first-mover economies such as Japan and Germany towards a 
handful of late-comer economies. Taking advantage of its competitive advantages in 
manufacturing and ability to acquire technological capabilities in solar PV, China has 
accounted for the vast majority of recent capacity expansion, particularly in cells and 
modules. South Korea has also become a significant manufacturer, albeit only in the 
upstream part of the value chain. Other emerging economies, while increasing their output, 
have remained relatively small players in the production of solar PV.   
 
Yet this changing centre of gravity of manufacturing has not been accompanied by an 
equivalent shift in the locus of innovative activities over which, to a greater or lesser extent, 
first-movers have retained their dominance. In other words, our findings provide support to 
the spatial decoupling hypothesis, which predicts a growing spatial separation between 
manufacturing and innovation over time. However, this headline conclusion comes with a 
number of important caveats, which paint a more nuanced picture of recent dynamics. First, 
there is evidence of spatial recoupling in the case of scientific publications, where China and 
South Korea have significantly increased their outputs in both relative and absolute terms. It 
is however far less evident in the case of patents and especially best-in-class product 
innovations. Whilst filing a growing number of patents, China is still some way behind 
Germany, Japan and the US, although South Korea is increasingly part of the “club” of 
leading patenting economies in solar PV. Neither country is close to challenging the 
dominance of the main first-movers at the technological frontier of efficiency-enhancing 
product innovation (Wu & Mathews, 2012). What this would suggest is that catch-up is 
greater in underlying science (e.g. required for inventive activity), but more partial in the case 
of applied capabilities required to turn ideas into commercially viable, class-leading products. 
Another caveat is that a declining share of manufacturing in first-movers has mostly been 
accompanied by a declining relative share in innovation. The case of Japan is most striking in 
this regards. Germany and the US have been more resilient to these trends. 
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A third caveat is that the shift of manufacturing activity is relatively recent.  All our findings 
suggest is that first-movers (and, most notably, China) have been able to upscale their 
manufacturing capacity faster than their innovation capacity. Stated differently, it would 
appear to take longer to be successful in innovation than manufacturing, not least because 
the latter only requires technological capabilities together with capital to invest in plant and 
equipment. Higher-value forms of innovation which allow countries to move from simply 
replicating existing designs to developing entirely new ones require well-developed innovative 
capabilities (Lema & Lema, 2012). Previous work indicates that it may be possible for late-
comers to accumulate these capabilities, but that this takes considerable time, effort and the 
right set of enabling conditions (Dicken, 2010; Fu et al., 2011; Hobday, 1995). The important 
point is that there is nothing to suggest that China, South Korea or indeed other emerging 
economies will not become future leaders in high-level innovation. Yet the evidence from 
our study suggests that this will not happen in the short-term.  
 
Still, without losing sight of these caveats, our findings have a number of wider implications. 
First, they are instructive for debates regarding the importance of spatial proximity to 
manufacturing for continued innovative performance (Boschma, 2005; Potter & Watts, 2010; 
Yeung, 2007). The literature offers a number of compelling reasons as to why, despite 
advances in information and communication technologies, it might still matter to retain a 
significant domestic manufacturing base. For example, leading-edge product innovation is 
known to require considerable experimentation, which benefits from proximity to 
manufacturing where new designs, material and production techniques can be trialled. 
Indeed, given the price sensitive nature of the market for solar PV products (Dunford et al., 
2013), competitive advantage in the sector requires a close coupling between product and 
process innovations. Our findings suggest that while late-comers may well benefit from an 
increased manufacturing base to increase their innovative output, first-comers do not 
significantly lose their innovative strength against a backdrop a declining share of global 
manufacturing capacity.  
 
One plausible explanation for this finding lies in our data. The decline in manufacturing 
dominance of first-movers is relative rather than absolute. The US, Japan and Germany have 
all increased their total manufacturing capacity. What may count is not simply the global 
share of manufacturing, but retaining a “critical mass” of local manufacturing, which supplies 
the necessary feedbacks, learning and synergistic spill-overs. This ties into another related 
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explanation provided by work in economic geography into the factors which render global 
innovation hubs successful (Hassink, 2010; MacKinnon et al., 2009). After several decades of 
experience, learning and capability-building, it may be that first-movers have developed well-
functioning innovation systems which make them resilient to growing competition from late-
comers. Indeed, consistent with this interpretation, several studies highlight how the success 
of the clean tech industry in first-mover economies can be attributed to clusters of 
interdependent firms, institutions and social capital, which provide positive externalities 
(Cooke, 2008; Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Pegels & Lütkenhorst, 2014). In the case of the 
solar PV industry, first-movers such as Japan, Germany and the US continue to retain their 
advantages in process technology, supplying a large share of the production equipment that is 
installed in solar PV factories globally. 
 
Our findings also have implications for academic and applied debates about FMA in clean 
tech (Fankhauser et al., 2013; Huber, 2008; Lee et al., 2009). The past decade has witnessed 
growing concerns about the domestic economic returns from public supply- and demand-
side supports – particularly in the area of renewable energy technologies – which have been 
provided in developed economies. A particular focus of these debates has been on solar PV, 
with critics suggesting that price-based incentives such as FITs in Germany amount to a large 
cross-subsidy to Chinese producers, rather than a fillip to domestic firms. Our findings 
certainly do not challenge this narrative, at least in the case of manufacturing, with evidence 
elsewhere confirming that the majority share of the dramatic expansion of solar PV 
production in China has been exported to supply growing demand in developed economies 
(Kirkegaard et al., 2010; Liu and Goldstein, 2013). Indeed, to the extent that China has been 
able to readily acquire the technological capabilities required to manufacture cells and 
modules, we support the idea that late-comers can take advantage of technological advances 
in first-movers to gain a competitive lead (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Perkins & 
Neumayer, 2005). 
 
At the same time, results from our analysis place these concerns in context. They indicate 
that first-movers such as Germany and Japan may have lost out to China in terms of 
capturing some of the value-added from manufacturing to supply growing demand. 
However, they would appear to have mostly retained their lead when it comes to innovation, 
particularly in terms of their ability to develop patentable technology and leading-edge 
product enhancements. This is important. As recognised by economists, economic 
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geographers and management scholars, innovation underpins the creation of high value-
added and increasing returns to the domestic economy (Aghion & Howitt, 1998; Mudambi, 
2008; Storper, 1997). Manufacturing, by contrast, is vulnerable to declining economic returns 
over time (Ernst et al., 2001).  
 
One limitation of our chapter is that we do not have comparable financial data on the 
revenues, returns and profitability of the solar PV industry in different countries. Our 
assertion is nevertheless supported by evidence from other studies. For example, Goodrich et 
al. (2011) show that the US enjoyed a net trade balance of about US$900 million in 2011 with 
the China, stemming from the sale of advanced proprietary materials and manufacturing 
equipment of solar PV product technologies. Chase (2013) demonstrates how many leading 
East Asian firms – along with European and US firms that participated in the parts of the 
crystalline PV supply chain that were vulnerable to increases in global supply – have negative 
margins of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). However certain American and 
European companies that were in the high value parts of the supply chain – or a profitable 
alternative to crystalline PV – do show positive EBIT margins that are above the rest of the 
industry. Studies have also highlighted how the rapid expansion of solar PV manufacturing in 
China, supported by government-derived subsidies, has led to over-capacity, falling margins 
and bankruptcies of high profile firms such as S0075ntech (Liu & Goldstein, 2013; Zhang et 
al., 2013). Manufacturers in first-movers have not been immune from these pressures and 
have similarly suffered capacity cut backs, closures and job losses. Yet the important point is 
that ongoing innovative advantages in first-mover economies provide them with a certain 
degree of resilience against downward cost pressures for manufactured products arising from 
comparatively  low (technological) barriers to entry in crystalline silicon cells and modules 
(Liu & Goldstein, 2013).  
 
We therefore conclude by suggesting policy-makers in developed economies should not 
erroneously read recent dynamics in the global solar PV industry as evidence against the case 
for early public support for clean tech. Headline statistics about the dramatic shift of the 
clean tech industry to industrialising Asia are potentially misleading from the perspective of 
appropriating high valued in the local economy. Our study suggests that early involvement in 
solar PV – often supported through government policies – did provide enduring first-mover 
advantages for countries such as Germany, the US and, to a lesser extent, Japan, in terms of 
innovation. Likewise, for policy-makers in emerging economies, our findings suggest that it 
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may be possible to achieve growth in domestic manufacturing capacity in clean tech. Yet this 
will not rapidly translate into strong domestic innovation capabilities in the short-term.  
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Chapter 4: Accessing knowledge 
spillovers through international research 
collaborations: Analysis of  solar PV 
innovation networks 
A comparative approach to how the maturity of technologies and the 
domestic industrial composition affects the propensity for actors to 
collaborate with domestic or foreign partners.  
 
4 Make invisible 
ABSTRACT. The structure of global innovation networks (GINS) and international 
research collaborations can highlight the level and quality of knowledge spillovers 
different countries have – based on their position within these networks and the 
countries they actually collaborate with.  Evolutionary economic geography (EEG) 
and international development literature implicitly recognises that a hierarchy exists 
amongst countries with different levels of technological capabilities. EEG highlights 
how countries with high technological capabilities are those that can engage with 
innovation at the technological frontier – and can thus restrict international research 
collaborations between these groups of countries. International development 
literature recognises that countries with lower technological capabilities undertake 
research collaborations with countries with high technological capabilities in order to 
benefit from experiential and knowledge spillovers. Both EEG and international 
development literature recognise that the ‘catch up’ nature of these collaborations 
does not necessarily guarantee that countries’ will benefit from knowledge spillovers 
at the technological frontier.  This chapter explores these interactions by studying the 
evolution of different countries positions within different solar PV innovation 
networks over two time periods. It also focuses on the research collaboration profiles 
of Germany, Japan and USA (as first-mover countries) and China (as a late-comer) – 
– which all have high industrial capacities for solar photovoltaic (PV) technologies. 
The preliminary results identifies countries with low industrial capacity but high 
technological capabilities playing a more prominent role  in research collaborations 
for each of these countries with large industrial capacities.  This finding is surprising 
as the current literature has focused on the importance of research collaborations 
between countries with high industrial capacities – as they share similar challenges in 
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using research to improve the technological capabilities of the domestic industry. 
Given this research finding, this chapter considers whether countries with high 
industrial capacity would prefer to collaborate with countries that they do not 
compete with in manufacturing but who still have high technological capabilities.   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Evolutionary economic geography (EEG) and international development literature both 
recognise the importance of countries’ technological capabilities in not only improving the 
productivity of domestic industrial capacity, but also in yielding new economic growth 
opportunities by creating new product innovations. Bell & Pavitt (1997, pp. 85-86) define 
technological capabilities as “the skills, knowledge and institutions that make up a country’s 
capacity to generate and manage change in the industrial technology it uses”. Technological 
capabilities are distinct from industrial capacity, which refers to the “capital goods, 
knowledge and labour skills required to produce industrial goods with a ‘given’ technology” 
(Bell & Pavitt, 1997, p. 86). This distinction is important as economies with “first-mover 
advantage” and “late-comer advantage” compete in innovating at the technological frontier. 
First-mover advantage refers to those countries that participated in the first stage of 
technological development by innovating and commercialising technologies (Aoyama, 
Murphy, & Hanson, 2011). Late-comer advantage refers to those economies that have not 
invested in the initial research and development (R&D) for commercialising technologies 
(Altenburg, 2008; Ernst, 2000). Instead, they capitalise on the availability of newly developed 
technology that can be transferred to their own economies (Fan, 2006; Mathews & Cho, 
2000). They can then leverage their comparative advantage in producing these technologies at 
lower costs (Vernon, 1966). 
  
Whilst first-mover countries have demonstrated their technological capabilities in innovating 
the first cycle of technologies, late-comer countries focus on building their own technological 
capabilities to compete in innovation in the next cycle (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Coe & 
Bunnell, 2003). Both the EEG and international development literatures recognise the 
importance of improving the technological capabilities of the domestic economy, as it 
enables domestic actors to produce high quality technologies, which yield greater economic 
value because other economies have yet to learn how to reproduce them (Lall, 1994; Pike, 
Dawley, & Tomaney, 2010; Watson et al., 2014). EEG describes economies with high 
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technological capabilities as being resilient to global competition within a given industry 
(Hassink, 2010; Pike et al., 2010). The international development literature recognises the 
need for developing countries with high industrial capacity to escape the “middle income 
trap” by increasing their technological capabilities to undertake innovation (Aiyar et al., 2013; 
Ohno, 2009).  
 
An interesting spatial phenomenon that EEG explores is how different economies that 
compete on innovation also participate in collaborative relationships with innovation 
(Chompalov, Genuth, & Shrum, 2002; Frenken & van Oort, 2004). This is because as 
innovation increases in complexity with iterative cycles, it can require the integration of a 
greater set of resources and knowledge specialisations (Jelinek & Schoonhoven, 1993; Tidd, 
Bessant, & Pavitt, 1997). EEG highlights that the nature of scientific research – and funders’ 
requirement to demonstrate “novelty” – means that different geographical clusters develop 
distinct knowledge specialisations (Chompalov et al., 2002; Katz, 1994). Rather than 
undertake indigenous efforts in achieving the same knowledge specialisation that other 
countries’ have proven specialisations in, an innovation cluster would be more willing to 
engage in research collaborations with external clusters (Beaver & Rosen, 1978; Gluckler, 
2007). International research collaborations thus enable leveraging of each countries’ 
knowledge specialisations to explore potential technological trajectories (Jeong, Choi, & Kim, 
2013; Wagner & Leydesdorff, 2005).  
 
Both the EEG and international development literature recognise that international research 
collaborations thus constitute an important part of knowledge spillovers between countries 
(Breschi & Lissoni, 2001; Matthiessen, Schwarz, & Find, 2010). The accumulation of national 
and international research collaborations creates global innovation networks (Glanzel & 
Schubert, 2005). The structure of global innovation networks not only implies knowledge 
spillovers between directly collaborating actors, but can facilitate the transmission of these 
knowledge spillovers to third parties that are connected to either one of these collaborators 
(Ter Wal & Boschma, 2011, 2009). EEG studies on global innovation networks show that 
their geographical spread is highly uneven, as it is dependent on the degree of connectedness 
within these networks, and which countries are connected (Bathelt & Li, 2013; Gluckler, 
2007; Matthiessen et al., 2010). The importance of being able to benefit from these 
knowledge spillovers is that countries can increase their own technological capabilities – 
thereby not only increasing their competitive advantage in innovation but the productivity of 
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domestic industrial capacity (Aoyama et al., 2011; Dicken, 2011; Ernst, 2000; Henderson et 
al., 2002). 
   
This chapter is interested in studying the patterns of research collaborations between 
countries participating in the solar photovoltaic (PV) industry as a way of comparing first-
mover versus late-comer dynamics. Chapter 3 demonstrated that more economies are 
engaging in research of solar PV technologies. This chapter demonstrates that countries 
which gained first-mover advantage by initially commercialising solar PV technologies still 
account for a significant proportion of global research activities. However it also 
demonstrates that China – which entered the industry at a later stage through the 
manufacture of solar PV technologies – is generally increasing its proportion of global 
research activities. Given that both first-mover and late-comer countries are engaging in solar 
PV research collaborations, are there any expectations regarding the patterns of research 
collaborations amongst countries that also compete in the supply of technologies? What 
would the implications be for domestic technological capabilities considering their position 
within global innovation networks, and the profiles of country collaborations? 
  
Both the EEG and international development literature are relevant in identifying key factors 
that can shape the patterns of research collaborations between countries. The literature from 
EEG highlights how the nature of innovation requires certain kinds of “proximity” (i.e. 
similarity) to overcome the friction of spatial distance and facilitate research collaborations 
(Boschma & Martin, 2010; Morgan, 2004; Ter Wal, 2014). The literature from international 
development literature that is relevant for this chapter focuses on how developing countries 
undertake industrial catch up. More specifically, this literature shows that during the initial 
entry into an industry, late-comer countries will undertake research collaborations with more 
technologically capable countries – by undertaking research at the technological frontier they 
can improve their own technological capabilities (Ernst, 2000; Mathews & Cho, 2000; Tang 
& Hussler, 2011; Zhou et al., 2012). Nevertheless, as they increase their industrial capacity in 
these technologies, they also leverage their access to domestic industry to increase indigenous 
innovation (Lewis & Wiser, 2007; Wu & Mathews, 2012). 
  
In order to explore the pattern of research collaborations between first-mover and late-
comer countries in the solar PV industry, this chapter gathered global datasets from both 
peer-reviewed journal articles and patents of solar technologies. Most empirical studies on 
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international research collaborations use only one or the other. However as both scientists 
and firms undertake collaborations in both types of media, studies which only use one kind 
of dataset could be biased in their interpretations of the relevance of partnering countries. 
Considering these biases is especially important as the nature of collaboration for peer-review 
publications is different from patents (Dasgupta et al., 1962). Whilst the former undertakes 
scientific research for technologies, the latter engages with research for technologies that seek 
commercialisation (Gittleman & Wolff, 1995). Thus co-patenting relationships require higher 
levels of trust between collaborative actors in order to limit knowledge spillovers to potential 
competitors (Asheim, Coenen, & Vang, 2007; Storper & Venables, 2004). This chapter’s 
interest in comparing research publications with patents is that it can highlight the kinds of 
knowledge spillovers that occur between countries with different technological capabilities, 
and what kinds of knowledge flows different countries have access to. So far, no study has 
used both datasets to investigate this question on research collaborations.  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised into the following sections. Section 2 will review the 
relevant literature on the patterns of international research collaborations. Based on this 
literature, this chapter will set up investigative hypotheses to compare the level of 
connectivity between first-mover and late-comer countries within global innovation 
networks. Furthermore, it will consider what kind of patterns can be identified from the 
collaboration profiles of first-mover versus late-comer countries. Section 3 will focus on 
comparing countries’ positions with global innovation networks. Section 4 will analyse the 
profiles of different countries. Section 5 will then conclude with comments on further 
research. 
 
4.2 Factors that shape international research collaborations 
over time 
 
4.2.1 EEG: Patterns of international research collaborations  
 
A branch of EEG is concerned with the development of research collaborations between 
innovation actors. The motivation for studying research collaborations is that it becomes 
more prolific in successive product life cycles (PLCs) of high-value technology (a.k.a. “high 
tech”) – highlighting its importance in transmitting knowledge spillovers across regions 
(Glanzel & Schubert, 2005; Ter Wal, 2014). However different empirical studies demonstrate 
how these knowledge spillovers improve the technological capabilities of participating 
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actors/regions (Ozman, 2009). These include Sebestyén & Varga's (2012) study of co-
patenting  with the European Union’s 27 countries; Kafouros et al. (2014) study of the 
improvement of Chinese firms’ product sales through research collaborations between 
national and international university/research institutes; and De Vaan, Boschma & Frenken's 
(2012) study of survival rates of firms within clusters in the global video-gaming industry. 
Potter & Watts' (2010) study of lagging regions in the UK demonstrates how lack of access 
to global knowledge networks negatively affects firms’ financial performance in the latter part 
of the PLC. 
 
EEG develops a framework for analysing the patterns of international research 
collaborations based on ideas of “proximity” (Boschma & Martin, 2010; Katz, 1994; Ter Wal, 
2014). This literature recognises that in spite of a greater number of economies engaging in 
innovation, it does not necessarily follow that these economies are equally likely to 
collaborate with each other (Luukkonen, Persson, & Sivertsen, 1992; Ponds, van Oort, & 
Frenken, 2007). Instead, countries are more likely to undertake international collaborations if 
they share certain similarities (i.e. “proximity”). The most important of these is spatial 
proximity (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002). Despite advances in internet and communication 
technologies (ICT) and decreased costs of long-distance travel, innovative actors still tend to 
collaborate with others that are spatially proximate to them (Aoyama et al., 2011). 
  
One explanation for the persistence of spatial proximity is shared institutions (i.e. 
institutional proximity) such as similar cultures, languages and close social networks that 
reinforce the “neighbour” or “supra-regional” effect of international research collaborations 
(Ponds et al., 2007). For example, Luukkonen, Persson & Sivertsen (1992), Guellec & van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), and Ponds et al. (2007) demonstrate how the spatial and 
cultural similarities of Scandinavian countries enable greater research collaborations within 
this region. Proximity enables the effective communication and trust that are necessary for 
research collaborations (Storper & Venables, 2004). The issue of trust also highlights the 
importance of similarity in  intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes, since dissimilarity can 
discourage international research collaborations (Ernst, 2011; Kafouros et al., 2014). 
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4.2.2 First-mover versus late-comer countries: Patterns in international 
research collaborations 
 
How does a country’s entry point into industries affect who they collaborate with and their 
position within global innovation networks? Both the EEG and international development 
literatures acknowledge that the entry point into these industries can explain differences 
technological capabilities of various countries (Christopherson, Michie, & Tyler, 2010; Ernst 
& Kim, 2001; Lall, 2000). Acknowledging the path dependency and cumulative nature of 
technological capability development, these literatures look at the impact of national 
innovation systems on each country type’s technological capabilities (Lo, Wang, & Huang, 
2013; Lundvall et al., 2002). National innovation systems characterise how the process of 
innovation is shaped by various actors’ interactions within domestic institutions as well as 
domestic and global networks (Freeman, 1995).  
 
EEG argues that countries that are first to successfully commercialise technologies have 
already developed innovation systems that enhance their technological capabilities 
(Christopherson et al., 2010; Swanstrom, 2008). The spatial embeddedness of the domestic 
innovation system allows knowledge spillovers to agglomerate within the local economy, 
limiting its spread (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002; Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Storper, 1997). 
Therefore, there are few economies with the technological capabilities to compete in 
advancing the technological frontier (Asheim & Coenen, 2006). However, in successive 
iterations of PLCs, competing at the technological frontier requires a greater variety of 
knowledge to be integrated into different technological combinations (Ter Wal & Boschma, 
2009; UNCTAD, 2005). Certain national economies have developed technological niches 
that create a narrower, more path-dependent trajectory for the kind of technologies they 
develop (Boschma & Martin, 2010; Malmberg & Maskell, 1997). However, by tapping into 
global innovation networks, actors in these economies can access a larger portfolio of 
knowledge to diversify product development (Coe & Bunnell, 2003; Henn, 2012). 
  
Therefore, the main driver for international collaborations between leading innovation 
clusters is a recognition of the mutual benefits of such partnerships (Hamdouch & Depret, 
2009; Schubert & Braun, 1990). These mutual benefits include knowledge spillovers through 
interactive learning, shared economic costs of research, and access to larger social networks 
(Beaver & Rosen, 1978; Coe & Bunnell, 2003; Jeong et al., 2013). These same benefits cannot 
necessarily be realised by partnering within the domestic economy (Moulaert & Sekia, 2003). 
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However, first-mover countries are more likely to engage with other countries that have 
developed similar levels of technological capabilities in order to partner with innovation at 
the technological frontier (Glanzel & Schubert, 2005; Wagner & Leydesdorff, 2005). 
 
Both the EEG and international development literatures recognise how certain dynamics 
facilitate international collaborations between countries with different levels of technological 
capabilities (Amin & Thrift, 1992; Aoyama et al., 2011; Bathelt & Glu, 2003; Dicken, 2011). 
Both the literatures acknowledge that countries with high technological capabilities attract 
more research collaborations than those with lower technological capabilities (Gertler & 
Levitte, 2005; Matthiessen et al., 2010; Storper, 1997). International development literature 
highlights how late-comer countries can still have comparatively lower levels of technological 
capabilities despite successfully transferring technologies and increasing their industrial 
capacity, as they are still developing their own innovation systems. Late-comer countries are 
motivated to undertake research collaborations with first-mover economies because they see 
the possibility of increasing their own technological capabilities (Ponds et al., 2007) and 
because it “raises opportunities for developing country institutions, including firms, to build 
capacities by learning through interaction with more technologically advanced 
institutions[…]” (Ockwell, Sagar & de Coninck, 2014, p. 3). 
 
Another literature on global value chains (GVCs) – whose contributions come from both 
economic geographers and development academics – analyse how actors in first-mover 
economies increase their research linkages with late-comer countries (Ernst, 2006; Liu & 
Chen, 2012). These studies explore how firms in developed countries are “offshoring” 
innovation to developing economy “hosts”, where manufacturing occurs (Chen, 2004). The 
main purpose of offshoring R&D is to create technologies that are suited to the host 
country’s markets (Nieto & Rodríguez, 2011). Another motivation is to undertake R&D that 
helps actors in host economies to improve their technological capabilities through innovative 
learning (Qu, Huang, Zhang, & Zhao, 2013). There is no significant indication that foreign 
industrial capacity is being leveraged to undertake innovation at the technological frontier 
(D’Agostino, Laursen, & Santangelo, 2012; Haakonsson, Jensen, & Mudambi, 2012). This 
shows that firms continue with R&D in their home countries due to the spatial 
embeddedness of innovation processes (D’Agostino & Santangelo, 2012). So although there 
are greater research linkages between economies with different technological capabilities 
within global production networks, the balance of research collaboration still favours 
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economies with high technological capabilities (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002; Gertler & Levitte, 
2005). It should be noted that literature on international research collaborations within GVCs 
focuses on inter-firm networks, rather than academic or other types of research 
collaborations. It is still important to consider the patterns of international research 
collaborations within scientific research, as it presents other forms of international 
knowledge spillovers.  
 
Nevertheless, international development literature that studies the development of national 
systems of learning in industrialising economies – particularly East Asia – demonstrates how 
these countries also increasingly engage with indigenous innovation. “National systems of 
learning” refers to the improvement of technological capabilities through the active 
participation of both the state and firms within domestic networks of research institutions 
and industrial capacity (Lo et al., 2013; Mathews & Cho, 2000). Firms’ R&D branches can 
leverage their access to industrial facilities to promote technological learning between 
scientists and engineers (Lazonick, 2004; Wang & Lin, 2012). The government also plays an 
active role in facilitating these R&D linkages between indigenous research actors (e.g. 
universities and research institutes) and industries in order to increase indigenous innovation 
(D’Costa, 2012; Khan & Park, 2011; Khanna, 2008). This access enables actors within the 
domestic innovation system to quickly test and up-scale production for new cycles of 
technologies – thereby raising their technological capabilities (Nahm & Steinfeld, 2013). 
  
Mathews & Cho's (2000) comprehensive analysis of the semi-conductor industry in East Asia 
demonstrates the importance of having a large industrial base to create national systems of 
learning. Lewis & Wiser (2007) and Liu & Goldstein (2013) demonstrate how large domestic 
markets for wind technologies – and limited access to foreign technologies – encouraged 
Chinese firms to leverage their large industrial base, accumulate greater experience, and 
eventually develop more advanced wind technologies.  This literature emphasises how the 
specific context of East Asian economies has made them less reliant on foreign economies 
for research collaborations. 
 
4.2.3 Comparative hypotheses of first-mover versus late-comer countries in 
the solar PV industry 
 
A set of exploratory hypotheses will be set out in this section to compare first-mover and 
late-comer countries’ access to knowledge spillovers through their position within global 
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innovation networks and the research partner profiles of specific countries. These 
exploratory hypotheses are based on integrating the literature from EEG and international 
development. The purpose is to have an intellectual starting point to predict where first-
mover and late-comer countries’ position will be within global innovation networks, and who 
they will collaborate with over time. Investigating the research collaborations within the solar 
PV industry is chosen for two reasons. As elaborated in Chapter 3, research for solar PV 
technologies includes new product innovations and the improvement of existing production 
processes. Chapter 3 also demonstrated that there is a geographical dispersion of 
technological niches, creating the conditions for different countries to undertake 
international research collaborations to leverage these networks. Chapter 3 also demonstrated 
that first-movers, and increasingly late-comer China, contribute significantly to solar PV 
research. Therefore studying the research collaborations between countries – and the larger 
global innovation networks – can enable the investigation of countries’ access to international 
knowledge spillovers.  
 
The first investigation hypothesis is that first-mover countries will tend to be the most central 
in the network, as the recognition of their high technological capabilities attracts research 
collaborations with other first-mover as well as late-comer economies (Bathelt & Glu, 2003; 
Matthiessen et al., 2010). This hypothesis is supported by the literature from both EEG and 
international development. Nonetheless, EEG studies show that from the perspective of 
these central countries, they are more likely to collaborate with other similarly advanced 
countries than with countries that have lesser technological capabilities (Choi, 2011; Guellec 
& van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Leydesdorff & Wagner, 2008). These findings 
corroborate the literature that theorises an hierarchical structure to global innovation 
networks (Choi, 2011; Coe & Bunnell, 2003). 
  
This chapter also investigates how these dynamics change across two different time periods 
of the solar PV industry. These time periods are delineated by China’s rise to prominence in 
solar PV research, prompting the investigation of who they undertake research with. The 
hypothesis from EEG is that first-mover countries such as the USA, Japan and Germany are 
more likely to collaborate with each other in the first period than with a late-comer economy 
such as China. However, their propensity to collaborate with late-comer economies can 
increase in the later time period as the latter’s research levels increase. For China, it is likely 
that research collaborations within the country will increase over both time periods. This 
 141 
 
hypothesis supports the international development literature on East Asian economies, which 
notes that domestic actors increasingly rely on local resources to engage in indigenous 
innovation (Fan & Hu, 2007; Tang & Hussler, 2011). However, as China becomes more 
prolific within solar PV research, it is expected that its profile of international research 
collaborations will continue to include leading innovation clusters (Kim & Tunzelmann, 
1998; Wu & Mathews, 2012). 
  
This section has attempted to integrate the literature from EEG and international 
development to create exploratory hypotheses that compare first-mover and late-comer 
countries’ access to knowledge spillovers in global innovation networks, and patterns of 
international research collaborations in the solar PV industry. Section 3 will analyse countries’ 
relative positions within global innovation networks, with a particular focus on the 
“centrality” measures of Japan, Germany, the USA, and China; section 4 will analyse their 
specific research collaboration profiles. These four countries were chosen because they have 
large industrial capacities. Therefore increased domestic technological capabilities gained 
through domestic and international knowledge spillovers are more likely to directly benefit 
their domestic manufacturing base.  
 
4.3 Analysing countries “centrality” within global innovation 
networks 
 
4.3.1 Applying measures of “centrality” to compare countries’ positions 
within global research networks 
 
This section applies “centrality” measures, developed by network theories, to analyse 
different countries’ access to knowledge spillovers through international research networks in 
the solar PV industry (Morrison et al., 2014; Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009). Network theory 
analyses the relationships between different nodes in a structure, which cumulatively form a 
network (Hansen, Shneiderman, & Smith, 2010). In this case, the relationships are signified 
by the pairs of countries that undertake collaborations with each other; the nodes refer to the 
countries themselves. Network analysis can thus be used to compare how well-connected 
different countries are to all the others in the research network, or their “centrality” within 
the network (Marsden, 2002). Network structures demonstrate that some unrelated countries 
may nevertheless have indirect access to others through a mutual connection with centrally 
connected countries (Everett & Borgatti, 2005). The most central countries have the greatest 
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access to information within the network, but also the greatest role in disseminating 
information to other countries (Wagner & Leydesdorff, 2005).  
 
These measures of “centrality” can thus be used to study different economies’ access to 
knowledge spillovers through their participation in research collaborations with different 
countries. Four different measures of centrality are used to compare countries’ position 
within these networks (Hansen et al., 2010). The first is “degrees”, which refers to the 
number of countries (including itself) with whom actors of that country have undertaken 
research collaborations. The second is “betweenness centrality”, which calculates how certain 
countries act as a “bridge” between others that would otherwise not necessarily be connected 
to each other. Countries with high “betweenness centrality” can thus receive and disseminate 
the greatest amount of information from and to other nodes in the network. Their absence 
can cut off other nodes in the network. Their centrality to ‘remote’ countries in the network 
also ensures that they receive proprietary information from these countries that other 
countries are unlikely to access. The next measure that will be used is the “eigenvector 
centrality” measure, which calculates how well connected a country is to other well-
connected countries involved in research collaborations. “Eigenvector centrality” can thus be 
used to compare where countries are positioned within the hierarchy of research network 
relations. These different measures of centrality are useful in comparing how easily countries 
can access not only a broader portfolio of knowledge, but a high quality of knowledge as well 
(Ter Wal & Boschma, 2009).  
 
In order to undertake an in-depth analysis of how countries’ positions changed within the 
global innovation networks for solar PV over two time periods, this research restricted the 
number of countries included in the network to 16. It justifies this position as these 16 
countries cumulatively contribute to over 70% of the global total of research output in each 
dataset (as can be seen in Chapter 3). Furthermore it is important to keep the number of 
countries in each time period constant in order to enable comparisons of countries’ centrality 
within the network in each time period (Luukkonen et al., 1993). The first time period (1990-
2004) represents the early stage of large-scale commercialisation efforts of solar PV 
technologies by first-mover countries.  Japan, and even China, had a comparatively large 
industrial capacity for solar PV at this time (although China’s export of solar PV technologies 
to the global market only really increased in the second time period). The second time period 
(2005-2012) represents an inflection point where late-comer countries – especially China – 
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increased their industrial capacity to a point that surpassed first-mover countries. In this case, 
China overtook Japan in terms of solar PV technology manufacturing.  
International research networks are derived by identifying all the country affiliations of 
different actors that have collaborated on the same research publication or patent. The 
research publications were identified by searching for “solar photovoltaic” in the two major 
academic databases of Scopus and Web of Science (WoS) – filtering for scientific 
publications. Each dataset yielded over 22,000 publications between 1990 and 2012. Authors’ 
country affiliations were determined using the Scopus dataset, and their institutional 
affiliations were taken from the WoS dataset. The patent datasets are derived from the 
European Patent Office’s Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT), which has 
compiled global patent data for solar PV technologies, identified under the patent 
classification code “Y02E10”. The 51,293 patents used in the analysis are those submitted by 
either firms or inventors, and which were granted as patents in the years between 1990 and 
2012. Three different types of patent research networks were identified based on 
collaborations between: (1) inventors, (2) firms, and (3) firms and inventors.  
 
The purpose of using these different networks is to triangulate the evidence that delineates 
the structure of global innovation networks for solar PV technologies. As will be seen in the 
next sub-section, networks identified in research publications are very different from those 
associated with patents. In comparing these networks, this chapter provides spatial evidence 
for the discrepancy between scientific collaborations and those with more industrial 
applications. However, this chapter acknowledges that both of these research collaboration 
types only represent formal networks, represented through codified information (Ernst & 
Kim, 2001). Therefore, this chapter potentially represents only a subset of global innovation 
networks, but acknowledges that informal, social networks can also enable knowledge 
spillovers between countries (Coe & Bunnell, 2003; Østergaard, 2009; Saxenian, 2002). 
Nevertheless, analysing this codified information is still useful as it represents the outputs – 
and hence evidence of knowledge spillovers – between different countries.  
 
4.3.2 Comparing countries’ centrality within solar PV research networks 
 
The following figures not only show the research collaborations between countries, but each 
country’s position within these figures represents different dimensions of centrality. The 
NodeXL software application was used to calculate countries’ centrality measures, whilst also 
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delineating the connections between countries within the different quadrants of these figures. 
The purpose of these graphs is to provide a visual representation to enable comparisons 
between countries. Figure 1 is provided as a guide to interpreting the comparisons between 
countries based on their positions in the graph. Countries in quadrant 1 in the top right 
corner of the graph (Q1) are those that are highly connected, and can thus serve as a bridge 
for less connected countries. Countries quadrant 4 in the bottom right corner (Q4) are 
connected to many countries, but their connectivity is similar to other countries in this 
quadrant (in other words, they receive the same level of knowledge spillovers as other 
countries with same number of degrees). Countries in quadrant 3 in the bottom left corner 
(Q3) are the least connected, and require other countries to help connect them to the wider 
network. In other words, these countries are the least central in the network and are the least 
likely to benefit from knowledge spillovers. Quadrant 2 (Q2) refers to countries that 
undertake international research collaborations with few countries, but their connections to 
“remote” countries enables them to act as an effective bridge to the broader network. As can 
be seen, there are no countries in Q2. It should be noted that the size of the point 
representing each country denotes their eigenvector centrality– in other words, the country’s 
position within the global hierarchy of research collaborations. The thickness of the lines 
(known as edges) refers to the number of collaboration between countries. When there are 
“circular loops” around a country, it represents the amount of intra-country research 
collaboration; this is distinct from the country “point” which represent eigenvector centrality. 
 
Figures 2 to 6 thus delineate the structure of research networks for each research dataset in 
each time period. The tables that have the actual centrality values of countries in each time 
period can be found in Appendix 1. Whilst all 16 countries are represented in most graphs 
(the UK does not appear in the Inventors network graphs because of lack of patents), this 
section will focus on comparing the centrality positions of Japan, Germany, China and the 
USA. In looking at all 5 datasets in each time period, it does not appear that the countries’ 
positions within the graph have changed drastically over time. The USA has a high number 
of degrees and high “betweenness” and eigenvector centralities in both time periods – 
representing their centrality in both research and patent networks. Germany occupies a 
similar position in all five graphs, though it has a much lower “betweenness centrality” than 
the USA. This may indicate Germany’s propensity to collaborate mostly with other well-
connected countries within the network (particularly European countries) – reflecting its high 
eigenvector value within the networks. 
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These charts reveal some interesting findings, especially with regard to Japan and China. In 
comparison to the USA and Germany, Japan has fewer collaborations with other countries, 
and has lower “betweenness” and eigenvector centralities. Studies by D’Costa (2012), 
Luukkonen et al. (1992) largely show that Japan tends to be more insular with its research 
collaborations, partly due to its highly unique culture and language, but also because it has 
strong domestic linkages between domestic firms and research institutes. However what is 
more striking is the difference in China’s position in research publications relative to patent 
networks. Whilst China has higher measures of centrality in research publication datasets (in 
both time periods), it is less connected and central for collaborations on patents. This 
difference does not just pertain to China, but also to other countries such as Australia, 
Sweden, Spain, Italy, and South Korea.   
 
What is very interesting to note is the centrality of Australia, and Switzerland in these 
research networks. In fact, Australia has higher centrality measures within scientific research 
publications (see Appendix Tables A1 and A2), whilst Switzerland is higher in patent 
collaborations (see Appendix Tables A3, A4, A5). In studying the solar PV research 
community, two important factors can explain these findings. In the case of Australia, it 
achieved one of the longest-standing world records in the early 1990s for developing the 
highest crystalline PV cell efficiency within a laboratory setting. This attracted funding from 
both the Australian national government and British Petroleum (BP) to establish the 
Australian Centre for Advanced Photovoltaics. This centre attracts prominent international 
solar PV researchers interested in advancing crystalline solar PV. The Centre also edits one of 
the most prominent solar PV journals, Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, which 
publishes the bi-annual results of the world’s best-in-class recorded cell efficiencies. The 
centre is also a major school that attracts students from around the world to engage in solar 
PV research, thus developing international social networks. In the case of Switzerland, its 
prominence can be explained by its high technological capabilities in the semi-conductor 
industry. Switzerland is an important exporter of production equipment that produces 
different components along the value chain for crystalline PV technologies. Therefore 
Switzerland’s high centrality in patent networks demonstrates its status as an innovation hub 
for the industrial side of solar PV research.  
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These findings demonstrate the importance of considering what types of research different 
countries engage with. Whilst scientific research networks show a more interconnections 
between countries, patent networks still show both spatial and institutional similarities. The 
interconnections between countries can be measured by “graph density”, which refers to the 
number of collaborations between countries divided by the total number of possible 
collaborations, based on the number of countries in the network. Therefore high ratios 
demonstrate greater connectivity between all countries in the network. Whilst the density of 
networks increases over time for both types of research, the density for patents is lower than 
scientific collaborations in both time periods. This demonstrates that whilst late-comer 
countries like China can more easily benefit from knowledge spillovers through scientific 
research, they may not necessarily benefit to the same degree from knowledge spillovers in 
early stage commercialisation activities – as represented by patent networks.  
 
Figure 1. Understanding positions within the figures 
 
Source: Author schematic 
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Figure 2. Scopus: International research collaborations in different time periods 
 
Figure 2A: Scopus co-author research collaborations (1990-2004) 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV author networks from Scopus database. 
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Figure 2B: Scopus co-author research collaborations (2005-2012) 
 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV author networks from Scopus database. 
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Figure 3. Web of Science: International research collaborations in different time 
periods 
 
Figure 3A: Web of Science co-author research collaborations (1990-2004) 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV institutional networks from Web of Science database.
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Figure 3B: Web of Science co-author research collaborations (2005-2012) 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV institutional networks from Web of Science database. 
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Figure 4. Co-Inventors: International research collaborations in different time periods  
 
Figure 4A: Co-Inventor research collaborations (1990-2004) 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV co-inventor networks from PATSTAT database. 
 
  
 152 
 
Figure 4B: Co-Inventor research collaborations (2005-2012) 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV co-inventor networks from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 5. Inter-Firm research collaborations: International pairs in different time 
periods  
 
Figure 5A: Inter-Firm research collaborations (1990-2004) 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV partner firm networks from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 5B: Inter-Firm research collaborations (2005-2012) 
 
 Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV partner firm networks from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 6. Firms’ and Inventors’ international research collaborations in two different 
time periods 
 
Figure 6A: Firm-Inventor research collaborations (1990-2004) 
 
 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV firm-inventor networks from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 6B: Firm-Inventor research collaborations (2005-2012) 
Source: Author’s derivation from solar PV firm-inventor networks from PATSTAT database. 
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4.4 Country profiles: who do countries collaborate with? 
 
4.4.1 First-mover countries 
 
Another way to analyse countries’ access to knowledge spillovers is by considering who they 
undertake research collaborations with. EEG argues that although the research actors within 
a country are interested in tapping into global innovation networks, the research 
collaborations themselves tend to be with countries that are ‘proximate’ –in terms of spatial 
distance and/or having institutional similarities (Asheim et al., 2007; Storper & Venables, 
2004). Furthermore, EEG demonstrates that if countries collaborate in one time period, they 
are more likely to collaborate with the same countries again in future time periods (Heimeriks 
& Boschma, 2013). This does not mean that these countries are unlikely to collaborate with 
others as well – it just means that original partners tend to maintain a favoured status over 
time, demonstrating a path dependency in research collaborations between countries. 
 
In order to provide a balanced assessment of the relevance of partner countries within each 
country profile, a ratio of observed/expected partnerships is used (represented in the blue 
bar graphs below). This is in contrast to the actual percentage that partner countries account 
for in the different datasets (represented by the red dashes). The observed/expected ratio is 
derived from Luukkonen et al.'s (1992) study of international research collaborations and 
country preferences. It recognises that certain countries, such as the USA, have a large 
number of publications and a larger tendency to collaborate with other countries. Therefore, 
using the actual percentage of publications would overstate the importance of the USA in 
collaborations with each country. The observed/expected ratio instead creates a standardised 
index calculation where the observed number is compared with the expected number of 
research collaborations of the country, given the size and tendency of each country to 
collaborate. The calculation for the observed/expected ratio is given below.  
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Cxy = number of collaborations between country x and y in the time period 
T = total number of collaborations of all the countries in the dataset in that 
time period 
Cx = total number of collaborations for country x 
Cy = total number of collaborations for country y 
 
Luukkonen et al. (1992, p. 107) note that, “when the index value exceeds one, there are more 
collaborations between a pair of countries than expected, given their size and tendency to 
collaborate[...]”. Therefore, this index is very useful in providing a balanced ranking of 
countries’ tendencies to collaborate with others – enabling a ranking profile of different 
countries’ relevance in research collaborations. The following sub-sections will analyse the 
collaboration between selected first-mover countries, starting first with Japan and Germany. 
It will then review the collaborations of the most central late-comer country, China. It will 
then end with the USA, which has demonstrated in the previous section its centrality and 
tendency to collaborate with all other countries in the network. Therefore the last section will 
reveal the most important relationships for the most central country in solar PV research – 
indicating these countries’ probability of obtaining high-value knowledge spillovers that 
would potentially not have been accessed through its own connections.  
 
4.4.2 First-mover countries: Japan and Germany 
 
In analysing the observed/expected ratios of both Japan and Germany in both time periods 
shows that spatial proximity continues to matter over time and in both research publications 
and patents. Japan’s most important partners that exceed the observed/expected ratio of 1 
are South Korea and Australia for scientific research publications. For Germany, the most 
relevant countries that exceed the value of 1 are its European neighbours, including Russia. 
  
Whilst the “neighbour effect” largely persists for Germany’s collaborations across all 
datasets, there is a difference for Japan between research collaborations and patents. For 
scientific research, Japan also tends to undertake collaborations with its neighbours including 
China. However for international collaborations in patents, its foremost partners are the 
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USA, Switzerland, or Canada (depending on the patent dataset and time period). At face 
value, this finding is surprising. Studies that compare research collaborations between the 
global scientific community and industry demonstrate that the latter requires more spatial 
proximity between collaborators in order to limit the geographical spillovers of proprietary 
research efforts (Kwon et al., 2011; Ponds et al., 2007). However, one of the limitations of 
patent datasets is that it does not list all the different actors within a firm that participate in 
patent collaborations. This is why this research does include intra-country collaborations, 
which demonstrate the continued importance of collaborations at the national level. In fact 
all the observation/expected ratios of intra-country collaborations are higher than 1, 
representing the clustering of research activities at the national level.  
 
It is also very interesting to note the relevance of Australia and Switzerland for both Japan 
and Germany. Whilst it can be argued that Australia’s relative proximity to Japan and 
Switzerland’s proximity to Germany facilitates collaboration between neighbours, it is not as 
obvious that Australia should figure so prominently for Germany, and Switzerland for Japan. 
However these findings align with the ‘centrality’ measures of these countries, as discussed in 
the previous section, where Australia plays a central role in research publications, and 
Switzerland plays a more central role in patent collaborations. What is also interesting to note 
is China’s position within Japan’s and Germany’s country profiles. Whilst it features as a 
prominent research partner in scientific collaborations with Japan and Germany, it has a 
much lower country ranking in patent networks for these countries.  
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Figure 7. Japan’s profiles of country partners in two time periods 
 
Figure 7A. Scopus research collaborations with Japanese authors in two time periods 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from publications downloaded from Scopus database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from publications downloaded from Scopus database. 
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Figure 7B. Web of Science research collaborations with Japanese institutions in two 
time periods 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from publications downloaded from Web of Science database. 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from publications downloaded from Web of Science database. 
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Figure 7C. Patent collaborations with Japanese inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
  
 163 
 
Figure 7D. Patent collaborations with Japanese firms in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 7E. Patent collaborations between Japanese firms and domestic/foreign 
inventors in two time periods 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 8.Germany’s profiles of country partners in two time periods 
 
Figure 8A. Scopus research collaborations with German authors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Scopus. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Scopus. 
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Figure 8B. Web of Science research collaborations with German institutions in two 
time periods 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Web of Science. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Web of Science. 
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Figure 8C. Patent collaborations with German inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 8D. Patent collaborations with German firms in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 8E. Patent collaborations between German firms and domestic/foreign 
inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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4.4.3 Late-comer economies: China 
 
In examining the country partner profiles for China in each research dataset for both time 
periods, it is surprising that central first-mover countries do not have a higher ranking than 
countries such as Canada and Sweden (for research publications), and Australia (for patents). 
In Scopus, Canada has a value above 1 for the 1990-2004 period, while Sweden’s value 
exceeds 1 in the 2005-2012 period.  In WoS, both Canada and Sweden have values over 1 in 
the second time period. Though other first-mover countries such as the USA and Japan are 
amongst the top ranked countries for research collaborations, Germany is not as relevant a 
partner (especially in the second period from both Scopus and WoS datasets). One reason 
could be that China became less reliant on international collaborations in the second time 
period, as both the observed/expected ratios and the actual percentage of scientific research 
collaborations within China increased in the second time period. 
  
Another interesting feature of China’s relationships is the prominence of Australia in 
collaborating on patents. This is especially evident in the second time period in inter-firm 
partnerships and collaborations between firms and inventors. Australia’s prominence in 
patent collaborations is surprising, given that Japan and the USA play a larger role in China’s 
scientific research collaborations. One explanation could be the lack of industrial capacity in 
Australia. For Chinese firms, the importance of Australia in crystalline PV research can make 
it an attractive partner for undertaking research collaborations. For Australian firms and 
inventors, the lack of a large domestic industrial capacity hinders its ability to commercialise 
the potential technologies borne of patents. Collaborating with Chinese firms and inventors 
provides access to large industrial capacities that can enable the up-scaling of early stage 
technologies. 
  
Therefore Canada and Sweden’s relevance to China in scientific research publications, and 
Australia’s prominence in industrial application, raises an additional hypothesis of 
considering the comparative sizes of industrial capacity in each partner country. Late-comer 
countries such as China would also be interested in collaborating with countries that have 
high technological capabilities in order to increase its own. Furthermore, it has the industrial 
capacity to attract countries with high technological capabilities but low existing industrial 
capacity (such as Australia, Canada and Sweden). Although this hypothesis is preliminary, it is 
corroborated by the research findings of relationships between Australia and China in 
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Chapter 5. It highlights how the absence of a domestic industry in first-mover countries can 
prompt industrial research collaborations with late-comer countries that seek to increase their 
own technological capabilities.  
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Figure 9. China’s profiles of country partners in two time periods  
 
Figure 9A. Scopus research collaborations with Chinese authors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Scopus. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Scopus. 
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Figure 9B. Web of Science research collaborations with Chinese institutions in two 
time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Web of Science. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Web of Science. 
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Figure 9C. Patent collaborations with Chinese inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 9D. Patent collaborations with Chinese firms in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 9E. Patent collaborations between Chinese firms and domestic/foreign 
inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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4.4.4 USA: First-mover who is the most central network 
 
In each of the networks featured in Section 2, the USA demonstrated its prominence as the 
most central node in the network. Whilst the USA is an important bridge of knowledge 
spillovers for all countries (demonstrated by it high betweenness centrality), the countries 
that are most relevant to the USA can receive the most benefit through having a higher 
interaction with the USA. Unlike other first-mover countries like Japan and Germany, the 
USA’s most relevant partners are more geographically dispersed. These include Canada (a 
direct spatial neighbour), but also Australia, Taiwan, Sweden, and South Korea. 
  
Out of this set of countries, one of the most striking findings is the relevance of Taiwan – 
especially as it exceeds even the USA itself in terms of inter-firm patent collaborations in the 
first period (see Figure 10D). This finding is striking because of the low centrality of Taiwan 
in all five research networks seen in Section 2. However for both research and patent 
collaborations, it does play an important role for the USA. In surveying the literature on 
Taiwan’s strategies for increasing its own technological capabilities, two important factors are 
highlighted. Both Chen & Jaw (2009), Saxenian (2002), Wu & Mathews (2012) highlight the 
importance of Taiwanese diaspora networks in the USA which leverage both human and 
financial capital to facilitate technology transfers and research collaborations between the two 
countries. The purpose is to not only build the industrial capacity of Taiwan, but to engage in 
the circulation of knowledge between the two countries. What can be seen is that in the latter 
time period, Taiwan plays a less important role for the USA in all research datasets, except 
for firm-to-firm patent collaborations. Nevertheless Taiwan’s high relevance as a partner to 
the USA demonstrates its indirect access to high-level knowledge spillovers – potentially 
bypassing the need to undertake direct research collaborations with several other countries. 
 
Another interesting feature of the USA’s collaboration profiles is how other first-mover 
countries with large industrial capacities (aside from Switzerland) do not feature in the top 3 
partner countries in either time period. Although Germany is a mid-ranking country for the 
USA (especially in the second time period), Japan tends to be at the lower end. One possible 
explanation for this pattern is that both Germany and Japan have similar levels of product 
diversification (as can be seen in Chapter 3) (Carvalho & Perkins, 2015). One explanation for 
this pattern is that both Germany and Japan are similar to the USA in terms of their product 
diversification, therefore collaboration is less beneficial since there is less need to leverage 
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knowledge complementarities/complementary resources. An alternative explanation is that 
since these countries compete directly in the commercialisation of more niche technologies, 
they may be less willing to share proprietary information. This hypothesis could be supported 
by the relative drop in ranking for both Japan and Germany in the latter time period for each 
patent dataset.  
 
However another explanation could be that countries with a large industrial capacity may not 
be as collaborative as economies with smaller industrial capacities. In looking at the research 
partnership rankings of the USA, Germany, Japan, and China in each country’s dataset, they 
are not as relevant as countries with smaller industrial capacities. This finding is surprising as 
it shows that first-mover countries do not collaborate with each other as often as might be 
suggested, despite these countries featuring prominently in the hierarchy within networks 
(suggested by their high eigenvector centrality in the latter period). These findings, along with 
their collaborations with other countries that are less competitive in terms of industrial 
capacity, highlight how the competitive dynamics of the domestic industry can potentially 
affect who these countries collaborate with.  
 
  
 179 
 
Figure 10. USA’s profiles of country partners in two time periods 
 
Figure 10A. Scopus research collaborations with American authors in two time 
periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Scopus. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Scopus. 
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Figure 10B. Web of Science research collaborations with American institutions in two 
time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Web of Science. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from research publications downloaded from Web of Science. 
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Figure 10C. Patent collaborations with American inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 10D. Patent collaborations with American firms in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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Figure 10E. Patent collaborations between American firms and domestic/foreign 
inventors in two time periods 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from patents downloaded from PATSTAT database. 
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4.5 Conclusion. Discussion of findings and implications for 
future research 
 
This chapter has studied the evolution of first-mover and late-comer countries in accordance 
with their centrality within different innovation networks of solar PV, and who they 
collaborate, in two time periods. The purpose was to investigate certain implicit hypotheses 
that are within the existing literature from EEG and international development on the 
structure of these networks, and the collaboration profiles of different countries, based on 
their technological capabilities. EEG posits that countries with high technological capabilities 
are more likely to collaborate with each other than those with low technological capabilities – 
given the need to have similar levels of capabilities to undertake research at the technological 
frontier (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002; Coe & Bunnell, 2003; Matthiessen et al., 2010). The 
international development literature recognises that countries with lower technological 
capabilities will undertake research collaborations with countries with high technological 
capabilities in order to benefit from more high-level knowledge spillovers (Fan & Hu, 2007; 
Hu, 2012; Kim & Tunzelmann, 1998). The experience from these research collaborations 
would increase the technological capabilities of late-comer (Bell & Albu, 1999; Ockwell, 
Sagar, & de Coninck, 2014). 
  
Both of these literatures highlight how international research collaborations provide a key 
form of knowledge spillovers that can increase the technological capabilities of both first-
mover and late-comer countries (Beaver & Rosen, 1978; Katz, 1994; Lewis, 2014; Luukkonen 
et al., 1992). In testing these hypotheses, the chapter identifies the USA, Germany and Japan 
as being both first-movers and having large industrial capacity. This categorisation is justified, 
especially given these countries’ contributions to global research and manufacturing (as 
shown in Chapter 3) (Carvalho & Perkins, 2015). As a late-comer, it recognises that whilst 
China has a lower technological capability than these other countries, its capabilities appear 
to be increasing. In looking at these countries positions within the different solar PV 
innovation networks, it does recognise the difference between countries’ positions in 
scientific research publications versus patents. Whilst the former shows the rise of China’s 
centrality within these networks, the latter shows that China is less central within patent 
networks. This result could be due to China having a comparatively lower contribution to 
patent research  (Carvalho & Perkins, 2015). With regards to looking at international research 
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collaborations for patents, the lower centrality of China in comparison to the other countries 
would imply it would benefit less from knowledge spillovers from industrial research.   
  
However what is more surprising is the pattern of partner country profiles of these countries. 
Though USA, Germany and Japan have high technological capabilities, these countries do 
not feature prominently in the top relevance of countries. Of course, one explanation for 
Germany is that it collaborates more with its European neighbours, demonstrating the 
continued importance of spatial proximity in international collaborations. What is equally 
surprising is that USA, Germany, and Japan do no feature as prominently for China as 
research partners. This appears to contradict initial thesis from the international development 
literature – which highlights that late-comers seek research collaborations with countries that 
are most central in the network (Ernst, 2006; Kim & Tunzelmann, 1998; Mathews & Cho, 
2000). Though arguably Japan is not as central within the network (as seen in the centrality 
tables in the Appendix), it is actually spatially close to China to enable research 
collaborations. A common pattern in all of these countries’ profiles is the importance of 
other countries who do have high technological capabilities, but lower industrial capacity.  
 
Bearing in mind that these results are preliminary, it does raise important questions on how 
the size of domestic industries can affect international research collaborations. Considering 
that each of these countries’ analysed have high industrial capacity, could competitive 
dynamics of the industries lead to these actors collaborating less with each other than would 
be originally assumed? This factor would be interesting, as innovative actors would want to 
ensure that knowledge spillovers increase the competitiveness of domestic industrial capacity 
over foreign competitors. Therefore the political economy – and more specifically, techno-
nationalism – could affect the pattern of international research collaborations, something that 
the EEG literature has yet to explicitly explore. The political economy factor could 
potentially explain prominence of countries such as Australia, Switzerland, and Canada – 
which have comparatively smaller industrial capacities but high technological capabilities. As 
these countries do have high technological capabilities from research, they are attractive to 
collaborate with. However their comparatively lower industrial capacity does not necessarily 
threaten the competitiveness of domestic industry – thus removing the political economy 
consideration. In order to explore these patterns, future research should also look at the 
research collaboration profiles of these countries. Qualitative methodologies of interviewing 
actors in the different cross-section of technological capabilities and industrial capacity would 
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thus be useful in exploring whether political economy factors can influence patterns of 
research collaborations.  
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4.7 Appendix Tables 
Table A1. Scopus: Centrality measures of countries in each time period 
 
 
Countries 
Degree Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality 
1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 
USA 17.00 17.00 15.98 0.49 0.09 0.07 
China 13.00 17.00 7.14 0.49 0.07 0.07 
Germany 15.00 17.00 4.62 0.49 0.08 0.07 
UK 14.00 17.00 3.13 0.49 0.08 0.07 
France 13.00 17.00 1.28 0.49 0.08 0.07 
Australia 9.00 17.00 1.07 0.49 0.05 0.07 
South Korea 7.00 17.00 0.17 0.49 0.03 0.07 
Spain 10.00 17.00 0.11 0.49 0.06 0.07 
Switzerland 12.00 16.00 1.50 0.33 0.07 0.06 
Canada 7.00 16.00 0.00 0.33 0.04 0.06 
Japan 12.00 16.00 2.92 0.32 0.06 0.06 
Italy 15.00 16.00 4.97 0.23 0.08 0.06 
Netherlands 11.00 16.00 0.84 0.23 0.06 0.06 
Sweden 11.00 15.00 0.24 0.15 0.07 0.06 
Russia 12.00 15.00 1.03 0.33 0.07 0.06 
Taiwan 4.00 14.00 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.05 
 Source: Calculated from Scopus database  
 197 
 
Table A2. Web of Science: Centrality measures of countries in each time period 
 
 
Countries 
Degree Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality 
1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 
Australia 11.00 17.00 1.54 0.52 0.06 0.07 
China 11.00 17.00 4.98 0.52 0.05 0.07 
France 13.00 17.00 1.10 0.52 0.07 0.07 
Italy 15.00 17.00 3.87 0.52 0.08 0.07 
Japan 13.00 17.00 2.59 0.52 0.07 0.07 
South Korea 7.00 17.00 0.17 0.52 0.03 0.07 
Spain 12.00 17.00 0.22 0.52 0.07 0.07 
UK 15.00 17.00 4.31 0.52 0.08 0.07 
USA 17.00 17.00 15.37 0.52 0.08 0.07 
Canada 7.00 16.00 0.98 0.26 0.03 0.06 
Germany 14.00 16.00 1.64 0.26 0.08 0.06 
Netherlands 12.00 16.00 0.38 0.26 0.07 0.06 
Switzerland 12.00 16.00 0.38 0.26 0.07 0.06 
Sweden 12.00 15.00 0.22 0.00 0.07 0.06 
Russia 14.00 14.00 3.26 0.17 0.08 0.05 
Taiwan 5.00 14.00 0.00 0.17 0.02 0.05 
 Source: Calculated from Web of Science database 
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Table A3. Co-Inventors: Centrality measures of countries in each time period 
 
 
Countries 
Degree Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality 
1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 
Germany 13.00 16.00 10.52 11.12 0.11 0.10 
USA 16.00 16.00 32.10 11.12 0.12 0.10 
France 9.00 12.00 1.87 2.60 0.08 0.08 
South Korea 6.00 12.00 0.25 3.39 0.05 0.08 
Switzerland 10.00 11.00 2.43 1.86 0.09 0.07 
China 9.00 11.00 2.78 2.28 0.08 0.07 
Netherlands 6.00 11.00 0.20 2.41 0.05 0.07 
Canada 11.00 11.00 8.70 3.31 0.09 0.07 
Japan 7.00 10.00 0.20 1.55 0.07 0.07 
Spain 7.00 9.00 0.50 0.90 0.06 0.06 
Sweden 4.00 8.00 0.00 0.53 0.03 0.05 
Italy 7.00 8.00 0.20 0.48 0.06 0.05 
Australia 5.00 7.00 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.05 
Russia 6.00 7.00 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.05 
Taiwan 4.00 7.00 0.00 0.14 0.03 0.04 
 Source: Calculated from PATSTAT database 
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Table A4. Intra-Firm Networks: Centrality measures of countries in each time period 
 
 
Countries 
Degree Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality 
1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 
USA 10.00 12.00 22.60 23.83 0.13 0.13 
Germany 9.00 9.00 14.70 4.92 0.12 0.11 
China 3.00 10.00 0.00 12.25 0.02 0.11 
France 8.00 8.00 7.90 5.67 0.11 0.09 
Japan 8.00 7.00 3.90 1.58 0.12 0.09 
South Korea 2.00 7.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.09 
Switzerland 7.00 8.00 11.60 15.92 0.09 0.08 
Netherlands 6.00 6.00 0.00 0.83 0.09 0.07 
UK 8.00 6.00 1.60 0.83 0.12 0.06 
Taiwan 1.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 
Canada 8.00 5.00 6.70 0.00 0.11 0.05 
Australia 3.00 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 
Sweden 2.00 4.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.03 
Italy 3.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 
Spain 4.00 2.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
USA 10.00 12.00 22.60 23.83 0.13 0.13 
Germany 9.00 9.00 14.70 4.92 0.12 0.11 
 Source: Calculated from PATSTAT database 
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Table A5. Firms and Inventor networks: Centrality measures of countries in each 
time period 
 
 
Countries 
Degree Betweenness 
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 1990-2004 2005-2012 
Germany 15.00 17.00 13.63 12.09 0.09 0.09 
USA 17.00 17.00 21.24 12.09 0.10 0.09 
Switzerland 13.00 14.00 5.46 5.09 0.09 0.08 
France 10.00 13.00 1.48 3.29 0.07 0.08 
Netherlands 10.00 13.00 0.90 2.66 0.07 0.08 
South Korea 7.00 13.00 0.38 4.49 0.04 0.07 
Japan 11.00 12.00 3.58 1.88 0.07 0.07 
China 10.00 11.00 2.20 1.75 0.07 0.06 
UK 10.00 10.00 4.85 3.65 0.07 0.06 
Canada 10.00 9.00 4.07 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Italy 7.00 9.00 0.00 0.40 0.05 0.05 
Spain 8.00 9.00 0.53 0.25 0.06 0.05 
Australia 7.00 8.00 0.58 0.24 0.05 0.05 
Taiwan 6.00 7.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 
Sweden 5.00 6.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 
Russia 6.00 6.00 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.03 
Source: Calculated from PATSTAT database 
 
  
Chapter 5: How does the presence – or 
absence – of  domestic industries affect 
the commercialisation of  technologies? 
A comparative approach to how the maturity of technologies and the 
domestic industrial composition affects the propensity for actors to 
collaborate with domestic or foreign partners.  
5 Make invisible 
Abstract. The literature in evolutionary economic geography (EEG) highlights the 
importance of the spatial proximity between research institutes and industrial firms in 
facilitating learning feedback between these different types of actors when engaging 
in commercialisation for early stage technology. This literature assumes the existence 
of domestic industries to enable these commercialisation efforts. This chapter 
considers the importance of domestic industry in enabling innovation efforts for 
different solar photovoltaic (PV) technologies. It demonstrates how the 
professionalisation of solar PV sciences and the spread of solar PV social networks 
has enabled innovators and industrial actors to ‘search for the right partners’ in early-
stage research for alternative PV technologies. While there is no guarantee, the 
presence of domestic industries with diverse skill sets can increase the probability of 
finding a partner with the right knowledge complementarities. These preliminary 
findings also illustrate how strong linkages between research institutes and domestic 
industries can intentionally limit international knowledge spillovers that can help 
foreign industrial partners to compete with domestic industries. In contrast, the 
absence of domestic industrial linkages incentivises research institutes to seek foreign 
industrial partners for commercial collaborations.   
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Evolutionary economic geography (EEG) demonstrates how economies become resilient to 
global competition by developing more innovative technologies (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; 
Storper, 1997; Swanstrom, 2008) and retaining high-value industrial activities (Asheim & 
Coenen, 2006). In doing so, these economies can adapt to the loss of mature technology 
manufacturing as they shift to lower cost economies. By spatially embedding innovation 
within the domestic economy, countries can develop the next generation of technologies 
(Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). Alternatively, the domestic economy can concentrate on high-
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level process innovations (Bailey & Bosworth, 2014; EU Commission, 2012) that  improve 
the production efficiencies and quality of technologies. However EEG cautions that the 
path-dependent nature of technological accumulation can lock economies into innovating 
along specific technological trajectories (Boschma & Martin, 2010). Economies that led the 
innovation of a specific technology can become vulnerable to disruptive innovations 
introduced by another economy.  
 
This chapter focuses on how industrial diversity enables the resilience of economies by 
introducing disruptive innovations. Disruptive innovation is related to J. A. Schumpeter’s 
notion of ‘creative destruction’, where incumbent firms and industries are replaced by newer, 
more innovative firms (Schumpeter, 1975). Schumpeter ascribes this industrial dynamism to 
the competitiveness of innovative firms and their associated technologies. Domestic 
industries can achieve a level of resilience if they successfully commercialise technologies that 
other economies cannot replicate. As Chapter 2 argues, industries that only manufacture 
replicable incumbent technologies are less likely to be resilient to global competition in the 
long run. The replicability of technologies in different economies exposes them to global 
supply and demand dynamics (Masahiko & Haruhiko, 2002). Although these technologies 
can still appropriate large shares of the market, margins of economic value diminish. In 
contrast, firms (and their associated industries) that commercialise alternative technologies 
can achieve higher levels of value-added (Porter, 2011). These alternative technologies have 
yet to become replicable due to proprietary ownership. 
  
The global solar photovoltaic (PV) industry provides a good case study for exploring how the 
nature of industrial dynamism affects economies’ resilience to global competition. The vast 
majority of solar PV demand is met by crystalline PV technologies (Goodrich, James & 
Woodhouse, 2011). However, the global oversupply of crystalline PV technologies led to 
diminished, and even negative, profit margins for most firms involved in this value chain 
(Chase, 2013). Established ‘Tier 1’ solar PV firms (i.e. those proven to have high quality 
technologies) have survived, but many ‘Tier 2’ and ‘Tier 3’ players have gone bankrupt (see 
Figure 1). In contrast, two firms producing alternative PV technologies have managed to 
achieve profitable margins during this time. Their success in commercialising alternative PV 
technologies is due to lower production costs relative to crystalline PV (see Figure 2 in 
Chapter 2).  
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Figure 1. Nameplate cell manufacturing capacity of companies by rank (MW and 
distribution in meeting demand) 
 
Source: BNEF (2012:, p. 5). *Note: This was reported as of 12 May 2012 
 
 
This chapter explores how different actors engage with domestic and foreign networks in 
efforts to commercialise different solar PV technologies. It draws on interviews with research 
institutes and firms in various countries, who are involved with the innovation of crystalline 
PV and/or alternative solar PV technologies. These interviewees are located in economies 
that have the presence – or absence – of a domestic solar PV industry. This chapter is similar 
to Chapter 4 in terms of using a comparative approach based on the industrial composition 
of countries. However Chapter 4 uses scientific publications and patents to spatially delineate 
these research collaborations. This approach has it limits because it does not capture the tacit 
forms of knowledge exchange occurring through social networks of innovative actors. 
Second, these indicators only represent research collaborations to the exclusion of 
commercialisation efforts. Interviews, however, can provide insight into these tacit 
interactions in the commercialisation process of different PV technologies. 
  
This chapter can thus include an analysis of commercialising efforts based on different 
categories of industrial composition and maturity of technologies. The literature from EEG 
largely assumes that in the early stage of commercialisation, interactions between innovative 
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actors and industrial actors need to be spatially proximate (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). In 
contrast, the spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing can be spatially 
distant for mature technologies (Vernon, 1966). This chapter’s comparative approach yields 
preliminary findings that appear to contradict the existing hypotheses. It demonstrates that 
even at the early stages, cooperation between research and industrial actors can occur 
transnationally. What appears to be more important is a high level of knowledge 
complementarity between partners. By contrast, the presence of a domestic industry can raise 
an inherently techno-national perspective of foreign research collaborations where more 
mature technologies are concerned. The absence of a domestic industry not only eliminates 
this concern, but can even facilitate foreign collaborations. Therefore these findings indicate 
how the nature of the domestic industry can either limit or facilitate knowledge spillovers 
across national borders.  
 
The purpose of this research is to examine whether innovative actors need access to 
domestic industry in order to advance domestic efforts into solar PV innovation. Section 2 
looks at challenges in commercialising technologies, with a particular focus on the spatial 
dynamics between innovation and manufacturing. Section 3 illustrates why the solar PV 
industry is a good case study to explore these questions and describes the methodology. 
Section 4 discusses the main findings. The concluding section focuses on the implications of 
these findings for the wider literature on EEG and green growth.  
 
5.2 Does the commercialisation of technologies need access to 
domestic manufacturing? 
 
This section starts by looking at the motivation for analysing the spatial relationship between 
innovation and manufacturing. Using the literature on the systems failure approach to 
innovation systems, it demonstrates how countries’ ability to commercialise product 
innovations is based on ‘scaling’ production. Scaling production implies access to industries 
that can develop technological equipment to manufacture a high volume of final products (or 
sub-components) (Huijben & Verbong, 2013).  In additional to the theoretical literature that 
eschews geographical perspectives on technological transitions, associated empirical studies 
on the commercialisation process tend to focus on countries with domestic industries. EEG 
provides a useful perspective on the spatial evolution of industrial activities based on the 
maturity of technologies (Boschma & Frenken, 2006; Vernon, 1966). Therefore EEG is 
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useful in demonstrating how the maturity of technologies affects the spatial distance between 
innovation and manufacturing. The following section integrates these insights into a 
conceptual framework and concludes by recognising that there is a gap in the literature in 
terms of how the presence (or absence) of domestic industry influences the nature of 
research-industry partnerships.   
 
5.2.1 The importance of scaling in commercialising technologies 
 
The systems failure approach to innovation systems focuses on how the lack of linkages 
between key actors leads to the failed commercialisation of product innovations – especially 
with regards to “crossing the valley of death” (Geels, 2002; Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & 
Gilsing, 2005). Innovation systems characterises how innovative actors operate within 
various networks and institutions to undertake innovations – including bringing these 
technologies to the market. The systems failure approach focuses on various imperfections 
within the innovation systems that inhibit innovation efforts. For this issue, the most relevant 
are transitions failure, and weak and strong network failures (Carlsson et al., 2002). The 
“valley of death” analogy refers to the financing gap in the middle stages of the innovation 
process involved with revising early demonstration technologies  (Markham et al., 2010). 
There are several challenges in enabling market commercialisation. The first is demonstrating 
that these technologies actually function outside of a laboratory setting, which requires the 
development of prototypes for field testing and obtaining feedback from early users of 
technologies (Schot & Geels, 2008). 
  
The systems failure approach recognises entrepreneurs as important actors in seeking 
commercial applications for prototypes (Auerswald, 2012). This approach recognises that 
economies that lack these kinds of actors – and their networks – can produce a lot of 
promising product innovations that “remain on the shelf” – highlighting a weak network 
failure (Woolthuis, Lankhuizen & Gilsing, 2005). Entrepreneurs’ ability to raise financing for 
scaling production is extremely difficult. A comprehensive survey of clean energy investors 
by BNEF (2010) demonstrates there are not many investors who match the risk tolerance 
and capital requirements required at this stage of technology development. 
 
Another key issue for the commercialisation of disruptive (or at least, alternative) product 
innovations is to ensure that they are competitive with incumbent technologies (Unruh & 
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Einstein, 2000). The attractiveness of disruptive innovations is that they provide 
technological performance that is superior to incumbent technologies (Klepper, 1996). 
Nonetheless, the potential for these technologies to displace incumbent technologies can be 
hampered by techno-institutional lock-in effects of incumbent technologies – demonstrating 
strong network failures (Stern & Rydge, 2013). These ‘lock-in’ effects refer to factors such as 
supportive infrastructures or user behaviours that reinforce the preference for incumbent 
technologies. Strategic niche management (SNM) studies emphasise the creation of 
‘protected market spaces’ for learning feedback loops between producers and potential users 
(Verbong, Geels & Raven, 2008). This feedback can modify the design and functionality of 
technologies to meet customer preferences/needs, and even their safety (e.g. pharmaceutical 
industries). User-producer linkages are also important in integrating clean energy 
technologies into the larger energy infrastructure (Cowan & Hultén, 1996; Unruh, 2002). 
  
The second challenge is the actual scaling of production, which can require the development 
of specialised production equipment for manufacturing (Huijben & Verbong, 2013). It can 
also include retooling existing manufacturing plants to accommodate product innovations 
(Tamayo-Torres, Gutierrez-Gutierrez & Ruiz-Moreno, 2014). Achieving scalability is 
especially important in terms of ensuring that disruptive technologies go beyond niche 
technologies to large-scale market diffusion (BNEF, 2010). An important factor that prevents 
alternative innovations from displacing incumbent technologies is their higher costs of 
production (Argote, 1993). These high production costs are not necessarily due to being 
inherently more expensive to produce than incumbents (McDonald & Schrattenholzer, 
2001), but because of low production volumes. Standard microeconomic theory 
demonstrates that economies of scale are achieved by increasing production volume to a 
point where average unit costs decline. Furthermore, increasing production enables learning-
by-doing processes that further enable the commercialisation of technologies (Jovanovic & 
Rousseau, 2002). Learning curves were thus developed as a concept for measuring 
productivity improvements or cost reductions associated with increases in production 
capacity (Klenow, 1998).5 
 
                                                 
5Ibenholt (2002, p. 1182) demonstrates how “cost reductions are driven by five factors: (1) 
technological progress; (2) input price changes; (3) internal-efficiency improvements; (4) learning-by-
doing; (5) economies of scale.” 
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Empirical studies on clean energy technologies demonstrate how these technologies have 
rapidly progressed along the learning curve. Goldemberg et al. (2004) describes how the 
Brazilian Alcohol Program provided producer subsidies to ethanol producers whilst setting 
fuel prices for gasoline. These policies encouraged the increase in ethanol production which 
reduced costs to a point where subsidies were no longer needed. Bazilian et al.'s (2012) study 
of crystalline PV measures how the prices for technologies (measured in dollars per watt) 
reduced by 67% from 2003 to 2012 with increases in production volume. Due to these 
reductions in cost and high domestic electricity prices, crystalline PV electricity generation 
became price competitive in countries such as Germany, Spain, Italy and Denmark. Solar 
PV’s achievement of grid parity in these markets means that it no longer requires subsidies to 
compete with conventional electricity generation. However Nemet's (2006) study of solar PV 
learning curves, and Ibenholt's (2002) comparison of wind learning curves in European 
countries, demonstrate how excessive demand can thwart cost reductions. A good example is 
crystalline PV whose prices increased above the learning curve around 2003 due to demand 
exceeding supply, even with increased production capacity (see Figure 2 in Chapter 2). These 
studies demonstrate that the commercialisation of clean energy technologies suffers from 
production scalability issues (BNEF, 2010; Jamison, 2010).  
 
This section briefly reviewed the challenges in commercialising product innovations – 
particularly with regard to scaling. A major challenge with scaling is access to industry with 
the necessary production technologies and engineering expertise. The difficulty is that there 
may be no investment to build a domestic industry for this technology due to high capital 
costs or lock-in effects. Second, the domestic economy may not have industrial players with 
the right knowledge complementarities to scale these technologies. So does the lack of a 
domestic industry mean the products of innovative economies just remain on the shelf? 
 
5.2.2 How the maturity of technologies affects spatial distance between 
innovation and manufacturing 
 
Evolutionary economic geography provides analysis on how the spatial relationship between 
innovation and manufacturing changes as technologies mature (Boschma & Frenken, 2006). 
During the early stage of scaling new product innovations, innovation and manufacturing 
tend to be closely clustered (Klenow, 1998). This spatial proximity is required to enable tacit 
exchanges of feedback between scientists and industrial actors in developing appropriate 
production technologies (Breschi & Lissoni, 2001). Alternatively, scientists can work with 
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industrial players (e.g. engineers) in developing or retooling their production facilities to 
enable the scaling of new product innovations. 
  
EEG also demonstrates that spatial proximity between innovation and manufacturing is 
reinforced by differences between scientists and industrial players. Ponds, van Oort & 
Frenken's (2007) study of collaborations between universities, governments and firms in the 
Netherlands shows that there is a correlation between organisational differences and closer 
spatial proximity. Their study argues that increased levels of communication and clarification 
are required between collaborative actors that have different organisational backgrounds. 
Similarly, Gittleman & Wolff (1995) demonstrate that a higher level of communication is 
required because scientists and industrial firms have different goals and cultures in their 
approach to research. For example, while scientists achieve recognition through making their 
findings well known in the research community (Dasgupta et al., 1962), industrial firms 
maintain competitive advantage by safeguarding technological knowledge from competitors 
(Frenken & van Oort, 2004). The need for exclusive rights to technological knowledge 
particularly applies during the commercialising phase; whilst other firms can also produce 
innovations, the ability to bring these technologies to the market is what enables firms to 
derive returns on investment. Therefore the closer a technology is to being commercialised, 
the higher the level of trust that is needed amongst actors. Boschma & Martin (2010) 
demonstrate that this need for trust requires greater spatial proximity between innovation 
and manufacturing. 
 
However EEG also recognises that the spatial distance between innovation and 
manufacturing can increase once a technology ‘matures’. Technological maturity occurs when 
the market for a particular technology picks a ‘dominant design’ – that with the greatest 
market acceptability (Cantwell, 1995). Interest in other product designs wane and the market 
switches its focus to reducing costs for the dominant design. One way to achieve this is by 
relocating production to economies with comparatively lower costs of production (Vernon, 
1966). This shift can reduce, or even eliminate, the manufacturing of these particular 
technologies in the economies that originally innovated them (Ernst, 2006). However, it 
benefits economies with comparative advantage in low-cost production as it allows them to 
enter the industry through manufacturing (Wu & Mathews, 2012) and technology transfer 
processes enable them to increase their industrial capacity.  
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At this stage of technological maturity, actors can also reduce production costs through 
process innovations that improve efficiency. Many studies on East Asian economies 
demonstrate how process innovations occur during the actual manufacturing process 
(McDonald & Schrattenholzer, 2001; Watson et al., 2014). This learning-by-doing enables 
these actors to identify organisational improvements to routines and processes that are key to 
cost reductions. These economies leverage their access to manufacturing to increase their 
technological capabilities, which not only means an increase in production of more 
sophisticated technologies, but also engaging with more sophisticated innovation.  
  
A good example of learning-by-doing can be seen in East Asian economies, notably South 
Korea, Taiwan, and China. These economies not only leverage their comparative advantage 
in manufacturing, but also undertake indigenous innovation. The increase in technological 
capabilities allows these economies to continuously ‘absorb’ external knowledge. However 
Hansen & Ockwell (2014) and Bell (2009) distinguish between technological capabilities and 
industrial capacity – with the latter referring to an economies ability to produce existing 
technologies. In contrast, technological capabilities include creating new product designs (i.e. 
product innovation) or even undertaking advanced engineering to improve the sophistication 
of production equipment. Dicken (2011) and Bailey & Bosworth (2014) recognise that 
production equipment is becoming highly automated, so process innovations for these 
technologies require more sophisticated innovation capabilities. These high level process 
innovations stand in contrast to lower levels of process innovations that occur through 
developing production capabilities (Hansen & Ockwell, 2014).  
 
EEG recognises that when highly sophisticated engineering is required to improve 
production equipment, industrial firms will choose to undertake these process innovations 
near economies with technological capabilities. This is because the spatial embeddedness of 
innovation clusters attracts industrial actors to undertake joint research and development 
(R&D) for these technologies. Amin & Thrift (1992), Maskell & Malmberg (1999), and 
Storper (1997) argue that these ‘centrifugal’ forces reinforce these innovation clusters’ 
importance within global production networks. These innovation clusters which have both 
innovative actors and industry can either can in Jacobian economies that have multiple 
industries located in a single cluster, or industrial districts that specialise in a given technology 
(Aoyama, Murphy, & Hanson, 2011). With regards to high level process innovations, it 
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indicates that process innovation and industrial facilities are located within the same 
economy. 
 
Economies that first innovated the dominant design can also continue to improve product 
design through iterative cycles. They can transfer these designs to production economies with 
the capabilities to retool their facilities to produce these designs. The idea of ‘just-in-time’ 
production first referred to Toyota’s ability to produce new designs at a faster rate through 
innovations in production facilities (Monden, 2012), but has come to characterise East Asian 
economies that are part of global production networks (Dicken, 2011). These economies can 
quickly modify their production facilities to manufacture successive product innovations that 
are designed in foreign economies. Conversely innovative economies do not necessarily have 
to rely on the domestic industry to introduce updated designs of products that are already 
commercialised.  
 
5.2.3 Considering economies without domestic industries 
 
The focus of this chapter is to consider whether research institutes need access to domestic 
industry in the commercialisation process. Domestic industries are important for scaling 
production – which itself has systemic challenges. EEG also analyses how technological 
maturity influences the spatial distance between innovation and industrial actors. Studies on 
the innovation systems of industrialising economies highlight that economies with high 
production capabilities do not necessarily develop innovative capabilities. 
 
However there is little literature on whether new product innovations –alternatives to the 
dominant design – require access to domestic industry for scaling and commercialisation. 
The literature derived from the systems failure and the EEG literature would hypothesise 
that these economies would need access to domestic industrial players. This is due to the 
importance of spatial proximity for enabling learning feedback loops and engendering trust.6 
Chapter 4 has identified economies who play an important role in solar PV research, but do 
                                                 
6It should be noted that EEG recognises that scientists’ networks are more openly collaborative with 
actors outside the economy, even for technologies that are at an early stage, because of the 
importance of creating knowledge spillovers through leveraging each other’s specialisations. However 
This same literature finds a contrasting case with scientist-industrial partnerships. Industrial players 
invest in these ventures to obtain economic rent through proprietary ownership of the technology.  
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not have access to a large domestic industry (Carvalho, 2015a). How these researchers engage 
with foreign industrial partners – especially in comparison to researchers with access to 
domestic industrial partners – addresses an important gap in the literature.   
 
Table 1. Comparative framework of opportunities and challenges to commercialise 
technologies, based on presence or absence of domestic industry  
 
 
 
Maturity of 
technology 
Innovative actors located in economies with different 
industrial compositions 
Presence of domestic 
industry 
Absence of domestic 
industry 
Alternative 
technology  
(pre-
commercialisation) 
Presence of domestic industry 
provides opportunities for 
scaling production to 
commercialise technologies 
(From the EEG literature). 
(Hypothesis based on the current 
EEG literature) Need for 
spatial proximity makes it 
challenging to commercialise 
alternative technologies with 
lack of domestic industry.  
Dominant 
technology  
(commercialised 
technology) 
Opportunities for high-level 
process innovations and 
improvements on product 
innovation with domestic 
industry. (From the EEG 
literature). 
Linkages between these 
economies in technology 
transfer and joint R&D for 
process innovations (From the 
EEG literature and innovation 
systems literature of industrialising 
economies). 
Based on: Bell, 2009; Boschma & Martin, 2010; Hansen & Ockwell, 2014; Maskell & Malmberg, 
1999; Murmann, 2005; Storper, 1997 
 
 
5.3 Solar PV technologies: case study and research 
methodology 
 
5.3.1 Choice of the solar PV industry as a case study 
 
Using the solar PV industry as a case study is useful as it has multiple product innovations at 
different stages of development. Solar PV technologies refer to the direct conversion of 
photon energy (derived from sunlight) into electricity through the use of semi-conductive 
materials (Green et al., 2015). PV cells are the main technological components that undertake 
the electricity conversion, and are made from different semi-conductive materials. The 
‘dominant’ semi-conductive material is crystalline silicon. Alternative solar PV technologies 
either rely less on silicon materials, are derived from alternative semi-conductive materials 
(Chopra, Paulson & Dutta, 2004), or use a combination of semi-conductive materials 
(including crystalline PV). 
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The attraction of alternative technologies is that they have the potential to be produced at a 
lower areal cost (i.e. surface area) and/or higher efficiencies than crystalline PV, and have 
greater opportunities for different applications (Green, 2007; Hegedus, 2006). Figure 2 
demonstrates how crystalline silicon PV (shortened to crystalline PV) has a higher areal cost 
than alternative PV technologies – as can be seen by their placement on the x-axis. For 
conventional thin-film PV technologies (denoted as II technologies in Figure 2), the amount 
of semi-conductive materials used is less – thereby being comparatively cheaper to crystalline 
PV for each square metre. However they also conduct less electricity from their exposure to 
sunlight (represented by the power efficiency levels on the y-axis). High-efficiency PV 
technologies (denoted as III technologies in Figure 2) can also be cheaper per square metre 
by being made of semi-conductive materials that conduct more electricity over the same 
surface area; or concentrating the focus of solar energy onto a smaller areal surface to 
conduct more electricity. In summary, areal costs of alternative PV technologies can be lower 
than crystalline PV technologies due to: (1) cheaper material inputs; or (2) having PV cells 
with higher power efficiencies. An additional attraction of thin-film and organic PV cells is 
their flexibility and integration with different materials, enabling alternative PV technologies 
to be incorporated into buildings, thereby increasing opportunities for architectural design 
and energy.   
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Figure 2. Areal costs and efficiencies for different solar PV technologies  
 
Source: Ekins-Daukes, N.J., 2013, p. 10 
Note: Conventional flat-plate PV (I) refers to crystalline PV technologies that have a maximum power 
efficiency limit of 32.7%. Conventional thin-film PV (II) has cheaper material costs, whilst high efficiency 
PV concentrator (III) can reach higher efficiencies.  
 
Solar PV is particularly useful for this study as the production equipment of crystalline PV 
would not be suitable for alternative PV technologies (Green, 2007). The spatial implication 
is that an economy that produces crystalline PV technologies does not have an automatic 
advantage in developing alternative PV technologies. Instead, up-scaling the production of 
alternative technologies requires complementary knowledge from other industries. For 
example, many alternative technologies (such as thin-film and organic PV) require the 
production of large sheets of high quality material and can draw on experience from 
complementary production lines including glass, steel and photography (for the printing of 
film).  These production facilities (or fabrication lines) can be used for upscaling based on 
existing processes and retooling for semi-conductive PV cell materials. Access to production 
technologies is important for overcoming two main challenges of commercialising 
technologies. The first is to achieve material quality in terms of durability and power 
efficiencies, as well as managing the toxicity of certain materials. The second is the scaling of 
production. This highlights the importance of industrial actors that in providing access to 
production technologies and facilitating learning-by-doing (Goodrich et al., 2011). 
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Crystalline PV technologies achieved early commercialisation due to knowledge 
complementarity with the semi-conductor industry for electronics, whose production 
equipment could be easily adapted. These knowledge complementarities enabled the USA, 
Japan, Germany and Switzerland’s semi-conductor industries to retool fabrication lines for 
crystalline PV. This production equipment could then be sold to foreign economies – 
particularly to Chinese companies. With a number of Chinese firms taking up production, 
China’s aggregate supply of crystalline PV grew from 255MW/year in 2005 to over 
38,000MW/year in 2012 (Chase, 2013).  
 
5.3.2 Methodology 
 
The solar PV industry is a suitable case for the purposes of this study because it currently has 
a dominant and ‘mature’ technology in the form of crystalline PV technologies, as well as 
alternative PV technologies that are being developed from a different set of production tools. 
This research has identified actors that engage with innovation and commercialisation 
processes for both types of technologies, some of whom are located in economies with a 
domestic industry, some of whom are not. Using interviews as a research method was 
beneficial as interviewees were willing to talk about the nature and geography of their 
research-industrial interactions, some of which are confidential and would not necessarily be 
revealed on websites or public reports. Where available, this chapter used additional sources 
to corroborate the information on research-industry partnerships (e.g. company or research 
institute reports, or third party information). 
  
This chapter takes a comparative approach in determining how access to domestic industries 
and the maturity of technologies shape the nature of research-industry partnerships. 
Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted with innovative actors that fit within 
the cross-section of these categories. The interviews were semi-structured and purposefully 
open-ended to avoid biasing interviewee’s responses. Nevertheless each interview addressed 
four thematic questions: 
 
1. What kind of technologies is the interviewee involved in? 
2. How does the interviewee engage with commercialisation efforts for these 
technologies? 
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3. (Depending on if the interviewee is part of a research institute or industry) How 
does the respective organisation engage with external actors in undertaking scientific 
research and/or industrial research? Where are external actors located? 
4. How has the competitive dynamics in research – and the broader solar PV industry – 
affected the affiliated institute’s research efforts?   
 
A total of fourteen in-person interviews were taken with high-level and/or experienced 
actors in the solar PV industry. Another interview was undertaken via email exchanges. Each 
interviewee was chosen due to their seniority and extensive experience in the research 
institute and/or firm. Due to the sensitivity of certain views provided, the researcher took 
specific precautions in protecting interviewees’ identity. This prerogative is especially justified 
in cases where actors can be identified from the cross-section of their knowledge 
specialisations and geographical affiliation.7 Therefore, this research abstracted from 
geography and knowledge specialisations (revealed in Table 2 below).  
 
The organisations studied for this chapter include research institutes, production equipment 
manufacturers, and final product firms located in Australia, China, Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, UK, and the USA. These innovative actors are affiliated with the following solar 
PV technologies: crystalline PV, thin-film, polymers, and multi-junction cells. The 
technologies are at various stages of commercialisation. Pre-commercialisation refers to 
attempts to scale production before bringing the final PV product to the market. Early 
commercialisation refers to efforts in selling final PV products to the market. 
Commercialised technologies refer to final PV products that have already been sold to 
external buyers in the market.  
 
Domestic industry access, shown in the last column of Table 2, refers to the presence of 
domestic industries with complementary knowledge in manufacturing that material, as well as 
whether the domestic industry produces crystalline PV. Table 2 thus reveals the categories 
that these actors fulfil and the kinds of partnerships they undertook. There is more than one 
interviewee (from different countries) that fall within each category. So although the sample 
size is small, the depth of the interviews with senior personnel still provides valid insights. 
                                                 
7The ‘closed’ nature of the solar PV industry makes it possible for those familiar with the industry to 
identify interview participants. 
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Additionally, the main findings of this research were derived from more than one interviewee 
– thereby providing some level of robustness. These insights reveal how access to domestic 
industry has influenced participants’ commercialisation efforts. 
Table 2. Summarised findings of industrial partnerships with different interviewees  
Particip-
ant 
# 
Organisational 
affiliation (s) 
Technology type Commercial status Type of partner (geography) Domestic industry access? 
P1* University 
(Government funds 
research) 
Organic and dye-
sensitised PV 
Pre-commercial (1) Foreign research partners (1) Large presence of 
domestic industry for 
crystalline PV (final 
products); (2) no domestic 
industry with 
complementary knowledge 
base in alternative PV 
technologies 
P2 University  
(Government funding 
and Industrial 
Partnerships) 
Organic and dye-
sensitised PV 
Pre-commercial (1) Foreign industrial partner to 
use production equipment to 
up-scale technology; (2) 
Domestic and foreign research 
partners 
Potential for domestic 
industrial base (presence of 
complementary industries) 
P3 (1) Research institute 
(for PhD); (2) Career 
mostly in technology 
firms, appealing to 
private capital markets 
Thin-film technology Early stage 
commercial-isation 
(1)Domestic industrial partner 
with complementary 
knowledge; (2) Worked on 
foreign technology transfers for 
government-led research 
partnerships 
(1) Domestic manufacturing 
for crystalline PV;(2) 
Domestic industrial base 
with complementary 
technology for equipment 
manufacturing for semi-
conductor and alternative 
PV technologies 
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Particip-
ant 
# 
Organisational 
affiliation (s) 
Technology type Commercial status Type of partner (geography) Domestic industry access? 
P4 Solar PV firm Thin-film technology Commercialised 
technologies 
(1) In-house R&D; (2) 
Technology acquisition of other 
alternative PV firms 
(1) Domestic manufacturing 
for crystalline PV;(2) 
Domestic industrial base 
with complementary 
technology for equipment 
manufacturing for semi-
conductor and alternative 
PV technologies 
P5 Research institute 
(government and 
industrial partnerships) 
Crystalline PV; multi-
junction PV cells  
Crystalline PV 
(commercialise; 
multi-junction (pre-
commercial) 
Foreign industrial partners  No domestic industry 
P6†,** Research institute 
(primarily industrial 
partnerships/ 
technology licensing; 
government funding) 
(1) crystalline PV 
(commercialised); (2) 
thin-film (pre-
commercialised) 
Crystalline PV 
(commercialised); 
thin-film (pre-
commercialised) 
(1) Foreign industrial partners 
with crystalline PV 
technologies: technology 
licensing of PV applications 
and joint R&D of higher 
efficiency cells; (2) Domestic 
research partners for thin-film 
technologies  
Domestic industry for semi-
conductors and crystalline 
PV fabrication lines 
P7 
Research institute 
(government funding 
with strong emphasis 
on industrial 
partnerships) 
Crystalline PV 
technology 
Commercialised 
technologies 
Mostly partnering with 
domestic industry for 
equipment manufacturing 
Domestic industry for semi-
conductor and equipment 
manufacturing for crystalline 
PV 
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Particip-
ant 
# 
Organisational 
affiliation (s) 
Technology type Commercial status Type of partner (geography) Domestic industry access? 
P8 
Research institute 
(majority of funding is 
non-government, with 
particular emphasis on 
industrial partnerships 
Mostly crystalline PV  
Commercialised 
technologies 
Domestic and foreign industrial 
partners for improving 
production equipment 
(1) Large presence of 
domestic industry for 
crystalline PV (final 
products); (2) no domestic 
industry with 
complementary knowledge 
base in alternative PV 
technologies 
P9 
Research institute 
(government funding 
with emphasis on 
industrial partnerships) 
Crystalline PV 
technology 
Commercialised 
technologies 
Working with foreign research 
institutes and industrial partners 
to import technologies and 
cater to local market 
(1) Large presence of 
domestic industry for 
crystalline PV (final 
products); (2) no domestic 
industry with 
complementary knowledge 
base in alternative PV 
technologies 
P10 
Solar PV technology 
firm 
Crystalline PV 
technology 
Commercialised 
technologies 
Firm did in-house R&D and 
partnered with foreign research 
institute for joint R&D 
applications 
(1) Large presence of 
domestic industry for 
crystalline PV (final 
products); (2) no domestic 
industry with 
complementary knowledge 
base in alternative PV 
technologies 
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Particip-
ant 
# 
Organisational 
affiliation (s) 
Technology type Commercial status Type of partner (geography) Domestic industry access? 
P11 
Solar PV firm (for 
upstream products) 
Provide silicon wafers 
for crystalline PV and 
semi-conductor 
industry 
(commercialised) 
Commercialised 
technologies 
(1) Mostly in-house R&D; (2) 
Domestic and foreign research 
partnerships 
(1) Domestic manufacturing 
for crystalline PV;(2) 
Domestic industrial base 
with complementary 
technology for equipment 
manufacturing for semi-
conductor and alternative 
PV technologies 
P12† 
Industrial firm 
(conglomerate) 
Equipment 
manufacturer and 
balance-of-systems 
Commercialised 
technologies 
(1) In-house R&D with 
affiliates around the world 
(mostly in domestic HQ); (2) 
most high-level innovations in 
country HQ 
Domestic industry for semi-
conductor and equipment 
manufacturing for crystalline 
PV 
P13‡ 
Industrial firm 
(conglomerate)  
Equipment 
manufacturer 
Commercialised 
technologies 
(1) In-house R&D with 
subsidiaries around the world; 
(2) Acquisition of domestic and 
foreign firms for technologies 
to improve production process; 
(3) Research partners with 
universities (based on specialty 
or technology transfer)    
(1) Domestic manufacturing 
for crystalline PV;(2) 
Domestic industrial base 
with complementary 
technology for equipment 
manufacturing for semi-
conductor and alternative 
PV technologies 
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Particip-
ant 
# 
Organisational 
affiliation (s) 
Technology type Commercial status Type of partner (geography) Domestic industry access? 
P14‡ 
Industrial firm 
(conglomerate) 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
Commercialised 
technologies 
(1) In-house R&D with 
subsidiaries around the world; 
(2) Research partners with 
universities (based on specialty 
or technology transfer)    
(1) Domestic manufacturing 
for crystalline PV;(2) 
Domestic industrial base 
with complementary 
technology for equipment 
manufacturing for semi-
conductor and alternative 
PV technologies 
P15** 
Industrial firm (solar 
PV)  
Equipment 
manufacturer 
Commercialised 
technologies 
(1) Technology transfer 
processes to foreign countries 
(where customers are located) 
Domestic industry for semi-
conductors and crystalline 
PV production equipment 
*Responded through email to in-depth questionnaire. 
**Located in the same country that has small industrial base for production equipment for crystalline PV.  
†Interviewed two people from same organisation at the same time.  
‡Belong to same company but based in different countries.
5.4 Research findings & discussion 
 
How does the nature of research-industrial partnerships differ when these actors have access 
to domestic industry? This chapter presents novel findings that explore the propensity and 
nature of research-industrial partnerships based on the presence (or absence) of domestic 
industries. For alternative technologies, it demonstrates that the openness to collaborate with 
industrial partners is based on the complementarity of knowledge; there is a greater 
willingness to work with foreign partners if the research institute’s prototype can be up-
scaled in the firm’s facility. 
  
In contrast, the presence (or absence) of a domestic industry that provides crystalline PV 
production equipment influences research institute’s propensity to collaborate with actors in 
low-cost countries such as China. Research institutes that collaborate with domestic industrial 
partners limit research partnerships with Chinese firms (based on P7 and P8 responses). 
Instead, they recognise their role in helping domestic equipment manufacturers improve 
high-level process innovations that can then be sold to Chinese crystalline PV factories. 
However, the research institutes that do not have large domestic equipment manufacturers 
do engage with Chinese solar PV firms (based on P5 and P6 responses). The following sub-
sections illustrate these dynamics.  
 
5.4.1 Alternative PV technologies: The search for the right partner 
 
The up-scaling of production for alternative PV technologies requires access to industrial 
production facilities that can be retooled to suit alternative PV purposes. Interviewees for 
alternative PV technologies reported that even when the PV cell was not yet ready for up-
scaling, having an industrial partner was important in getting access to materials and 
production lines for learning-by-doing processes (based on P1, P2, and P3 responses). They 
acknowledged that finding the appropriate research and/or industrial partner is an important 
part of this learning process.  
 
For interviewees that undertook commercialisation processes for alternative technologies, a 
major reason they could up-scale production was because the domestic industry had the 
appropriate production equipment. First Solar’s first manufacturing plant was in Perrysberg, 
Ohio. Perrysburg is known for having a strong glass-making industry, which also benefits 
from industrial linkages with Ohio State University. Although First Solar manufactured this 
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technology in-house, it chose to locate in Perrysburg due to the knowledge spillovers in glass 
making that occur within this industrial district. Another interviewee that undertook 
commercialisation of a thin-film technology said he partnered with an entrepreneur with 
connections in the optics industry. These findings reinforce the hypothesis that economies 
with a diverse set of industries have a higher probability of matching research and industrial 
partners for commercialising technologies. However, it does not guarantee that the match 
will enable technological commercialisation. One interviewee (P3) based in the USA 
highlighted the difficulties in finding the right partner due to financing issues, lack of 
experience in developing these technologies, and lack of a large-scale domestic PV market. 
  
On the other hand, the lack of diversity in the domestic economy does not necessarily 
hamper the learning efforts of research institutes involved in alternative PV technologies. 
Social networks are an important avenue in internationalising research-industrial 
partnerships, especially as students and colleagues move into industries while maintaining ties 
with former research affiliations, including facilitating partnerships (based on P2, P3, P5, P6, 
and P8 responses). These interviewees highlight how the number of international research 
collaborations has increased with the professionalisation of the sciences (Beaver & Rosen, 
1978), which refers to how a research community develops around a scientific subject – in 
this case, solar PV technologies. The nature of scientific research and funding – which 
focuses on novel contributions – also has specific knowledge specialisations developed in 
distinct geographies (Martin & Sunley, 2007). These geographies spatially cluster innovative 
actors involved within specific niches of solar PV technologies. All the interviewees 
recognised the specialities of different innovation clusters based on results published in 
prominent academic and industrial journals.8 Furthermore, the interviewees highlight the 
importance of conferences in not only announcing new scientific findings (or improved 
results), but finding potential research/industry partners. 
  
International recognition of research institutes’ advances is an important factor in attracting 
scientific and industrial funding – even from foreign partners. All the interviewees that 
undertook alternative PV research were open to collaborations with foreign actors where 
                                                 
8Prominent solar PV journals that interviewees frequently used for announcing results were the 
Journal of Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, the I EEE Journal of Photovoltaics, 
and Solar Energy Materials & Solar Cells. 
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there were benefits from leveraging each other’s specialisations. Two of the interviewees who 
undertook alternative research said foreign industrial firms with complementary production 
facilities have approached them (based on P1 and P2 responses). These firms had made 
contact due to the prominence of these researchers’ work in that field. Both researchers said 
that it was not necessary for the research institute and the manufacturing line to be in the 
same country in order for learning to take place. 
 
[P1, organic and dye-sensitised PV researcher] “I don't think being close is so important for 
OPV [organic photovoltaics] commercialisation. In fact, R&D sites can be far away from 
manufacturing sites. For example, I do have close collaboration with research partners in Europe or 
North America. Long distance is a very limited factors.”  
 
[P2, organic and dye-sensitised PV researcher] “One common interest [between solar cell 
researchers and photocopier manufacturers] is we want to understand how fast the charges 
move in the material. They found a way of processing materials that they think will enable the 
charges to move faster. We’ve got the ability to do measurements and also the ability to do 
calculations. We have now a collaboration which involves we sending them pieces of glass. They would 
coat them with their materials and send them back and then we do the measurements and hope to 
come out with a publication together.”  
 
These comparative findings draw two important conclusions. First, diversity in the industrial 
composition of the economy can enable knowledge spillovers in the local economy. This 
diversity in manufacturing can increase the opportunities to find a domestic industrial partner 
to commercialise alternative technologies. Economies that produce the incumbent 
technology (in this case, crystalline PV) cannot replicate the production lines of alternative 
technologies due to the lack of complementarity. This suggests greater resilience in 
economies that can commercialise alternative technologies.  
 
Second, the lack of industrial diversity does not necessarily stop the research institute’s 
pursuit of alternative technologies. Instead the professionalisation of alternative PV research 
can help both researchers and industries identify appropriate partners outside of the domestic 
economy. Therefore the lack of a domestic industry does not inhibit opportunities for 
learning-by-doing. Instead it enables international knowledge spillovers between research 
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institutes and industries. Figure 3 presents a summary of how national and international 
partnerships can be formed between research institutes and industrial firms.  
 
Figure 3. Different geographical avenues in creating domestic and international 
partnerships between research institutes and industrial firms 
 
Source: Author schematic 
 
 
5.4.2 Commercialised technologies: How presence (or absence) of domestic 
industries affects motivations for industrial partnerships 
 
The successful commercialisation of crystalline PV products depends on producers’ ability to 
compete by: (1) increasing power efficiencies of PV cells; and/or (2) improving production 
efficiencies to decrease production costs (van der Zwaan & Rabl, 2003). Both cases require 
high-level process innovations to improve production equipment. For crystalline PV 
innovation, spatial relationships between research institutes and PV equipment 
manufacturers are particularly important. Interviews conducted for this study reveal how the 
presence or absence of domestic industry impacts the propensity to partner with industrial 
partners, as well as the nature of that partnership (please refer to summary in Table 3).  
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This research interviewed four research institutes (P5, P6, P7, and P8) in the study that were 
outside of China, and were involved in crystalline PV research. The novelty of this research 
lies in understanding which research institutes partner with Chinese solar PV firms. There is 
a focus on China because it has the largest share of manufacturing of final solar PV products 
(BNEF, 2012). This means that Chinese solar PV firms are potential customers for importing 
production equipment but also competitors to other final PV producing firms.  It was 
revealed that the presence (or absence) of a domestic industry that sells technologies to 
Chinese customers influences the propensity to partner with Chinese solar PV firms. It 
should be noted that interviewees based in China highlighted the importance of collaborating 
with foreign research partners to undertake technology transfer and joint research 
collaborations.  These findings corroborate the expectation that late-comers continue to rely 
on foreign partners (or innovation centres) to build both production and innovation 
capabilities(Ernst, 2009; Fu & Gong, 2011; Fu & Zhang, 2011; Peidong et al., 2009). 
  
The two research institutes (P7 and P8) that had domestic industry (in the form of semi-
conductor technologies) both admitted that they had limited – or even refused – partnership 
offers from Chinese PV firms, while accepting funding from other foreign industries (in 
addition to domestic firms). The aversion to partnering with Chinese solar PV firms was due 
to domestic industry considerations. First, these research institutes depended on domestic 
industrial partners to engage in learning feedback loops for undertaking high-level process 
innovations, as well as industrial funding. They therefore did not want to undermine the 
economic opportunities of domestic equipment manufacturers selling to Chinese companies. 
Furthermore, they wanted to ensure that knowledge spillovers continued to benefit the 
domestic industry, since they were the only avenue for remaining competitive with low-cost 
producers. These interviewees highlighted that cultural and language differences acted as 
barriers to partnerships, but that the resilience of domestic firms was the most important 
factor in limiting research collaborations.  
 
[P8, Crystalline PV Researcher] “[…]because of the competition between the [domestic country] 
solar industry and the Chinese, we are not directly going to China because this would be complicated. 
First of all we would like to support the [domestic country] industry, [especially as] there's strong 
competition [between the domestic industry and China]. On the other hand, a lot of the 
equipment makers here in [domestic country] are selling directly to China, so there's an indirect 
contact with Asia and China…”  
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[P8, Crystalline PV Researcher] “[…] We have no direct projects with Chinese companies, but, 
because we are cooperating with solar cell companies here […] we really want to see that they have a 
chance to survive […]” 
 
[P7, Crystalline PV Researcher] “You can innovate in Europe and get it transferred quickly to 
China. In our case, especially for the very new things development that has a high potential, if we 
work for instance with equipment makers, we will not directly collaborate with the company in 
China. We really want, and first Europe to be able to get something out of the technology. Then it is 
up to the equipment maker to have a close collaboration with the end user of the equipment.  
 
In contrast, the two research institutes that did not have a large domestic semi-conductor or 
crystalline PV industry did have strong industrial partnerships with Chinese companies. The 
first research institute is the Australian Centre for Advanced Photovoltaics at the University 
of New South Wales (UNSW). The second institute is the Energy research Centre of the 
Netherlands (ECN). These research institutes benefitted from early government funding for 
developing high efficiency crystalline PV cells. However, as government funding has waned, 
and with insufficient domestic industry to provide financial resources, both research 
institutes have had to rely on engaging with foreign industrial partners. 
 
It should be noted that these research institutes had differing approaches to developing 
industrial partnerships with Chinese companies. ECN approaches Chinese firms as potential 
customers for their research services (i.e. offering business-to-business [B2B] services). More 
specifically, it engages with Chinese firms to sell technology licences and undertake research 
consultancies and joint R&D. Since China is the largest manufacturer in the world, it is also 
the largest market for ECN services. With regards to enabling certain product innovations, 
ECN was successful in a joint venture to scale an n-type silicon with Yingli (a Chinese PV 
company) and Tempress (a Dutch equipment manufacturing company) (ECN, 2012, p. 14). 
It also successfully developed a world record-holding PV module9 with two Chinese 
crystalline PV companies10 and two other firms. It should be noted that ECN did not partner 
with Chinese firms for the purpose of scaling alternative PV technologies. Instead ECN used 
                                                 
9This is for rear contact modules.  
10CSI and JA Solar 
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their knowledge specialisations in crystalline PV as an opportunity to ‘export’ research 
consulting and R&D services to foreign firms interested in contracting their research. 
  
UNSW also has strong industrial partnerships with Chinese solar PV firms due to its social 
network. Many Chinese solar PV scientists studied at UNSW and returned to China to 
undertake entrepreneurial ventures. The most well-known Chinese alumnus is Shi 
Zhengrong, the founder of Suntech – once one of the world’s largest solar PV companies. A 
prominent crystalline PV researcher from UNSW, Dr Stuart Wenham, also serves as the 
Chief Technology Officer for Suntech. However, many Chinese scientists from UNSW went 
on to start, or be part of management teams for, ‘tier 1’ crystalline PV companies in China. 
These social networks facilitated interpersonal trust and student-industry exchanges between 
UNSW and these companies. UNSW is an important educational centre for training solar PV 
scientists, recognised globally for its advances in crystalline PV technologies.  It attracts 
leading solar PV scientists and firms to undertake collaborations and can leverage these 
networks to attract additional partners. In response to a query about the importance of a 
leading American scientist joining the Centre’s research team, the participant [P5] said: 
 
[P5]“His contacts to the US are very valuable to us.  He brings in people that he used to work with 
from the University of Delaware. The contacts he's retained, knowledge and access on who to talk to 
is a big head start. He can approach them with credibility, because they know who he is, and he's not 
sort of cold calling them. He's brought in a lot of US partners that we might not have had access to 
otherwise without a whole lot harder work.”   
 
These findings provide important insights into how the presence (or absence) of domestic 
industries that cater to mature technologies affects international research-industrial 
partnerships. For the two research institutes with domestic production equipment 
manufacturers, the reticence to partner with China was unrelated to spatial distance. Their 
refusal was more techno-nationalistic – ensuring that their role in providing knowledge 
spillovers benefited the domestic industry. These industrial players in turn could provide 
value to the domestic economy by exporting these high-value technologies. In contrast, the 
lack of a domestic industry obviated these techno-national considerations for UNSW and 
ECN. Instead, Chinese foreign partnerships fulfilled the necessary investment to support the 
R&D activities of these institutes. Whilst ECN focused on exporting research services and 
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providing temporary exclusive licensing of technologies to firms, UNSW recently undertook 
an ‘open innovation strategy’.  
 
[P5]“Our university's actually taken a different line, more recently, and where a lot of our 
technologies are freely available. Just work with us, and we'll do research together.”  
  
 230 
 
Table 3. Summary of findings: Partnerships between research institutes and 
industrial firms 
 
 
 
Maturity of 
technology 
Innovative actors located in economies with different industrial 
compositions 
Presence of domestic solar PV 
industry, including equipment 
manufacturing industry 
Absence of domestic industry (or 
small-scale domestic industry) 
Alternative 
technology  
 
Presence of existing crystalline PV 
technologies is not suitable for 
alternative technologies. 
Commercialising alternative 
technologies is dependent on 
knowledge complementarities 
between research institutes and 
industries. Domestic economy more 
likely to benefit from 
commercialisation if it has a diverse 
set of domestic industries.  
The absence of domestic research 
and/or industry with knowledge 
complementarities does not limit 
industrial partnerships. The 
professionalisation of sciences (in 
terms of getting recognition for 
work) can facilitate international 
collaborations between research 
institutes and industries to engage in 
experimental learning and scaling 
efforts.  
Crystalline 
PV 
technology  
Limited partnerships between 
research institutes and industries in 
countries with low-cost 
manufacturing of crystalline PV 
technologies. Recognise the 
importance of using knowledge 
spillovers to enhance 
competitiveness –and export 
opportunities – of domestic 
industry.  
To capitalise on the ‘embeddedness’ 
of research capabilities in crystalline 
PV, institutes partner with foreign 
companies interested in technology 
transfer and improving innovation 
capabilities. These partnerships can 
occur through B2B research 
services, and/or social networks.   
Source: Author’s compilation.  
 
5.5 Conclusion. Implications for current and future research 
 
This chapter has explored the implications of access to domestic industry for the 
commercialisation of solar PV technologies. The findings are also potentially applicable to 
other industries with similar diversity in alternative technologies. However, it acknowledges 
that these research findings are preliminary and that a broader sample of actors representing 
the different cross sections need to be surveyed in order to make these comparisons more 
generalisable and robust. Nevertheless these initial findings are novel, and are validated by at 
least two independent sources from each category. This comparative approach provides 
essential nuances to the spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing.  
  
EEG emphasises the importance of spatial proximity between scientists and engineers when 
engaging in early-stage innovation (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996). When research 
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collaborations between these actors are international, shared language and culture, as well as 
social networks are important for overcoming spatial distance (Boschma & Martin, 2010). 
This mode of networking creates ‘supra-regional’ connections, as opposed to the global 
innovation network (Luukkonen, Persson & Sivertsen, 1992; Ponds et al., 2007). This 
research confirms that shared languages and social networks can overcome ‘spatial distance’ 
in facilitating these collaborations, however it also emphasises how the professionalisation of 
the sciences creates a ‘global knowledge landscape’11 that identifies research institutes (and 
even firms) with more unique technological niches (Verbong & Geels, 2007). These findings 
suggest that spatial proximity is a beneficial, but not necessary, condition for early-stage 
commercialisation efforts.  
  
This chapter also recognises that the presence of a large crystalline PV industry within an 
economy does not predict the likelihood of developing the next set of product innovations. 
In fact it corroborates Boschma & Martin's (2010) observation that close linkages between 
research institutes and firms (in this case, domestic equipment manufacturers) creates a path 
dependency. Nonetheless much of the EEG literature recognises how innovation clusters 
attract linkages with multiple economies involved in complementary industrial activities, 
creating global innovation networks (Maskell & Malmberg, 1999; Storper, 1997). For mature 
technologies, there are even greater linkages between innovation hubs and manufacturing 
centres (Ernst, 2009). However this research identifies a new factor that can influence these 
linkages: how the level of interactivity between domestic research institutes and industries 
can raise political economy considerations in collaborating with foreign partners. Research 
institutes can intentionally choose not to work with foreign industrial partners if it threatens 
the competitiveness of the domestic industry. In contrast, the absence of a domestic industry 
does not obstruct the research efforts of globally recognised innovation clusters. Instead, 
these innovative actors are more willing to engage in foreign research partnerships – 
particularly with countries that do not have comparative advantage in research. In other 
words, social and economic linkages between research institutes and domestic industry can 
limit or facilitate international spillovers.  
  
                                                 
11Global knowledge landscapes differ subtly from global innovation networks in that they don’t rely 
on formal or informal networks between innovative actors, but rather that actors can use globally 
available codified knowledge to search for the right partner.  
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These findings highlight the disjuncture between technological races and green growth. A 
country can win a technological race making a technological breakthrough or being the first 
to commercialise the technology (Atkinson et al., 2009; Fankhauser et al., 2013; Pew, 2013). 
There is then a techno-national expectation that the domestic economy will have a 
competitive advantage in selling these technologies to domestic and global markets, leading 
to green growth. However this chapter belies the assumption that a single country will win 
the race, as efforts to commercialise early-stage technologies can occur through international 
collaborations by matching research and industrial actors through knowledge 
complementarities. Although a country with a diverse industrial composition is more likely to 
commercialise technologies, linkages are not guaranteed unless research institutes and 
industries cooperate with one another. This chapter also recognises that economies that have 
developed these linkages between research institutes and industry can reap green growth in 
the long run by engaging with high-level process innovations. Nevertheless, innovative 
countries without these domestic linkages can still export research services to foreign 
industries. These linkages demonstrate that the race for green technologies and the realisation 
of green growth can be won through international cooperation.   
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 Chapter 6: Thesis conclusion. Reflections 
on thesis contributions to the literature 
on green growth and evolutionary 
economic geography 
Examining the importance of a spatial perspective on technologies and industrial 
activities   
6 Make invisible 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis focused on two aims in evaluating the emerging literature on green growth. The 
first aim of this thesis was to identify a key gap in the current literature on green growth and 
the competitiveness of economies. As both developed and emerging economies invest into 
green industries, the ‘race’ for green technologies implies that domestic economies’ 
opportunities to realise ‘green growth’ is threatened by global competition (Barua, Tawney, & 
Weischer, 2012; Dutz & Sharma, 2012). The current literature addresses this issue by 
evaluating the success of environmental policy instruments in stimulating green innovation 
(Ambec et al., 2013; Dechezleprêtre & Sato, 2014; Lanoie et al., 2011).  Another set of the 
literature compares how various economies develop national innovation systems for green 
technologies (Jacobsson & Karltorp, 2013; Kamp, Smits, & Andriesse, 2004; Verbong & 
Geels, 2007). Whilst these literatures are important in highlighting the significance of 
innovation, they lack a spatial understanding of how technologies mature beyond innovation 
– and its implications on where different industrial activities locate as a result of these 
dynamics.  
 
Recognising this spatial perspective is important – not just in terms of redressing political 
economy concerns about the perceived loss of competitiveness when manufacturing shifts to 
low-cost economies. The second chapter developed a conceptual framework on how the 
spatial dynamics of various technologies influence where different industrial activities locate 
over time – thereby affecting the domestic economy’s ability to realise green growth 
(Carvalho, 2015c). This framework integrated key theories from evolutionary economic 
geography (EEG) that could reconcile the tension between the spatialisation of technologies 
and localisation of green growth. These theories include the spatial product life cycle (PLC) – 
which demonstrates how spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing 
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activities separate once technologies mature (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Boschma & 
Frenken, 2006; Coe & Bunnell, 2003). The consequence of technological maturity highlights 
the importance of innovation in enabling first-mover economies to withstand these shifts in 
manufacturing by capitalising on their specialised knowledge in innovating to develop the 
next set of technologies, and/or engage in high-level process innovations (Christopherson, 
Michie, & Tyler, 2010; Pike, Dawley, & Tomaney, 2010). By recognising that manufacturing 
can be more prone to spatial shifts than innovation in the latter stage of the PLC, EEG 
demonstrates how economies can be resilient to global competition. Chapter 3 applies this 
framework to provide evidence of this spatial decoupling occurring in the global solar 
photovoltaic (PV) industry (Carvalho & Perkins, 2015).  
 
Nevertheless EEG highlights how the spatial relationship between innovation and 
manufacturing does tend to be spatially proximate in the first stage of the PLC – that is, prior 
to the commercialisation of technologies (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; Khan & Park, 
2011; Ponds, van Oort, & Frenken, 2007). Therefore the next two chapters of the thesis 
continued to use the solar PV as a case study to examine the spatial relationship between 
innovation and manufacturing. Through its empirical research on the solar photovoltaic (PV) 
industry, it investigated whether domestic economies needed both innovation and 
manufacturing in order to commercialise technologies. The cumulative findings of this 
research seek to provide a more nuanced understanding of whether economies pursuing 
technological innovation actually do need a spatially proximate relationship to enable learning 
spillovers. These findings contribute to a gap in the EEG and innovation systems failure 
literature – which assume innovative actors do have access to domestic industry when 
undertaking early commercialisation of technologies.  
 
Through exploring these aims through four inter-related papers, this thesis summarises three 
important conceptual contributions to the literature on green growth and EEG. The first 
contribution is to the green growth literature – which focuses on how the spatial 
characteristics of technologies and industrial activities affect domestic economies’ exposure 
to global competition in supplying green technologies. The second contribution provides a 
nuanced consideration of how an economy’s access to domestic industry can affect who it 
collaborates with internationally. This contribution can advance the literature from EEG on 
the importance of spatial proximity between research and manufacturing prior to 
technological commercialisation. It also recognises how the presence (or absence) of a 
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domestic industry can raise political economy factors that can affect whether domestic actors 
engage in research collaborations with foreign competitors. The last contribution of this 
thesis presents the argument that the green growth literature needs to rebalance its focus on 
competitiveness of green economies by also realising the economic growth opportunities 
from market expansion.  
 
The next three sub-sections reflect on how the findings from the four chapters can be 
integrated to provide salience to these three contributions. Each section also considers how 
these preliminary findings can be further explored through additional research. The last 
section provides concluding remarks for the thesis.  
 
6.2 The spatial characteristics of technologies and exposure to 
global competition 
 
The current literature on the competitiveness of green economies focuses on how innovation 
will enable countries to achieve long-term competitive advantage in these industries 
(Fankhauser et al., 2013; Stern & Rydge, 2013). This thesis supports this assertion. But it also 
recognises that the concept of an industry can be deconstructed into innovation, 
manufacturing, and markets. Undertaking this deconstruction is important as it enables 
analysis on how these industrial activities have various spatial characteristics that affect where 
they are located – not just in terms of relative spatial distances to each other, but how these 
spatial distances can change over time due to the maturity of the technologies themselves 
(Bathelt & Glu, 2003).  
 
Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 use EEG’s concept of spatial product life cycles as a starting 
point in understanding that the spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing is 
spatially proximate during the pre-commercialisation of technologies in order to enable 
learning feedback loops between these innovative actors (Carvalho & Perkins, 2015; 
Carvalho, 2015c). However once the knowledge underlying production is codified to be 
transferable, manufacturing can be shifted to increase the industrial capacity in ‘late-comer’ 
economies (Aoyama, Murphy, & Hanson, 2011). Unlike manufacturing though, EEG 
demonstrated that innovation tends to be more spatially embedded within the domestic 
economy as it relies on knowledge generation assets developed from through the national 
innovation system (Asheim & Isaksen, 2002; Storper, 1997). EEG concept of resilience 
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highlights how economies that first commercialised these technologies can capitalise on their 
technological capabilities to engage with both product and process innovations for the next 
cycle of technologies (Boschma, 2004; Pike et al., 2010).  
 
The preliminary findings from Chapter 3’s comparison of the proportion of countries’ 
contributions to both global research and manufacturing do highlight that spatial decoupling 
persists in industrial research (represented by patent and best-in class data) (Carvalho & 
Perkins, 2015). However there appears to be convergence between first-mover and late-
comer countries – particularly China – in scientific research (represented by academic 
publications). Therefore these findings do recognise that late-comers such as China are 
increasing their research efforts in these technologies. However it is not discernible if these 
research efforts are successful in either product or high-level process innovations. Even 
countries such as South Korea, who do demonstrate high proportion of inventor and firm 
patent counts, only occupies the upstream part of the solar PV value chain that provides 
silicon material to the rest of the value chain.  
 
The findings from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can also provide important nuances to the spatial 
relationship between innovation and manufacturing for each economy (Carvalho, 2015a, 
2015b). Chapter 4 reveals that research collaborations for both scientific publications and 
patent datasets continue to be predominantly national (Carvalho, 2015a). Therefore 
regardless of where manufacturing occurs, it re-asserts EEG hypothesis of research networks 
being spatially clustered despite the absolute increases in international research 
collaborations. In looking at whether economies should have access to domestic industry for 
commercialising efforts of early-stage technologies, Chapter 5 highlights it is preferable but 
not a necessary condition for early-stage technologies (Carvalho, 2015b). Chapter 3 also 
identified countries with high research output but not a large domestic industry, whose role 
in innovation networks was analysed in subsequent chapters (Carvalho & Perkins, 2015). The 
findings with Australian and Dutch solar PV researchers do capitalise – or attract – research 
with countries that have high industrial capacities to engage with research (Carvalho, 2015b). 
This finding presents a potential contribution of this thesis to the EEG literature by 
highlighting how first-mover countries with no industrial capacity can still play a role in 
global innovation networks by collaborating with countries that do have industrial capacity – 
including late-comer economies. The novelty in this finding is considering how differences in 
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industrial capacity create motivations for international research collaborations. Furthermore 
it shows the continued significance of these economies to global innovation networks.  
 
Chapter 5 also reveals that the relevance of domestic industry to research efforts in scaling 
early-stage technologies is the level of knowledge complementarities between the types of 
actors (Carvalho, 2015b). It thus highlights that diversity in industrial composition can 
increase the probability of finding the right knowledge partner. Nevertheless if domestic 
industries are not interested in engaging with research institutes to commercialise these 
alternative technologies – the opportunity is missed by the local economy. However in these 
cases, research institutes can partner with willing foreign industrial partners – creating 
international knowledge spillovers. These findings can challenge the EEG literature’s 
emphasis on the necessity of spatial proximity between scientific research and industries in 
either early-stage or mature technologies. This is assuming of course, that the right 
international partner exists to undertake this research.  
 
6.3 The significance of domestic industrial capacity on the 
spatial relationship between innovation and manufacturing 
 
Whilst the prior sections findings highlight whether having access to a domestic industry is 
necessary to for domestic scientists to engage with industrial research, the presence of a 
domestic industry can influence patterns of international collaborations. A surprising finding 
in Chapter 4 is that the observed/expected ratios – which enables ranking of the relevance of 
different partner countries to a particular country – demonstrate that countries that are 
within the top hierarchy of global innovation networks do not collaborate with each other as 
the literature would suggest (Carvalho, 2015a). For Germany, the countries that are most 
relevant to them are other European countries – reinforcing the importance of spatial 
proximity. However it is surprising that Japan, USA and China – who also has a high central 
position in the network in the latter time period – do not actually have each other within the 
most relevant countries. Instead these countries tend to collaborate with other countries that 
do have relatively high technological capabilities – but a smaller (if non-existent) domestic 
industrial capacity. This result is only preliminary, and more in-depth quantitative analyses on 
the datasets should be taken to reveal the robustness of this finding. 
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Chapter 5 actually does provide supportive evidence of this hypothesis, as it recognises how 
the domestic industrial capacity can raise political economy issues in engaging with 
collaborations with foreign economies (Carvalho, 2015b). The interviewees from research 
institutes that worked in close conjunction with domestic industries intentionally limited 
collaborations with Chinese partners. The purpose was to ensure that their knowledge 
spillovers benefited domestic industrial partners – who could then sell these proprietary 
technologies to foreign economies. However the absence of a domestic industrial partner 
removed this techno-national concern – and in many ways, encouraged seeking 
collaborations with foreign industrial partners. These findings contribute to the EEG 
literature by identifying how political economy factors can affect countries’ propensity to 
undertake research collaborations with partners that can threaten competitiveness of 
domestic industry. However this factor appears to be prominent if there is actually close 
linkages between research institutes and industry. The findings from interviewees in the USA 
and UK – which both have domestic industries with knowledge complementarities – 
highlight that domestic industrial partners also need to be willing to undertake these 
collaborations.   
 
The presence (or absence) of domestic industries reinforces EEG’s importance of how 
innovation can provides growth opportunities for economies. For economies that do have 
close linkages between research institutes and firms, it enables knowledge spillovers that 
increase the technological capabilities of the domestic economy. In doing so, it enables 
domestic firms to sell high-value technologies to foreign economies that is difficult to 
replicate. However for economies that do not have domestic industry, research institutes can 
still find growth opportunities by ‘exporting’ their services to foreign economies interested in 
increasing their technological capabilities – as is the strategy of both Dutch research institutes 
and a small-scale industrial firm. Alternatively research institutes can attract participants 
through offering educational training, and open research collaborations – as a leading solar 
PV institute in Australia is undertaking.  These findings are intriguing, but preliminary. 
Further interviews with different sets of research and industrial firm actors that are in 
economies with different levels of technological capabilities and industrial capacity are 
needed in order to increase the robustness of the findings.  
 
 245 
 
6.4 Re-balancing green industrial policy to optimally realise 
green growth from supply and demand side activities  
 
The last major contribution this thesis provides to the literature on green growth is to 
highlight how the spatial characteristics of technologies can affect whether the domestic 
economy can optimally realise growth from a balance between supply and demand-side 
activities. Chapter 2 develops a framework that demonstrates how the spatial mobility and 
replicability of technologies affects whether domestic economies can be resilient to global 
competition (Carvalho, 2015c). It highlights that economies can be resilient to global 
competition if: (1) no other economy can replicate these technologies; (2) the low spatial 
mobility of technologies means that needs to be manufactured in domestic markets. If the 
first condition occurs, then economies can sell these technologies to global markets. 
However if other economies can replicate these technologies, it does not necessarily mean 
they can access domestic markets if the technologies have high transport costs, or trade 
costs. Whilst high transport costs means that it is more cost-effective for manufacturing to 
be close to markets, trade costs can artificially impose these costs to favour domestic 
industries.  
 
In looking at the solar PV industry, a post-reflection of the findings from Chapter 3 
recognise the difference between the success of technological commercialisation versus 
growth opportunities for the economy. Technological commercialisation refers to when a 
technology is able to compete in the wider market.  Liebreich (2013) reveals that the increase 
in the production volume of crystalline PV technologies from all the participants – but most 
particularly China – led to an 80% drop in global PV prices. The result was that solar PV 
technologies achieved grid parity in several markets – thus negating the need for subsidies. 
Whilst these depressed prices were beneficial for solar PV demand – firms from Europe, 
USA and China were either acquired or went bankrupt as they could not manufacture solar 
PV technologies below this market price. This finding reinforces the point that economies 
which only manufacture technologies that other economies can appropriate and replicate 
become less resilient. 
  
Despite the reduced resilience in supplying green technologies, economies can still achieve 
green growth through demand-side activities.  UNEP & BNEF (2013) demonstrates that 
global investments in demand-side activities (i.e. asset financing) far outweigh supply-side 
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investments. Furthermore supporting the deployment of green technologies in domestic 
economy can yield a range of job opportunities that are more reliant on domestic labour. 
However in order to capitalise on these market opportunities, domestic policy-makers need 
to ensure that they are not unnecessarily swayed by techno-national concerns that seek to 
protect domestic industry. These concerns can be justified in creating strategic niche markets 
for the development of early stage technologies (Schot & Geels, 2008). Of course, this kind 
of market protection does not require protection from foreign competitors in supplying these 
technologies – but it is needed to create a protected learning space that is not undermined by 
incumbent technologies (Unruh, 2002; Verbong, Geels, & Raven, 2008).  However it makes 
less sense to protect domestic industry – that potentially sacrifices market expansion – if 
these technologies are commercialised and the production is easily replicable in other 
countries. This protection especially seems unnecessary if technological firms in first-mover 
countries, such as USA, Germany and Switzerland, sold the production equipment to China 
to enable the latter’s increase in industrial capacity (de la Tour, Glachant, & Ménière, 2011; 
Pew, 2013). 
 
In considering these contributions, this thesis argues that both the academic literature and 
policy-makers need to understand the spatial characteristics of technologies in order to assess 
how economies can realise growth from either supply or demand-side activities. These spatial 
characteristics include: (1) understanding at what stage of commercialisation technologies are 
at, and its implications on either providing growth opportunities through supply (if few other 
economies can replicate) or demand (by getting access to cheaper technologies); (2) the 
transport costs that affect spatial mobility of technologies – determining whether market 
policies can still yield growth from manufacturing; and (3) the opportunity costs of trade to 
domestic markets (if technologies are replicable and have low costs of transport). Though 
this thesis largely relies on the solar PV industry as a case study, the spatial framework itself 
can be applied to different technologies – especially with regards to considering how the 
spatial ‘distance’ between the associated industrial activities will locate in relation to each 
other. These factors affect how different economies can realise green growth even with the 
internationalisation of green technologies.  
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